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ABSTRACT 
This thesis deals with infrastructure network vulnerability analysis in the natural disaster context. It starts from 
the observation that infrastructure such as water supply or power grid has significant influence on natural 
disasters’ indirect consequences. The aim is to model the vulnerability to take efficient decisions. 
The scientific approach is divided into two complementary parts. The first one deals with the vulnerability 
assessment, while the second one focuses on the decision aiding process to be implemented for the 
assessed vulnerability management. 
The proper vulnerability analysis is based on the analysis objects modelling. In order to achieve this, we will 
adopt graph theory representation. A literature review will allow us to identify the graph model which best suits 
the context of the thesis. In a multi network analysis environment, interdependences, i.e. relationships 
between components of the same or different networks - are a determining factor for any vulnerability model. 
We have thus proposed an approach to model interdependence compatible with the graph theory. There are 
two types of relationships: the one first is functional (dependence), while the second one is dysfunctional 
(influence). The vulnerability is assessed by a simulation-based approach. It is composed of one part relating 
to the system ability to resist the feared event; and another part relative to its ability to be back on its nominal 
state after the feared event. 
When the vulnerability is determined, the next step will be to take the necessary decisions to manage it. This 
part on the decision aiding is itself divided into two sub parts: first of all the process to be used for the crisis 
management is established. Then a methodology for decision aiding is proposed and a Decision Support 
System prototyped. 
Key words: Vulnerability, Risk, Robustness, Resilience, Network, Graph, Decision, ELECTRE, Java, UML, 
Interdependence, DB, System, Complexity 
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RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS 
Cette thèse traite de la vulnérabilité des réseaux d’infrastructure face aux catastrophes naturelles. Elle part du 
constat que les infrastructures telles que les réseaux d’eau, d’électricité influencent considérablement les 
conséquences indirectes des catastrophes naturelles. Elle vise donc à modéliser la vulnérabilité dans de 
telles situations pour une prise de décision efficace. 
La démarche scientifique est divisée en deux parties complémentaires. La première traite de la vulnérabilité 
des dits réseaux, tandis que la seconde se concentre sur le processus d’aide à la décision à mettre en œuvre 
en vue de gérer la vulnérabilité. 
L’analyse proprement dite de la vulnérabilité repose sur la modélisation des objets de l’analyse. Pour ce faire 
nous adopterons une représentation par la théorie des graphes. L’état de l’art à ce niveau nous a permis 
d’identifier les modèles de graphe les mieux adaptées au contexte de cette thèse. Dans un environnement 
d’analyse multi réseau, les interdépendances, c’est-à-dire les relations entre les composants du même réseau 
ou entre ceux de réseaux différents-sont un facteur déterminant pour tout modèle de vulnérabilité. Nous 
avons ainsi proposé un modèle compatible avec la théorie des graphes. Sont distingués deux types 
d’interdépendances. La première est fonctionnelle (dépendance), et la seconde est dysfonctionnelle 
(influence). La vulnérabilité quant à elle, est déterminée par une approche basée sur la simulation. Elle est 
composée d’une première partie relative à l’aptitude du système à résister à l’évènement redouté ; et d’une 
seconde partie relative à son aptitude à recouvrer des conditions opérationnelles spécifiées après 
l’occurrence de l’évènement redouté. 
Le calcul de la vulnérabilité est un point d’entrée pour assister la prise de décision. La deuxième partie aborde 
ce thème. Elle est elle-même divisée en deux sous parties : La première aborde le processus à mettre en 
œuvre pour la gestion de la crise ; la deuxième le Système Interactif d’Aide à la Décision réalisé. Celui-ci 
implémente le processus d’aide à la décision. 
Mots clés : Vulnérabilité, Risque, Robustesse, Résilience, Réseau, Infrastructure, Graphe, Décision,  
Interdépendance, ELECTRE, Java, UML, BDD, Système, Complexité.  
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General Introduction 
 Motivation 
Natural disasters have stricken populations everywhere in the word in the past years. For example in 2004, 
the Indian Ocean tsunami caused 220,000 deaths. Next, the cyclone Nargis in Myanmar made 138,373 
deaths in 2008. In the same year an earthquake in China killed 87,449 people. Two years later in 2010, 
230,000 people were killed by an earthquake of 7.0 in Haiti. More recently, in March 2011, a tsunami in Japan 
made 18,079 deaths. 
These few examples show the devastating character of natural disasters for human being. Caused deaths 
might be induced by disaster direct impact (trauma, asphyxia, drowning, burying, burning,) or by its indirect 
impact (thirsting, secondary infection of wounds, contamination, epidemic …). 
Major causes of deferred deaths problems are partly due to networks disturbance. Consequently, natural 
disasters are not the only cause of society’s disruption. Infrastructure network failure is among the worst 
causes. For instance in July 2012, a blackout in India affected over 620 million people. Moreover our societies 
are depending more and more on these networks (power grid, water, gas, telecommunications systems, etc.). 
Regarding consequences to population, most feared scenarios are when a natural disaster affects 
infrastructure networks. Consequences are then amplified. Another aggravation factor is interdependence 
among networks. In addition, materials, services, energies and information exchanged may aggravate or 
mitigate consequences. Due to interdependences, failure of a part of a network is likely to spread to the 
others. This situation makes difficult any risk or vulnerability analysis. For instance, because of 
interdependence in air travel, the 2010 volcanic eruption in Iceland affected about 20 countries. Despite the 
advancement in the vulnerability and risk analysis, it is always difficult to make decisions in crisis situations. 
Disaster is source of stress and anxiety for decision makers which judgment could be affected in such a 
situation. 
France and Europe are not safe from these elements and other furies of the nature. They are subject to all 
existent feared events on the planet. Witness is the heat wave which occurred in the summer 2003. This heat 
was responsible for 35,000 deaths in the European continent. In France, departmental files about major risks 
are established by the prefects and give an overview of natural disasters distribution on the national territory. 
Today, with widely varying severities, 23,500 communes are exposed to one or more natural disasters: 
cyclones, storms, floods, avalanches, landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, forest fires etc. Given this 
diversity of disasters, their amplitudes and frequencies, it is interesting to investigate the indirect 
consequences. In particular those induced by network failure. 
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For these reasons we have been motivated to pursue these years of research on the analysis of network 
vulnerability to natural disaster. 
 Objectives and delimitations 
Deaths caused by natural disasters can be induced by direct impact (trauma, asphyxia by drowning or burial, 
burning) or indirect impact (superinfecting of wounds, contamination, epidemics). This thesis focuses only on 
indirect impacts. It assumes that individuals still alive after the natural disaster occurrence could die for 
reasons related to the assistance inability to respond in a reasonable time on affected areas, or to implement 
effective health action. This situation is common after the occurrence of an earthquake. The Haiti earthquake 
is there unfortunately to remind us of that. A disaster by definition is an ordeal that disrupts society and leaves 
the individual alone face to the crisis for a longer or shorter time. In crisis time, people have to deal with 
multiple disabilities: stress, public service disruption, time to activate assistance, isolation situation etc. 
We argue that major causes of deferred death are often due to network disruption. By network we mean 
interconnected entities facilitating the circulation of useful goods (food, medicines, clothing, blankets etc.), 
equipment (tools, excavation machines, health infrastructure etc.), services (water, electricity) or information 
(internet, telephone). This thesis deals with network vulnerability to natural disasters as an entry point to a 
problem that may increase indirect damage caused to the population. Damage could be aggravated by a lack 
of decision or by inappropriate decision making. 
Taking into account each network separately helps providing interesting but not sufficient information to make 
the right decision in full knowledge of causes and consequences. The organizational dimensions and 
decision-making necessary to highlight preventive or corrective solutions in natural disasters context involve 
working in collaborative mode. These operation modes require adequate tools, adapted to the contexts and 
profiles of potential users. Decision support tools should be developed on the basis of multi-decision makers 
model (experts, decision-makers, users), multi-views (before, during, after the disaster) and multi-scales 
(global or local context). 
The techniques of safety operation (reliability, maintainability, availability, security) and risk management 
(assessment, prevention, mitigation, risk mapping) used in industrial fields will allow the establishment of a 
vulnerability model. Information extracted from this model will be an input of the decision-making. In a 
temporal sequence, these techniques can be applied: 
 To a Pre-event: Organization and implementation of operational emergency services, assessment of 
the impact of technological innovation on the consequences, estimation of the occurrence probability 
of a particular event; 
 During the event: Assessment of the event risk repetition, level of damage estimation depending on 
the intensity and first testimonials, estimation of assistance means to be used; 
 To a Post-event: Estimation of the insurance premiums by insurance professionals, evaluation of 
 3 
 
assistance program for concerned populations, establishment of recovery plans. 
This thesis encompasses all these phases. Its objectives are to overcome these problems by: 
 Modelling interdependent critical infrastructure; 
 Determining vulnerability of network, component, territory and stakes; 
 Modelling and determining the impact of interdependence on the vulnerability; 
 Correlating the intensity of a feared event and the damage to stakes; 
 Identifying the worst scenarios; 
 Determining a decision process for the crisis management; 
 Building a Decision Support System for disaster management. 
 Research process 
To describe and try to find solutions to the described problems, the investigation relied on two scientifically 
complementary laboratories: the Laboratory Engineering Production (LGP) specialized in industrial 
engineering and the Toulouse Research Institute in Computer Science (IRIT) specialized in computer science. 
The thesis program was thus articulated in 2 separated parts on scientific terms but with a common goal: 
 Part 1: Analysis of network vulnerability 
This part was realized in the team Decisional and Cognitive Systems (SDC) of LGP. This laboratory is part of 
the Tarbes National School of Engineers (ENIT). We worked on infrastructure network vulnerability problems 
assessment against natural disaster. 
Scientific problem: Representation of a sociotechnical system, correlation between intensity of the feared 
event and damage to the system element, vulnerability and interdependence modelling. 
Deliverable: Socio-technical model for the vulnerability assessment. 
After this part, we had a stay of four months at the University of Plymouth. The aim was to develop the 
collaboration with the School of Management and exchange our points of views about decision making in 
uncertain environment. 
 Part 2: Decision Aiding in crisis situation 
This part was realized in the Cooperative Multi-Agent Systems team at IRIT. We worked on the development 
of a decision aiding process and a Decision Support System in crisis situation. 
Scientific problems: Identification of the passage from nominal situation to a crisis situation, negotiation and 
decision-making in an uncertain environment. 
Deliverable: A decision process implemented in a Decision Support System based on the model developed in 
part 1. 
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The vulnerability model developed in part 1 should be substantiated according to the descriptive information of 
the current situation. The results of the simulation carried out through the vulnerability model will constitute 
inputs for the Decision Support System implemented in part 2. 
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Introduction générale 
 Motivations 
Ces dernières années, les catastrophes naturelles ont touché divers populations et infrastructures un peu 
partout dans le monde. Par exemple, en 2004, le tsunami de l’océan indien provoqua 220 000 morts. Ensuite, 
ce fut le tour du cyclone Nargis en 2008 à Myanmar. On dénombrera 138 373 morts. La même année un 
tremblement de terre en Chine sera à l’origine de 87 449 décès. Deux ans plus tard en 2010, 230 000 
personnes seront tuées par un séisme de 7 en Haïti. Plus récemment, en mars 2011, un tsunami au Japon 
causera 18 079 décès. 
Ces exemples montrent le caractère dévastateur des catastrophes naturelles pour l'être humain. Les morts 
sont causés soit par impact direct (traumatisme, asphyxie, noyade, brûlure, blessure) ou par impacts indirects 
(soif, surinfection des plaies, épidémie...). Nous soutenons que la cause principale des décès différés est liée 
en partie aux perturbations réseaux. Les défaillances des réseaux d'infrastructure font partie des pires causes 
de déstabilisation de la société. Par exemple en juillet 2012, une panne d'électricité en Inde a touché plus de 
620 millions d’abonnée. 
En ce qui concerne les conséquences pour la population, le scénario le plus redouté est quand une 
catastrophe naturelle affecte des réseaux d'infrastructures. Les conséquences sont alors amplifiées. Un autre 
facteur d'aggravation est l'interdépendance susceptible d’exister entre les réseaux. En outre, les matériaux, 
services, énergies et informations échangés peuvent aggraver ou atténuer les conséquences. À cause des 
interdépendances, la défaillance d'une partie du réseau est susceptible de se propager aux autres. Cette 
situation rend difficile toute analyse de risque ou de vulnérabilité. Par exemple à cause de l'interdépendance 
dans le transport aérien, l'éruption volcanique de 2010 en Islande affecta une vingtaine de pays. Malgré 
l'avancé des techniques d’analyse de la vulnérabilité et du risque, il est toujours difficile de prendre des 
décisions dans une situation de crise. En effet, une catastrophe est source de stress et d'anxiété pour les 
décideurs, dont les jugements peuvent être affectés. 
La France et l’Europe ne sont pas à l’abri de ces éléments et des autres colères de la nature. Ils sont soumis 
à tous les événements redoutés existantes sur la planète. Témoin en est la vague de chaleur qui a sévi en été 
2003. Cette chaleur a fait 35 000 morts sur le continent européen. En France, l'ensemble des dossiers 
départementaux des risques majeurs établis par les préfets permet de dresser un panorama de la répartition 
des risques naturels sur le territoire national. Aujourd'hui, avec des gravités très variables, 23500 communes 
sont exposées à un ou plusieurs risques naturels : cyclones et tempêtes, inondations sous ses différentes 
formes (de plaine, torrentielle, par remontées des nappes ou submersion), avalanches, mouvements de 
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terrain (glissement, chute de blocs, cavités souterraines et marnières, retrait-gonflement des argiles), 
tremblements de terre, éruptions volcaniques, feux de forêt. Compte tenu de cette diversité des catastrophes, 
de leurs amplitudes et de leurs fréquences, il est intéressant d'étudier les conséquences indirectes. En 
particulier celles induites par une défaillance réseau. 
Ce sont ces raisons, qui nous ont motivé à poursuivre ces années de recherche sur l'analyse de la 
vulnérabilité des réseaux d’infrastructure. 
 Objectifs et délimitations 
Cette thèse se concentre sur l’impact indirect des catastrophes naturelles sur les enjeux à travers les réseaux 
d’infrastructure. Les enjeux peuvent être la population ou une infrastructure vitale au fonctionnement de la 
société. Elle suppose que des personnes encore vivantes après l’occurrence ou le passage de la catastrophe 
naturelle meurent pour des raisons liées à l’incapacité des secours à intervenir dans des délais raisonnables - 
sur des zones touchées ou à mettre en œuvre des actions sanitaires efficaces. De telles situations sont 
fréquentes après un tremblement de terre. Celui d’Haïti est malheureusement là pour nous le rappeler. Une 
catastrophe est par définition une épreuve qui perturbe la société et laisse l'individu seul face à la crise 
pendant une période de temps plus ou moins longue. En temps de crise, les décideurs doivent faire face à 
des multiples situations : stress, perturbation des services publics, situation d'isolement, etc. 
La majorité des conséquences différées sont en lien avec une perturbation des réseaux d’infrastructure. On 
entend par réseau un ensemble d’entités interconnectées facilitant la circulation de biens (nourriture, 
médicaments, vêtements, couvertures), matériels (outils, machines de déblaiement, infrastructures 
sanitaires), services (soins, électricité) ou informations (téléphone, internet). Cette thèse traite de la 
vulnérabilité des réseaux aux catastrophes naturelles comme point d’entrée d’une problématique qui peut 
accélérer ou augmenter par contrecoup les dommages causés à la population suite à une absence de 
décision ou une prise de décision inappropriée. 
La prise en compte de chaque réseau séparément apporte des informations intéressantes mais non 
suffisantes pour prendre la bonne décision en toute connaissance de causes et de conséquences. Les 
dimensions organisationnelle et décisionnelle nécessaires à la mise en évidence de solutions préventives ou 
correctives pour affronter les catastrophes naturelles impliquent de travailler selon des modes collaboratifs. 
Ces modes de fonctionnement requièrent des outils adéquats, adaptés aux contextes et aux profils des 
utilisateurs potentiels. Ces outils d’aide à la décision doivent être développés sur la base de modèles multi-
acteurs (experts, décideurs, usagers), multi-vues (avant, pendant, après la catastrophe) et multi-échelles 
(contexte local ou global). 
Les techniques de sûreté de fonctionnement (Fiabilité, Maintenabilité, Disponibilité, Sécurité) et de gestion 
des risques (évaluation, prévention, atténuation, risk mapping) utilisées dans les domaines industriel et 
financier permettront d’établir un modèle de vulnérabilité. Les informations extraites de cette modélisation 
constituent des données d’entrée pour la prise de décision. Elles peuvent être utilisées dans le cadre de la 
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gestion des événements catastrophiques et prendre en compte les opinions de plusieurs acteurs (décideurs 
publics, experts, opérationnels) lors des prises de décision : 
 Pré-événements : Organisation et implantation des services opérationnels de secours, évaluation de 
l’impact d’une innovation technologique sur les conséquences éventuelles, estimation de la 
probabilité d’occurrence d’un événement particulier ; 
 Pendant l’événement : Évaluation des risques de répétition du phénomène, estimation du niveau des 
dommages en fonction de l’intensité et des premiers témoignages, estimation des moyens de 
secours à mettre en œuvre ; 
 Post-événement : Estimation des primes d’assurances par les professionnels d’assurance, 
évaluations des programmes de soutien des populations concernées, établissement des plans de 
redressement. 
Cette thèse comprend toutes ces phases. Ses objectifs sont de surmonter ces problèmes par : 
 La modélisation des infrastructures critiques interdépendantes ; 
 La détermination de la vulnérabilité d’un réseau, d’un composant, d’un territoire et d’un enjeu ; 
 La modélisation et l’évaluation des répercussions de l'interdépendance sur la vulnérabilité ; 
 La corrélation entre l'intensité d'un événement redouté et les dommages aux enjeux ; 
 L’identification les pires scénarios ; 
 La détermination d’un processus de décision pour la gestion de crise ; 
 La caractérisation d'un système d’aide à la décision pour la gestion des catastrophes. 
 Processus de recherche 
Pour décrire et tenter d’apporter des solutions à la problématique décrite, notre recherche s’appuiera sur deux 
laboratoires du PRES (Pôle de Recherche et d'Enseignement Supérieur) de Toulouse scientifiquement 
complémentaires : Le Laboratoire Génie de Production (LGP), spécialisé en génie industriel et l’Institut de 
Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT) - spécialisé en informatique. Le plan de la thèse est alors 
reparti en deux volets différents sur le plan scientifique, mais avec un objectif commun : 
 Volet 1 : Analyse de vulnérabilité des réseaux 
Cette partie a été réalisée dans l'équipe Systèmes Décisionnels et Cognitifs (SDC) du Laboratoire Génie de 
Production. Ce laboratoire fait partie de l'École Nationale d'Ingénieurs de Tarbes. Nous avons travaillé sur les 
problématiques d'évaluation de la vulnérabilité des réseaux d'infrastructures dans un contexte les 
catastrophes naturelles. 
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Verrous Scientifiques : Représentation d'un système sociotechnique, corrélation entre l'intensité de 
l'événement redouté et les dommages causés au système, Modélisation de la vulnérabilité et des 
interdépendances. 
Livrable : Modèle socio-technique pour l'évaluation de la vulnérabilité. 
Après cette partie, nous avons fait un séjour de quatre mois à l'Université de Plymouth au Royaume-Uni. 
L'objectif était de consolider la collaboration avec la « School of Management » et d'échanger nos points de 
vue sur la prise de décision en environnement incertain. 
 Volet 2 : Aide à la décision en situation de crise 
Cette partie a été réalisée dans l'équipe Systèmes Multi-Agents Coopératifs (SMAC) à l’Institut de Recherche 
en Informatique de Toulouse. Nous avons travaillé sur l'élaboration d'un processus d’aide à la décision et d’un 
système d’aide à la décision en situation de crise. 
Verrous scientifiques : Identification du passage d’une situation nominale à une situation de crise, négociation 
et prise de décisions dans un environnement incertain. 
Livrable : Un processus de décision mis en œuvre dans un système de d’aide à la décision basée sur le 
modèle développé dans le volet 1. 
Le modèle de vulnérabilité développé dans la partie 1 doit être justifié selon les informations descriptives de la 
situation actuelle. Les résultats de la simulation réalisée par le biais du modèle de vulnérabilité constitueront 
des entrées pour le système d’aide à la décision mis en œuvre dans le volet 2. 
 
 9 
 
CHAPTER I  
LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Résumé en Français 
Ce chapitre traite de l’état de l’art dans de domaine de l’analyse de la vulnérabilité des réseaux 
d’infrastructure. Elle est divisée en deux parties : La première partie se focalise sur le concept de vulnérabilité 
et des modèles structurels associés. Une modélisation par la théorie des graphes étant préconisée, les 
différentes catégories de graphes sont présentées. Par la suite nous identifions les métriques de la 
vulnérabilité : Centralité, Intégrité, Connectivité, ainsi que d’autres fonctions. 
La deuxième partie aborde les processus d’aide à la décision. Nous groupons l’ensemble des processus 
existants en trois catégories : Les processus linéaires, les processus cycliques et les processus hybrides. Les 
méthodes d’agrégation multicritère sont également catégorisées. Pour chaque méthode présentée, 
l’applicabilité à l’analyse de la vulnérabilité des réseaux est investie. Un accent est mis sur les méthodes de 
type ELECTRE. Pour cette dernière catégorie, le groupement est effectué en fonction des problématiques de 
base. 
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“There is nothing so strange and so unbelievable that it has not been said by one philosopher or another” 
Descartes 
 Literature review 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the science of vulnerability analysis as in many others, words such as risk, system are polysemic and 
interpreted in different ways. The objective of this state of the art is to present studies related to the field of the 
vulnerability analysis. It is divided into two parts: the first is about the concept of vulnerability and associated 
structural models. Since the modelling is based on the graph theory, different categories of graphs will be 
presented. Following on, the existing vulnerability metrics: centrality, integrity, connectivity, as well as other 
vulnerability functions will be introduced. The second part deals with the decision aiding process. We 
classified existing processes into three categories: linear processes, cyclic processes and hybrid processes. 
Multicriteria aggregation methods are also categorized. For each presented method, the applicability to the 
network vulnerability analysis is investigated. A focus is done on the ELECTRE methods. For this latter 
category, the grouping categories are performed based on basic problems. The results of this part allowed us 
to propose a vulnerability model overcoming literature shortcomings. We begin by the infrastructure network 
management literature review presented in the next section. 
I.1: INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK MANAGEMENT LITERATURE REVIEW 
Feared event 
and type of 
approach 
Vulnerable elements (vulnerability type) 
Seismicity 
Population 
Institutional 
Building 
Structural 
Network 
Economic 
activity 
Urban System 
Social Corporal Structural Functional 
Damage 
observation 
Colbeau-
Justin & de 
Vanssay, 
1996 - 
Leone & 
Mavoungo, 
2000 
Mahue-
Giangreco et 
al., 2001 
Colbeau-
Justin & de 
Vanssay, 
1996 
ATC-20 - 
AFPS 
Hassani 
&Takada, 
1995 
Chang, 
1996 
Mazzocchi 
& Montini, 
2002 
Menoni, 2001 
Vulnerability 
diagnostic 
Mavoungo, 
2006 
? ? 
 
HAZUS - 
ATC-88 - 
Gémitis 
Durville & 
Meneroud, 
1987 
? 
Gémitis-
Nice 
Gémitis-Nice 
(Lutoff, 
2000) 
Scenario ? HAZUS - ? HAZUS - HAZUS - HAZUS 
HAZUS 
Gémitis-Nice 
 Graph theory 
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Coburn et al., 
1992 
ATC-85 - 
Gémitis 
ATC-91  
Volcano 
Damage 
observation 
de Vanssay & 
ColbeauJusti
n, 2000 
Baxter et al., 
1997 
Leone & 
Gaillard, 
1999 - 
Voight, 1990 
Spence et 
al., 1996 
? 
D'Ercole & 
Metzger, 
2000 
Gaillard, 
2001 
D'Ercole & 
Metzger, 
2000 
Vulnerability 
diagnostic 
D'Ercole, 
1991- Dibben 
& Chester, 
1999 
? 
Lesales, 
2005 
Pomonis et 
al., 1999 
? ? ? 
D'Ercole & 
Metzger, 
2004 
Scenario ? 
Baxter et al., 
1998 
? 
Leone, 
2004 - 
Pomonis 
et al., 1999 
Stieltjes & 
Mirgon, 
1998 
? ? 
Gomez-
Fernandez, 
2000 
Land slide 
Damage 
observation 
Leone, 1996 ? ? 
Alexander, 
1988 - 
Leone, 
1996 
Leone, 
1996 
Leone, 
1996 
Leone, 
1996 
? 
Vulnerability 
diagnostic 
Cospar ? Cospar ? ? ? ? Finlay, 1996 
Scenario ? 
Finlay, 1996 - 
Leone, 1996 
? 
Hulbergern 
& Carree, 
1987 - 
Leone, 
1996 
Leone, 
1996- 
Panizza 
et al, 2002 
Leone, 
1996 
Mora, 1992 
 
Mora, 1992 
Wind 
Damage 
observation 
Sarant et al. , 
2003 
? 
Sarant et al., 
2003 
Hamparian
, 1999 
? ? ? ? 
Vulnerability 
diagnostic 
Pagney & 
Suédois, 
1999 
? 
Sarant et al., 
2003 
Bonfanti, 
2004- 
HAZUS 
? ? ? ? 
Scenario ? ? ? Khanduri & ? ? Khanduri & ? 
 Literature review 
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Table ‎I-1 : Infrastructure vulnerability review by [1] 
Infrastructure network management has been studied for many areas. [2] studied the vulnerability of roads. 
The financial aspect related to infrastructure network failure was investigated in [3]. [1] made a comprehensive 
literature review in this topic summarized in Table ‎I-1. Blue cells stand for standardized and reproducible 
approaches, yellow cells for non-standardized but reproducible approaches and green cells for approaches 
under research. It shows that with regards to networks study, there is a lack of study concerning many feared 
events. Infrastructure network failure is an issue which has not been much investigated. There is a lack of 
research at the structural or functional level. The structural level is related to the infrastructure architecture, 
and the function one to how it accomplishes its functions through flow circulation. 
Morrow, 
2003 
- HAZUS 
Morrow, 
2003 - 
HAZUS 
Flood 
Damage 
observation 
? 
Jonkman et 
al., 2002 
? 
Kelman & 
Spence 
(2004) 
? ? 
Torterotot, 
1993 
NRC, 1999 
Vulnerability 
diagnostic 
DEFRA/FHR
C, 2003 
DEFRA/FHR
C, 2003 
Green, 1988 
Lagadec, 
1995 
? ? ? 
Ledoux & 
Sageris, 
1999 
Barbut et 
al., 2004 
Hardy, 2003 
Reghezza, 200 
Scenario ? 
Ruin & Lutoff, 
2004 
Gilbert & 
Bourdeaux, 
1999 
Lagadec, 
1995 
HAZUS ? ? HAZUS 
Liu Renyi & Liu 
Nan (2002) 
Islam (1997) 
Légende : 1- 
Disponibilité 
opérationnelle 
(approche 
standardisée et 
reproductible 
 Graph theory 
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The review performed in this thesis and presented in next section is divided into two parts. The first one 
focusses on the network modelling through the graph theory. The second introduces some vulnerability 
metrics. 
I.1.1 GRAPH THEORY 
The first step of network vulnerability analysis is modelling. In the modelling step, graph theory is mostly used. 
The foundations of the graph theory were built by Leonhard Euler (1707-83) when he presented the solution 
Königsberg bridges [4]. Since then, the theory has evolved considerably. Nowadays, it is applied to many 
disciplines like organic chemistry modelling [5], mechanical system reliability analysis [6], representation of 
engineering systems [7] etc. 
A finite graph         is defined by a finite set of nodes              ;         and a finite set of 
edge               ; (|E|=M). 
In the field of infrastructure network modelling, graph theory is mainly used in the literature. When 
infrastructure networks are related to graph, many classifications are then possible. One of them separate 
infrastructure networks into social network (Facebook, Linkedin), information network (World Wide Web, or 
knowledge network), biological network (food networks) and technological network (power grids). 
Another classification is based on the network structure. From this point of view, networks can be classified 
according to their degree distribution [8]. This classification gives rise to three categories of network [9] : 
scale-free network, random graphs, and small word network. These categories are presented in the next three 
sections. 
 Scale-free Network 
For many real networks the degree distribution follows a power law [10], [9], [8]. This kind of network is named 
Scale-free Network. But only their degree distribution is scale-free. For Scale-free Network, the node fraction 
with a degree   follows a power law: 
         (‎I-1) 
  is the power law exponent, k is the degree. 
This is the case of networks like the power grids [10], the World Wide Web, the internet, and the air 
transportation networks [11]. 
In the literature the degree of distribution could also be exponentials, such as those seen in the power grid, 
railway networks, and power laws with exponential cutoffs, such as those seen in the network of movie actors 
and some collaboration networks [12]. 
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 Random graph 
Random graph are also known as Erdös-Rényi graph. In general, in this model of graph, the probability that a 
node is of degree   is given by the binomial law [8], [9]: 
     (   
 
)             (‎I-2) 
N is the number of node. The average distance for these networks is proportional to      [9]. 
Social networks belong to this category of network. 
 Small word network 
This model was proposed by Watts and Strogatz. The distance between two nodes in small word network 
decreases very slowly with the number of nodes [13]. It reflects the fact that although the number of vertices in 
the graph is high, the average distance is relatively short. These networks combine a high degree of 
agglomeration and a low average distance [9]. 
Neural networks belong to this type of networks. 
Structural characteristics resulting from each of these types are interesting and well analysed in the literature. 
From above definitions, it appears that infrastructure networks seem to belong to the category of scale-free 
network. 
Once networks are modelled by graphs, there are many models of vulnerability that can be applied. These 
models are presented in the next section. 
I.1.2 VULNERABILITY METRICS 
The concept of vulnerability is used in several disciplines: psychology, sociology, political science, economic, 
epidemiology, biology, environmental and geoscience [14]. Many terms are related to vulnerability concept in 
the literature: service-ability, reliability, availability, survivability. With respect to infrastructures, vulnerability 
analysis aims are pointed out by [14]. The author argues that it consists in answering the following questions: 
 What can fail? 
 What are the consequences? 
 How can this happen? 
 How to retrieve a nominal state? 
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To answer the first question, we must focus on network components. Indeed, the resulting vulnerability is 
strongly linked to that of the components. The second question is more difficult to answer. The range of 
consequences is large and may take various forms. The third question refers to the feared events. With 
respect to the listed questions, the implementation of corrective actions is required to solve the problem. The 
issues pointed out by [14] allow the Decision Maker understanding the context, but they do not take into 
account one of the aspects of the analysis: what can aggravate or mitigate the consequences? The answer to 
this question is given in II.2.3.3. 
These questions show that vulnerability emphasizes the degree in which people and their possessions are 
exposed to feared events. It indicates the level of damages which a certain phenomenon may produce and it 
is expressed on a scale varying from 0 to 1, 1 standing for the total destruction of material assets and loss of 
human lives in the affected area [15]. 
Vulnerability is defined in several ways in the literature. Table ‎I-2 resumes some of them. 
Definitions Author 
Probability of a complete or partial failure of infrastructures and loss of their ability to 
maintain their important functions for a certain period 
[16] 
Propensity to damage or malfunction of various elements exposed to risk (commodities, 
peoples, activities, functions, systems) constituent a territory and a given society 
[1] 
System time progressive property to support failure in function of its state [17] 
How a system, organization, or human performance is degraded if some hazard or threat 
exploits the vulnerability 
[18] 
Ability of the system to withstand hazard or threat [19] 
System overall susceptibility to lose due to a negative event, ie the magnitude of the 
damage given a specific strain 
[19] 
Susceptibility of rare, thought big, risks, while the victims can hardly change the course of 
events and contribute little or nothing to recover 
[20] 
Susceptibility to incidents that can result in considerable reductions in road network service-
ability. These incidents may then be more or less predictable, caused voluntary or 
involuntary, by man or nature 
[21] 
Manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g., physical, technical, organizational, 
cultural) that can be exploited to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that system 
[18] 
Characteristic of a critical infrastructure’s design, implementation, or operation of that 
renders it susceptible to destruction or incapacitation by a threat 
[22] 
Vulnerability refers to how a system, an organization or human performance is degraded if 
some hazards or threats exploits the vulnerability 
(Haimes 2006) 
in [19] 
Consequences that arise when a system is exposed to a strain for à given type and [19] 
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Table ‎I-2: Vulnerability definitions 
Defintions given in Table ‎I-2 highlight two viewpoints: 
 System-based view: focuses on how the considered system will fail or change from one state to 
another. This view is shared by [24], [17] and [18]. 
 Event-based view: considers the amplitude and/or the frequency of one or more events. This view is 
shared by [16], [1] and [19]. 
These two points of views are complementary. The vulnerability perception of a system remains dependent on 
considered states, and analysts’ views. 
For instance, the state of the system could be related to its performance [18] quoted by [19], to its reliability or 
to any others criteria. 
In the literature, survivability is used as an antonym of vulnerability. Survivability is generally used when 
talking about a disaster when it has already occurred while vulnerability concern the characteristics of an 
asset to resist to the feared event before its occurrence [25]. The survivability is defined as the capability of a 
system to fulfil its mission in a timely manner in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents [18] and 
concerns the system's performance after the occurrence of a feared event while vulnerability is the 
susceptibility of system facing feared events [26]. 
From definitions in Table ‎I-2 we pointed out many attributes associated with vulnerability: 
magnitude 
Flaw or weakness in the design, implementation, operation and/or management of an 
infrastructure system, or its elements that render it susceptible to destruction or 
incapacitation when exposed to a hazard or threat or reduces its capacity to resume new 
stable conditions 
(Kröger et 
Nan) in [23] 
Susceptibility (sensitivity) to threats and hazards that substantially will reduce the ability of 
the system to maintain its intended function 
[14] 
Collection of properties of an infrastructure system that might weaken or limit its ability to 
maintain its intended function, or provide its intended services, when exposed to threats and 
hazards that originate both within and outside of the boundaries of the system 
Holmgren and 
Molin (2005) in 
[14] 
Degree of loss or damage to the system when exposed to a perturbation of a given type and 
magnitude 
[24] 
The probability of damage to all or part of an infrastructure and the loss of its ability to 
maintain its important functions during a certain period 
[16] 
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 Vulnerability is time dependent; 
 A vulnerable system assumes the existence of a feared event; 
 Vulnerability is related to the system incapacity to play the role it has been designed for  
In our view, vulnerability is necessarily associated with the system it characterizes. For this reason the 
following definition is provided. 
Definition ‎I-1: Vulnerability is the incapacity of a stake to resist to the occurrence of a feared event 
and to recover efficiently its nominal function during a given period of time. 
The concepts of stake and feared event will be introduced in II.1.2.2. 
As further shown below, many vulnerability metrics in the literature are based on the network structure. In fact, 
some authors consider that the effectiveness of network functions realization is affected by its structure [27]. 
In [28] the authors argue that at the occurrence of a feared event, loss and damage depend on the structural 
organization and vary from one network to another. Then, analysing the topology of the network allows a 
better comprehension of the dynamic phenomena that affects its performances [29], the identification of its 
weaknesses [30] and the estimation of its vulnerability [29], [31]. 
Network parameters for vulnerability analysis include the degree, the clustering coefficient, the average 
distance, and the load [29]. Besides these parameters, one can observe four other classes namely: efficiency, 
integrity, probability and others vulnerability functions. Whatever the function used, the vulnerability might not 
increase with the addition of edge [29] and its analysis should help to measure the system’s response after a 
feared event occurrence [28]. These parameters are presented in the following sections. 
 Betweenness centrality 
The betweenness centrality    stands for the fraction of path going through a node    [32] quoted by [33]. 
       ∑
 
    
     
     
           (‎I-3) 
where      is the number of geodesics (paths) between    and   , and            is the number of 
geodesics between    and   that passes   . The load is defined in the same way for an edge    [33]. 
       ∑
 
    
     
     
           (‎I-4) 
Where            is the number of geodesics between    and   , that includes the edge   . 
The centrality determines the importance of a node in a network [33]. 
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For vulnerability estimation, the centrality of one component is calculated before and after the occurrence of 
the feared event (which means the removal of one or many nodes/edges) [11], [34], [35]. The centrality is a 
good indicator of the structural importance of a node or an edge in the graph. But from our view, it does not 
adjudicate on the vulnerability. Indeed, the vulnerability is induced by several failure modes. These modes 
result from component constitution, but also because of the overall dynamics. 
 Average Path Length 
The average path length between two nodes is the mean of the edges number of shortest paths [9]. 
   
 
      
∑  (     )        (‎I-5) 
To avoid infinite mean (the distance is infinite if no link exists between the nodes), the inverse of the average 
path [34] and [33] is commonly used. 
   
 
      
∑ ∑
 
 (    )
   (‎I-6) 
The average path measures the dispersion of the network and expresses the difficulty of communication 
between two nodes [36]. It also indicates the flow of traffic on the network. In our view, the average path 
length is a good indicator of structural vulnerability. The smaller is the parameter, the less vulnerable will be 
the global network. 
   is described in [11], [36], [37] and [38] as the efficiency and related to the network performance. The 
efficiency of a path between two vertices is the average efficiency of all the edges constituting the path. 
Resilience, which is one of the measures of vulnerability, is the drop of efficiency induced by the deterioration 
of edges [36], [35]. We will define this concept later in II.1.8. Vulnerability is then seen as the lack of network 
performance and is defined by. 
        
          
    
 (‎I-7) 
Where       is the overall efficiency of the system and       is the efficiency of the network after removal 
of the edge   . The overall vulnerability of the graph is then defined by: 
          [     ] (‎I-8) 
Finally, some authors consider the loss of performance caused by the removal of a node instead of an edge 
[39] , [28]. The vulnerability of the graph and its nodes are assessed in the same way. This way of estimating 
the vulnerability is very interesting. Interest focuses on the structure but not on the real circulation of flows in 
the network. Furthermore this approach does not take into account the intrinsic reliability of each component. 
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 Clustering coefficient 
Let us consider three nodes   ,    et   . If the node    is linked to the node   , and the node    to the node 
  , the transitivity is the average probability that the node    is linked to the node   . It measures the density 
of triangles in the network [9]. The number of possible connections for a node of degree       is [9]: 
(     
 
)  
     [       ]
 
 (‎I-9) 
By noting   the number of links between vertices incident to node   , the clustering coefficient of node    is 
then [9]: 
   
  
(       
)
 (‎I-10) 
The clustering coefficient of a graph will be then [9] , [33]: 
     
 
 
∑     (‎I-11) 
The clustering coefficient is a good indicator of network vulnerability. However, it does not give any idea on 
the vulnerability of a component. Indeed, the more, there will be of a triangle in the network, the less it will be 
vulnerable. 
 Connectivity 
Node connectivity is called cohesion, and edge connectivity is called adhesion. The node connectivity 
(respectively edge) of a graph is the minimum number of nodes (respectively edges) to be removed from the 
graph to disconnect it [40], [29]. A disconnected graph is a graph for which some flow cannot reach its 
destination. Connectivity is a vulnerability measure [9]. The higher the connectivity the less vulnerable will be 
the network. 
 Integrity 
Integrity is the ratio      . Where   is the size of the graph after damage of a fraction i of nodes compared 
with the initial size   . Vulnerability can be seen as a lack of integrity [13], [41], [41] and [42]. Other authors 
define integrity in relation to the weight, the geodesic distance and the range (ratio between the distance and 
weight) [37]. The integrity is related to the graph robustness. It does not give any indication on the graph, 
node or edge resilience. 
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 Probability 
The vulnerability of a system is measured in [9] and [14] as the probability        
        
   
 for a given period 
of time     that the negative consequence      of the disturbance is greater than a value  . Taking into 
account the occurrence of a feared event   , the total probability would be the sum of probabilities. 
              
   
  ∑        (
        
   
     )  (‎I-12) 
Where    is the initiating event. The main concern with these functions is the correlation between 
consequences and feared events. The range of consequences is large. An estimation on the basis of the 
expertise is certainly interesting but insufficient for an objective assessment of the vulnerability. 
 Vulnerability function 
Several authors suggest vulnerability functions in the literature. In [27] the authors define a vulnerability 
function for a graph with N nodes and M edges by: 
         (
 
 
       
 
 
) (‎I-13) 
Where   is the standard deviation of the degree distribution. This function does not take into account the 
vulnerability indicators such as cohesion (vertices degree) and adhesion (edges degree) [29], [40]. Moreover, 
the term does not allow the comparison between networks of different sizes and structures [29]. 
In this part, we have introduced the concept of vulnerability and approaches to estimate it. The majority of 
scientific approaches ignore the flow dynamics. We overcome these gaps with a simulation-based approach. 
We will thus introduce in II.1.8 some essential elements for the vulnerability estimation: flow, feared event, 
aggravation and mitigation factor etc. 
Vulnerability assessment is often a prerequisite to decision-making. We thus present in the following a review 
of decision-making process in the field of the infrastructure networks vulnerability analysis. 
I.2: DECISION AIDING LITERATURE REVIEW 
Decision theory  aims to justify, analyse and streamline actions susceptible to have negative consequences 
[43]. Historically, decision theory comes from the hazard formalization on board games. Later, in the period 
just before the World War II, decision aiding knows a major development. It exists studies conducted by the 
British Army as part of the installation of radar systems and German communications decoding efforts (1936-
37) [44]. The boost of the discipline will come with the success of operational research, linear programing and 
the game theory. Later in 1948, the development of project such as RAND [45] will give a new impulse to the 
discipline. Many theories will emerge to make the discipline increasingly relevant. 
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At this point in time, decision theory touches varied and diverse domains like management, politics, 
economics, mathematics, psychology, risk analysis and conflict of interest situations [43]. The scope is so 
broad that a complete literature review is not possible [44]. This wide application area makes the decision 
aiding activity a scientific and professional one with some formalism and abstraction [44]. Formal and abstract 
approach allows then the decision-maker to better analyse, understand, and justify the issues and/or the 
solutions. The formalism is justified by the use of formal languages to reduce human language ambiguity. The 
abstraction refers to the use of languages independently to the realm of the discourse. Despite the used 
formalism and abstraction, the concept of decision and decision aiding is diversified. For this reason some 
definitions are provided. Decision aiding is defined in several ways in the literature. In [45] and [46], 
ontological elements are introduced to define decision components. This implies: 
 Decision object: Purpose, program operation, instrument; 
 Decision organ: Organization, group, individual; 
 Decision type: Routine, creative, program application; 
 Decision scope: Strategic, tactical, and operational; 
 Decision elements control: Good, average. 
Some definitions of the decision are proposed in Table ‎I-3. 
 
Table ‎I-4: Decision definition 
From the definitions given in Table ‎I-4, decisions could be classified in many ways. In [49] the authors 
distinguished normalized and non-normalized decisions according to their nature. One decision is normalized 
if it exits an explicit process. A non-normalized decision is threated by a non-programed procedure [50]. At the 
structuration level, decision are classified by [51] in three categories: Structured decisions, bad structured 
decisions, and non-structured decisions. In structured decision the problem is established in technical terms 
and data are assumed as reliable. Bad structured problems require a big effort to formalize data which are 
qualitative, unstable, difficult to access etc. In non-structured decisions, problems are not clearly addressed. 
This point of view is also shared in [49] where decisions are classified into Structured, Semi structured, and 
Not structured decision. 
Definition Author 
A decision is an action that is taken to deal with a difficulty or respond to an environment 
change, that is to say, to solve an individual or organization problem 
[46] 
A decision is the act of a single individual (decision maker) which has a free choice 
between several possible actions at a given moment in time 
[47] 
A decision, whether individual or resulting from a work group can be defined as engaging 
in an action, that is to say, an explicit intention to act 
[48] 
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The definition of decision aiding adopted in this thesis is the one proposed in [52]. 
Definition ‎I-2: Decision aiding is the activity of a person (analyst) who, resting on models clearly 
explained and more or less completely formalized, searches some answer elements of an intervener 
in the decision process. (Decision Maker), elements contributing to shine the decision and normally 
prescribe behaviour likely to increase the coherence between the evolution of the process on one 
hand, the objectives and the value system of whom service this in intervener is placed one the other 
hand. 
This definition leads to some problem pointed out in [53] and [50]: 
 Description: problems associated with the actual characterization of the current state of the 
organization; 
 Investigation: associated with the relationship between two or more problems data or phenomena; 
 Explanation: problems associated with establishing a causal relationship; 
 Prediction: Problems associated with the future projection based on data feedback; 
 Prescription: problems associated with the normative projection based on data feedback; 
Decision aiding relies on postulates pointed out by [47] quoted by [50]: 
 First order reality assumption: the main aspects of the reality in which the decision aiding relies on 
are related to knowledge objects. These objects can be viewed as stable data; 
 Assumption of the decision maker: any decision is made by a decision-maker, actor clearly identified, 
with full powers, acting under a rational preference system with some axioms excluding ambiguity 
and incomparability, that are not modified by the decision aiding; 
 Assumption of optimum: in any situation leading to a decision, there is at least an optimal decision. 
For this decision, it is possible to establish objectively that there are not strictly better decisions. The 
optimal decision is supposed to remain neutral towards the decision process. 
Decision aiding is related to process presented in the next section. 
I.1.3 DECISION AIDING PROCESS 
Vulnerability and risk analysis are presented in [54] as a problem of individual or collective decision to reduce 
the complexity by supporting the problem formulation. From this observation, we can also say that analysing 
the vulnerability aims at making decisions in a certain environment. The vulnerability analysis and decision 
aiding are so intertwined. 
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In [49] the author was one of the first to argue that decision is not an action but a process carried out to solve 
problem. The author says also that decision is composed of four steps not always distinct: Intelligence; 
Design; Choice; Review. In [54] three phases are pointed out in the area of risk management: problem 
formulation, exploitation and recommendation. Decision aiding process pointed out by these authors focuses 
on the way decision makers collect and use information in order to understand and assist others stakeholders 
[55]. 
In a classification perspective, different decision processes are categorized by [56] depending on the level of 
authority and the proximity of the danger. The authors distinguished thus: 
 Office automation- analytical: Actions are taken by identified decision makers; 
 Political: Selection of actions under conflict of interest between stakeholders ; 
 Managerial: Actions are based on a satisfactory strategy. They are taken by considering 
consequences but on the basis of rules and code of conduct; 
 Routine operations: Actions result from automatism and rarely from conscientious analysis. Implicit 
rules and experience are used; 
 Crisis Management: Actions to reduce negative consequences of a phenomenon. 
This classification does not allow processes differentiation. One process could be political and include crisis 
management. That is why we propose another classification based on the type of the process itself. We then 
distinguished three categories according to decision phases’ succession: linear, cyclical, and mixed. An 
example of each of them is presented in the next sections. 
 Linear decision aiding process 
Linear decision aiding process consists in sequential steps. Figure ‎I-1 presents a process described in [57]. 
The particularity of this kind of process is the succession of its phases. Linear processes are suitable for the 
problem with minor stakes. But as soon as the context is of a certain complexity, linearity becomes source of 
amplification of the consequences by preventing any feedback loop. The cyclical process presented in the 
following section allows overcoming this lack. 
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Figure ‎I-1: Linear decision process by [57] 
 Cyclical decision aiding process 
Cyclic decision processes are presented in form of cycle. The Figure ‎I-2 presents an example of cyclic 
process [58] [59]. Cyclic processes are adapted to middle complexity problems. It is possible to return to the 
phase source of error after a cycle time whose duration varies according to the situation. The main difficulty 
for the analyst is to short down this time. The hybid processes presented in the next section can be used to 
tackle this problem. 
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Figure ‎I-2: Cyclic decision aiding [58] 
 Hybrid process 
Hybrid processes are the combination of linear and cyclic process. One example is proposed in [49]. An 
hybrid decision process for decision maker selection is proposed in [60]. She argues that decision is a 
process enrolled in time called Decision Time Line. 
Hybrid decision processes are adapted to many contexts whose complexity may differ. Whatever the type of 
the decision process, it is fitted of some linear elements pointed out by [61]. The author argues that elements 
of the decision process are constitutive of: 
 
Figure ‎I-3: Hybrid process by [49] 
 A research process to find goals; 
 The exact formulation of objectives; 
 The selection of alternatives to achieve these goals; 
Intelligence Design Choice 
Review 
Environment 
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Modelling Observation 
Real decision 
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 The results evaluation. 
Methods that could be used in these processes are presented in the next section. 
I.1.4 DECISION AIDING METHODS 
It turns out to be very difficult to make a full presentation of all decision aiding methods [44]. In a general way, 
in decision aiding, comparison of several actions is rarely a single criterion. That is due to the fact that when 
we have multiple objectives, it is difficult to reach them all at once [62]. Bernard Roy shows that optimization is 
not often the only neither the best approach to get a solution [54]. 
Speaking about research type in decision aiding in general, there are two types of methods pointed out in [59] 
and shown on Figure ‎I-4: Analytical approach and descriptive approach. Decision aiding Approach can be 
seen as the passage from problem situation to decision model [44]. Analytical approach aims to translate 
decision problem into mathematical functions to be optimized. Descriptive methods are used to describe 
decision making problems. In this approach the decision maker tries to use strategies already used by other 
decision makers in similar situations. 
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Figure ‎I-4: Decision aiding methods 
 Analytic or prescriptive approach: The objective of these approaches is to provide to decision maker 
tools for taking optimal decision in a given situation through mathematical models [50]; 
 Descriptive approach: These approaches intended to model decision makers decision process to 
describe the context , analyse and exploit decisions if possible[50]. 
Let's consider the problem of analysing the vulnerability of interdependent networks. A set of action was 
defined with more or less predictable consequences. The classical approach consists in associating to each 
system state probability the actions’ consequences. We can then use a utility function on consequences 
whose maximum value allows determining actions to apply. 
The existence of this function is guaranteed by a number of axioms stating that, in theory, there is a rational 
behaviour for decision maker. Preferences are transitive so the probabilities are independent [44]. This is not 
the case in our analysis. Indeed, different probabilities are dependent on each other. This approach is called 
normative because decision makers must adapt their behaviour and preferences to the axioms [44]. The 
descriptive approach will consist in adopting some strategy to make a decision under similar conditions. 
In [44], the author notes that descriptive methods are again of imposing rationality model to problem situation 
independency. This approach is difficult to apply in situations of natural disaster, given that each situation is 
isolated and crisis management is made by cooperating authorities but not necessarily on a feedback. 
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In the reality of natural disasters, problems are difficult to identify. Values of decision makers who define their 
preferences are difficult to understand in the allotted time. In the context of infrastructure network failure the 
question is related to the possibility of identifying every state of the system. In other words, looking for the 
solution of a problem well formulated is always possible. The risk is to seek a solution to a problem that does 
not exist [44]. 
In this literature review we have separated the two groups of methods presented in the following: Elementary 
methods and multicriteria methods. This separation is made by the complexity of the method. The next 
following sections will present some of them. 
I.1.4.1 CLASSICAL METHOD OR SINGLE SYNTHESIS CRITERION 
Table ‎I-5 shows some elementary methods. 
Methods Reference Description 
Weighted sum [21,40,54] 
The global performance of an alternative is computed as the weighted sum of 
its evaluations along each criterion. The global performance is used to make a 
choice among all the alternatives 
Lexicographic 
method 
[40,79] 
Based on the logic that in some Decision Making Situation (DMS) a single 
criterion seems to predominate. The procedure consists in comparing all the 
alternatives with respect to the important criterion, and proceed with the next 
one until only one alternative is left 
Conjunctive 
method 
[40,20] 
An alternative which does not meet the minimal acceptable level for all criteria 
is rejected. The minimal acceptable levels for each criterion are used to screen 
out unacceptable alternative 
Disjunctive 
method 
[40,20] 
An alternative is selected on the basis of its extreme score on any criterion. 
Desirable levels for each attribute are used to select alternatives which equal 
or exceed thresholds 
Maximin 
method 
[40] 
The overall performance of an alternative is determined by its weakest or 
strongest evaluation 
Single synthesizing criterion 
TOPSIS 
(technique for 
order by 
similarity to 
ideal solution) 
[40] 
The chosen alternative should have the profile which is the nearest (distance) 
to the ideal solution and farthest from the negative-ideal solution 
MAVT (multi- [43,45] Aggregation of the values obtained by accessing partial value functions on 
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Table ‎I-5: Elementary methods by [63] 
The unique synthesis criterion is to synthesize the family of criteria into a single criterion. In this method, there 
is no incomparability. It consists in building a single criterion synthesis using an aggregation function   by 
putting: 
      (                         ) (‎I-14) 
Function   usually takes one of the following forms [64]. 
attribute value 
theory) 
each criterion to establish a global value function V. Under some conditions, 
such a function V can be obtained through an additive, a multiplicative or  a 
mixed technique 
UTA (utility 
theory additive) 
[41] 
Estimate the value functions on each criterion using ordinal regression. The 
global value function is obtained through an additive technique. 
SMART (simple 
multi-attribute 
rating technique 
[26,27,62] 
Simple way to implement the multi-attribute utility theory by using the weighted 
linear averages, which gives extremely close approximation to utility functions. 
There are many improvements associated with this method like SMARTS [28], 
SMARTER [8]. 
MAUT (multi-
attribute utility 
theory) 
[19,43,93] 
Aggregation of the values obtained by accessing partial utility functions on 
each criterion to establish a global utility function U. Under some conditions, U 
can be obtained through an additive, a multiplicative or a distributional 
technique. 
AHP (analytic 
hierarchy 
process) 
[81,82] 
Converting subjective assessments of relative importance into a set of 
weights. This technique applies the decomposition, the comparative 
judgments on comparative elements and measures the relative importance 
through pairwise comparison matrices which are recombined into an overall 
rating of alternatives. 
EVAMIX [94] 
Two dominance indexes are calculated: one for ordinal evaluations and one 
for cardinal evaluations. The combination of these two indexes leads to a 
measure of the dominance between each pair of alternatives. 
Fuzzy weighted 
sum 
[4,23,46] 
These procedures use a-cut technique. A level sets are used to derive fuzzy 
utilities based on the simple additive weighted method 
Fuzzy maximin [10,98] 
This procedure is based on the same principle as the standard maximin 
procedure. The evaluations of the alternatives are fuzzy numbers. 
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 Weighted sum 
{
                                ∑        
 
   
                          ∑     [     ]
 
   
 (‎I-15) 
Where    is the criterion weight ∑     
 
    and   [   ] is the veto threshold. In [65] the authors showed 
the sensitivity of the method of weighted sums throughout the criterion scale. This represents a major 
disadvantage since the changing of scale is a simple operation that decision makers may have to do during 
the process of decision aiding [62]. 
For example one decision maker can choose the Euro and another the Pound as monetary unit. 
The second weakness of the weighted sum is compensation between criteria [62]. In fact, action negatively 
evaluated on a criterion may catch if it is positively evaluate on another. 
 Laplace criterion 
Historically, the Laplace criterion is known as the first to be introduced. It was proposed a century earlier by 
Huygens. For an action resulting in n consequences, it is given by: 
     
 
 
∑      
 
    (‎I-16) 
Where       is the consequence of the decision a for the state I and n is the number of state. This criterion is 
not applicable to the networks vulnerability analyses because the consequences are often in different units. It 
does not take into account either uncertainties about the consequences. 
 Bernoulli criterion 
Bernoulli criterion is similar to the one of Laplace. The difference is in the use of the logarithmic function to 
make difference between low and high changing of the consequences [43]. 
     
 
 
∑  [     
 
   ] (‎I-17) 
Where  is a logarithmic function. 
 The expected value criterion 
Taking into account the probability of every state, Laplace criterion becomes the expected value criterion. 
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     ∑        
 
    (‎I-18) 
Where pi is the probability associated with state i. 
 Criterion of expected utility 
Theory of expected utility has been developed as part of risk situations where consequences probabilities are 
known. Formally a decision problem is said at risk if, for each action there is a probability distribution on the 
consequences [43]. 
     ∑    [     
 
   ] (‎I-19) 
The fundamental principle of the theory of expected utility is that in risk situation, decision maker's behaviour 
is entirely determined by the preferences on probability distributions (lotteries) on the action consequences. In 
such situations, decision maker is called rational if the choice of its decisions is consistent with its preferences 
on lotteries. Theory of expected utility is a representation of preferences over lotteries. It allows defining a 
criterion (expected utility) by which lotteries may be compared [43]. 
The utility theory is based on the following axioms: 
 Preferences define a total order on lotteries: this means that all lotteries can be ranked and 
compared; 
 For the lottery  , if all lottery of a lottery set    are preferred to   and if this suite has a limit   , then 
this limit is preferred to  ; 
 Given the two lotteries   and    such as   is preferred to   , and a number   between 0 and 1, for a 
third lottery    , the composed lottery             should be preferred to             ; 
There are other criteria like those of Wald, Hurwicz, Savage but not presented in this chapter. The reader is 
invited to see [43] for more information. 
I.1.4.2 MULTICRITERIA DECISION AIDING 
Multicriteria decision aiding relies then on a coherent family of criteria instead of one single criterion. 
Multicriteria aggregation procedure enables going from a partial judgment (on an indicator / criteria) to an 
overall judgment of the study object to take adequate measures [66]. Multicriteria decision approaches can be 
grouped according to many characteristics: decision makers rationality, decision universe, provided action 
type [59]. A classification proposed in [59], [44], suggested four categories: Hierarchical approaches, Total 
aggregation approaches, partial aggregation approaches and iterative approaches. Similar classification is 
given in [47] and [67]. The difference between these aggregation approaches is indistinct [68]. It resides in 
multicriteria aggregation procedures [ also called exploitation phase [54]. 
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Outranking methods consists among others in: ELECTRE, QUALIFLEX, ORESTE, REGIME, PROMETHEE, 
PRAGMA/MACCAP, N-TOMIC, MACBETH. These methods are based on ELECTRE method. In outranking 
methods, two procedures are used: the first is to build outranking relations while the second is an exploitation 
procedure. Outranking consists in moving from a relationship based on comparison of each criterion to a 
global relation of comparison. Table ‎I-6 shows some outranking methods. 
Methods References Description 
ELECTRE I [70] 
The concept of outranking relationship is used. The procedure aims to reduce 
the size of non-dominated sets of alternatives (kernel). The idea is that an 
alternative can be eliminated if it is dominated by other alternatives to a 
specific degree. The procedure is the first one to seek to aggregate the 
preferences instead of the performances. 
ELECTRE IS [79] 
This procedure is exactly the same as ELECTRE I, but it introduces the 
indifference threshold. 
ELECTRE II [78] ELECTRE II use two outranking relations (strong and weak). 
ELECTRE III [71] The outranking is expressed through a credibility index. 
ELECTRE IV [80] This procedure is like ELECTRE III but did not use weights. 
ELECTRE 
TRI 
[79] 
This procedure is like ELECTRE III and use the conjunctive and disjunctive 
techniques to affect the alternatives to the different categories (ordered). 
PROMETHEE 
I 
[18] 
PROMETHEE I is based on the same principles as ELECTRE and introduces 
six functions to describe the Decision Maker (DM ) preferences along each 
criterion. This procedure provides a partial order of the alternatives using 
incoming and outgoing flows. 
PROMETHEE 
II 
[17] 
PROMETHEE II is based on the same principles as PROMETHEE I. This 
procedure provides a total preorder of the alternatives using an aggregation of 
the incoming and outgoing flows. 
MELCHIOR [50] MELCHIOR is an extension of ELECTRE IV 
ORESTE [69] 
This procedure needs only ordinal evaluations of the alternatives and the 
ranking of the criteria in terms of importance. 
NAIADE 
(novel 
approach to 
imprecise 
assessment 
and decision 
environments) 
[60] 
This procedure uses distance semantics operator to assess the pairwise 
comparisons among alternatives. The fuzzy evaluation are transformed in 
probabilities distributions and as PROMETHEE, this procedure compute 
incoming and outgoing flows. 
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Table ‎I-6: Outranking methods by [63] 
In the field of risk management another classification is given by [54]. This classification is based on the 
context shown in Figure ‎I-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed methods 
QUALIFLEX [64] 
This procedure uses a successive mutations to provide a ranking of the 
alternative corroborating with the ordinal information. 
Fuzzy 
conjunctive/ 
disjunctive 
method 
24] 
When data are fuzzy, the match between values and standard levels provided 
by the DM and the evaluations becomes vague and a matter of degree. The 
degree of matching is computed using the possibility measure and the 
necessity measure. The alternatives with the highest degree of matching are 
considered the best. 
Martel and 
Zaras method 
[56,57] 
This procedure uses the stochastic dominance to make pairwise comparison. 
These comparisons are used as partial preferences and an outranking relation 
is built based on a concordance index and discordance index. 
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Figure ‎I-5: Type of risk analysis by [54] 
Type A 
-Observation: 
No preference a priori, many decision makers, many 
stakes, qualitative information, weak knowledge, 
irrationality tendency 
-Needs: 
Decision problem structuring, Negotiate, Exchange, 
Implicate, inform 
 
Type C 
-Observation: 
No preference a priori, one 
decision maker, Scientific 
dominance, qualitative information, 
weak knowledge, deterministic 
tendency 
-Needs: 
Problem structuration 
 
Type B 
-Observation: 
Preference a priori, one decision 
maker, routine operation, 
analytical, mix information, 
Scientific dominance, deterministic 
tendency 
-Needs: 
Rapid decision, solutions 
optimization, actions 
systematization 
Type D 
-Observation: 
Non preference a priori or gradually, many decision 
makers, many stakes, heterogeneity of information and 
knowledge 
-Needs: 
Negotiate, Exchange, Implicate, inform 
Knowledge 
Information 
Decision 
level 
Operational Tactical 
Strategic 
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This figure classified decisions according to the preference, the number of decision maker, the operation type, 
etc. The axis knowledge/Information is related to the need of knowledge and information. These elements are 
placed according to the degree of information and knowledge needed. It follows then four categories A, B, C, 
D. For instance for the category A, we have weak knowledge about the context. So the need of information is 
higher for this category. From these categories the authors determined four types of methods. These are 
shown in the Figure ‎I-6. 
Figure ‎I-6: Multicriteria decision aiding methods for risk analysis type by [54] 
Type A 
ELECTRE METHODS 
NAIDE 
 
Type C 
ELECTRE METHODS 
NAIDE 
PROMETHEE 
MELCHIOR 
ORESTE 
REGIME 
Martel and Zaras method 
 
Type B 
Elementary methods 
Fuzzy maximin 
Fuzzy weighted sum 
TOPSIS 
MAVT 
UTA 
SMART 
MAUT 
AHP, EVAMIX 
Type D 
Fuzzy conjonctive/Disjunctive method 
Martel and Zaras method 
 
 
Knowledge 
Information 
Decision 
level 
Operational Tactical Strategical 
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It can be noticed that the ELECTRE (Elimination Et Choix Traduisant la Realité- Eimination and Choice 
Expressing the Reality) methods suit to A and C categories. There are few methods for the situation D on the 
contrary of the situation B. 
To determine decision maker’s preference system, Bernard Roy determined four relations: 
 Indifference: Corresponds to equivalence between two actions; 
 Strict preference: Corresponds to a significant preference of one of the two actions; 
 Low preference: Corresponds to the existence of clear and positive reason that imply a strict 
preference for one of the two actions, but these reasons are insufficient to infer either a strict 
preference to the other or an indifference between these two actions; 
 Incomparability: Corresponds to the absence of clear and positive reasons justifying one of the three 
previous situations. 
 
Figure ‎I-7: Preference relations 
From these four relations, five hybrid relations are shown in Figure ‎I-7. Through these relations, it is possible 
to build decision makers relational preference system. These relational systems are used in many methods 
and issues. 
[69] determined relevant context for ELECTRE methods. Our analysis shows that the context of this thesis 
suits ELECTRE utilization for many reasons: 
 There are many criteria; 
 Actions are evaluated for at least on criterion on an ordinal scale; 
 A strong heterogeneity related with the nature of evaluation exists among criteria (Human, 
Environment, Economy, Patrimony etc.). 
For those reasons, ELECTRE methods literature review is presented below. They are grouped by problem 
type. 
 
R 
J 
P 
Q 
~
K 
≻ 
I 
S 
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 Choice 
ELECTRE I: 
Adapted to choice problem, ELECTRE I method can identify subset of action offering best possible 
compromises by defining real-criteria [64]. It consists in partitioning the set of actions A into two 
complementary subsets N and A / N (The complementary subset of N). An outranking relation from the 
concept of concordance and discordance is defined. Thus an action A outranks action B, if the concordance 
and non discondance tests are verifyed. N is the kernel of the graph obtained by the outranking relation [62]. 
                                          (‎I-20) 
The concordance index for each pair of action         measuring the relevance of the assertion «    
outranks    » is given by: 
    
           
        
 
 (‎I-21) 
Where: 
              
          
        ; 
           ∑  ,    
        , the sum of the weight of criteria belonging to  
        ; 
           ∑  ,    
        ; 
           ∑  ,    
        ; 
           {   |             } : the set of criteria for which the action    is preferred to 
the action   ; 
                               the set of criteria for which the action    is equivalent to 
the action   ; 
                               the set of criteria for which the action    is preferred to 
the action   . 
The discordance index is defined by; 
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    {
                
 
  
   [             ]    
         
 (‎I-22) 
Where    is the amplitude of the scale associated to the criteria j for which there is the maximum of 
disagreement. The discordance test is satisfied if      .   ̂  and  ̂  are respectively the limits of 
concordance and discordance. The concordance index is generally between [          (  )]. 
ELECTRE I is theoretically and educationally interesting, it is also adapted to some practical situations. 
Indeed, in practice, a vast cloud of qualitative or quantitative elementary consequences is usually constructed 
and heterogeneous criteria which are associated to ordinal scales. In addition, data collected are equipped 
with imprecision, uncertainty and indeterminacy [70]. Furthermore this method is sensitive to concordance and 
discordance [64]. It should only be applied if all criteria were coded on a numerical scale with identical scales 
[70]. In addition, it may be that in the outranking graph there are isolated actions. These actions do not belong 
to the nuclei (hence to N). This is in our opinion a limitation of these methods that do not include all possible 
actions. 
ELECTRE IS (threshold) 
This method is designed to take into account the heterogeneity of the criteria scale and the vagueness of the 
data by using thresholds and pseudo-criteria instead of the true criteria [70]. The concordance index for each 
criterion and the overall index are calculated as following: 
    
∑            
 
   
∑   
 
   
 (‎I-23) 
Where: 
                             ; 
           
                
     
                                    
           ; 
                             . 
The discordance indices by criteria are binary and given by: 
          {
                                      
          
   
 
          
  (‎I-24) 
The discordance index is: 
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         {
                          
           
 (‎I-25) 
ELECTRE Iv 
This method overcomes the scales heterogeneity. Regardless of the types of scales, it selects the best subset 
of compromised by the introduction of veto thresholds. The approach is similar to that of ELECTRE I, the 
difference is the condition of concordance, called the condition of non-veto [70]. 
                      (‎I-26) 
To validate the assertion A outranks B, it is essential that among the minority of criterion opposing this 
assertion, none of them vetoed [70]. 
 Sorting 
ELECTRE TRI 
In the sorting process, categories must be defined in advance. ELECTRE TRI is the most used sorting 
method based on outranking relation [67]. Each reference profile r of each action A is seen as a vector 
function of some criteria. To determine whether an action    outranks the profile   , a parameter           
measuring the strength of the statement “    is as good as the profile   ” is defined. An action     is preferred 
to a profile    if             and             .   is the limit point to be determined. 
                  et              (‎I-27) 
                 et             (‎I-28) 
Once the outranking relation is constructed, its exploitation to sort alternatives is performed through several 
heuristic assignment procedures. In this method, two procedures respectively optimistic and pessimistic are 
used. In each procedure, each action is progressively compared with profiles               until the 
occurrence of one of these situations: 
                             ; 
                                                       ; 
K is the dimension of r. In the first case, both optimistic and pessimistic methods affect    to the group   . In 
the second case, the pessimistic procedure assigns    to    while the optimistic procedure assigns     to 
    . 
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 Ranking 
ELECTRE II 
This method arises from the ranking problem γ. The aim is to rank potential actions from the better to the 
worse by allowing tie [62]. The set A is provided with a structure and total pre order. This method is interesting 
from historical and pedagogical perspectives [70]. There are two outranking relations, strong and weak. This 
results in two outranking graphs whose exploitation is used for action classification. 
The concordance index is defined the same way as in ELECTRE I: 
    
           
        
 
 (‎I-29) 
Three thresholds c instead of one are defined:          which correspond to the satisfaction of the test with 
certainty. 
The concordance test is accepted if: 
     
 
  
     
 
  
     
 }
 
 
 
 
   
         
         
    (‎I-30) 
There are two discordance thresholds D1 and D2. The discordance threshold can be resumed for   
          as following: 
 If                     then there is a high uncertainty that the criterion j does not presents a 
major opposition to the outranking hypothesis; 
 If                           then there is a low certainty that the criterion j does not 
presents a major opposition to the outranking hypothesis. 
The discordance index is: 
    {
                 
[             ]       
         
 (‎I-31) 
High and low outranking relation conditions are: 
       : 
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This results in two outranking graphs to be exploited by an outranking algorithm. 
ELECTRE III 
This method was designed to accommodate imprecise, inaccurate and unreliable data. It improves the 
method ELECTRE II, by the introduction of pseudo-criteria instead of the true criteria [70], [62]. A true criterion 
is a function criterion as such: 
           {
                  
                  
 (‎I-32) 
The method introduced three so-called thresholds of indifference, strict preference and veto. 
         (‎I-33) 
The thresholds p and q can be constant or defined according to situation. 
A pseudo criterion is a function criterion to such as: 
  [    ]   [    ]
         
         
  [    ]   [    ]
         
      (‎I-34) 
          
           {
            
          [    ]
            [    ]     
       
             [    ]     
       
   [    ]  (‎I-35) 
In terms of index, ELECTRE III uses two indices for concordance: the concordance index for each criterion 
and the overall concordance index. The concordance index by criteria stated how action is as good as another 
under this criterion. The discordance is expressed through the veto threshold. The veto threshold for criterion 
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j, denoted vj is the value of the difference               from which it appears prudent to deny any 
credibility of outranking of the action    by action the   , even if all criteria are consistent with this outranking. 
ELECTRE IV 
ELECTRE IV also addresses issues γ. It is often difficult to define relative importance criteria coefficients. This 
is due to the fact that in many situations, we are not able to determine these coefficients. With this method, we 
do not need the weights of the criteria. 
Outranking assumptions, concordance and discordance are then abandoned. The method uses pseudo-
criteria. The operating procedure is the same as in ELECTRE III. It is also based on five outranking relations 
[70]. 
 Decision aiding methods 
44 
 
CONCLUSION 
Natural disasters’ analysis is investigated by many sciences. Some of them take interest in their causes when 
others focus on their consequences. Very often, consequences are assimilated to damages and prejudices 
that could affect population. At this level, there are immediate consequences which are estimable after the 
disaster; and indirect ones which are more difficult to assess. There are some models more or less efficient to 
determine economic consequences. Engineering sciences priorities have been logically oriented towards 
building construction techniques and disaster occurrence prevision. Among this category, some authors finally 
are interested by indirect effect to population. In recent years studies have addressed the concept of network 
and infrastructure as a direct component of people vulnerability. Our position is situated in this last category. 
In this category, researches are driven by local authorities in risk areas, resulted in maps, zoning and 
regulations for constructions. 
The aims of this chapter were to make a literature review about the infrastructure network in the context of 
natural disaster. We have read the essential references in this area. The review is made through two axes: 
 Vulnerability model: on this we find out that must of the authors are fused on the network structural 
parameters. We then aim to include flow circulation and the interdependences among networks; 
 Decision aiding: We have determined the group of method that suit the context of this thesis. 
On another level, the main challenge was to reconcile the different points of view on the concept of 
vulnerability. We were able to propose a vulnerability definition on the basis of this literature review. We 
determined the decision process that best suited the context of the thesis. We also analysed the aggregation 
methods. This analysis will enable us to propose the best suited in each crisis phase. 
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CHAPTER II  
MODELLING 
Résumé en Français 
Ce chapitre présente les modèles de réseau et de vulnérabilité que nous proposons. Nous commençons par 
confronter la notion d’infrastructure critique à celle de système complexe. Les composants du système final, 
justifiant cette complexité sont présentées. Nous introduisons ainsi les notions de Territoire, d’Enjeu, de  Flux, 
d’Environnement Externe, d’Évènement Redouté, et de Facteurs d’aggravation ou d’Atténuation. Les 
modalités d’interaction de ces éléments et leurs paramètres pertinents dans le contexte de cette thèse sont 
décrits. Pour être compatible avec la théorie des graphes, une approche de modélisation des 
interdépendances est proposée. Les relations sont regroupées en deux classes. Dépendance pour la partie 
fonctionnelle et Influence pour la partie dysfonctionnelle. Ces relations sont modélisées pour toutes les 
combinaisons des composants du réseau. Du point de vue modèle, les réseaux sont composés d’arêtes et de 
sommets. Nous introduirons alors des composants virtuels pour rester conforme à la théorie des graphes. Les 
sommets réels sont divisés en plusieurs catégories en fonction du traitement effectué sur les flux. Les 
concepts de vulnérabilité et de risque sont alors ré-analysé. Cette analyse conduira à distinguer deux 
composants de la vulnérabilité : La robustesse et la résilience. Les formulations de ces éléments sont 
proposées.  
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“All models are wrong, but some are useful” 
Box, 1979 
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INTRODUCTION 
As seen in the previous chapter, there are several vulnerability models in the literature. Most of these models 
are based on the network structure and disregard the flow circulation and the existence of interdependences. 
The objective of this chapter is to offer models that overcome these shortcomings. 
We begin by confronting notion of critical infrastructure to that of complex system. The components of the final 
system, justifying this complexity are presented. Thus, we introduce the concepts of Territory, Stake, Flow, 
External Environment, Feared Event, and Aggravating or Mitigating Factor. Detailed interaction rules between 
these elements and their relevant parameters in the context of this thesis are described. To be compatible 
with the graph theory, an interdependence modelling approach is proposed. Relationships are grouped into 
two classes. Dependence is related to the functional part and Influence is related to the dysfunctional part. 
These relationships are modelled for all combinations of the network components. From a model perspective, 
network is a graph composed of edges and nodes. We will then introduce virtual components to remain 
consistent with the graph theory. The real nodes are divided into several categories depending on the 
processing performed on flow. The concepts of vulnerability and risk are then analysed. This analysis will lead 
to distinguish two components of vulnerability: the robustness and the resilience. The formulations of these 
elements are proposed. 
I.3: VULNERABLE SYSTEM REPRESENTATION 
 
II.1.1 COMPLEX SYSTEM 
The term System commonly refers to complex entity treated (with respect to certain purposes) as a whole. It 
consists of elements and relationships between them, and defined according to the place they occupy in the 
totality [52]. Regarding system definitions in the literature, there are two schools of thoughts. The first one 
represents systems regarding their constitutions (structure). The second one defines them according to the 
provided services (dynamic and function). With respect to the first standpoint, a system is either a finite 
number of elements in relationship, forming a whole [71], or a set of interactive and interconnected elements 
[72], [73]. For the second point of view, a system is defined as a coherent set of elements or processes 
sharing objectives, responsibilities or common missions [17]. Each group disregards the aspects presented by 
the other group. Under these circumstances, we decided to propose a more generic definition. 
The notions of, complexity concept is found in several scientific and philosophical disciplines. But historically 
complexity was more a philosophical than a scientific topic. [74] examines historical processes that have 
made of complexity for a scientific problem. The author supports the thesis of the progressive recognition of 
complexity in science. According to this theory, complexity can be seen as a process having evolved through 
three major steps since the 17th century: detection, recognition and reflection. 
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 Detection: From the 17th to the 19th century, this stage is denial and invisibility of the complexity in 
scientific paradigm. It is based on the paradigm of simplification. Knowledge is necessary based on 
reduction and disjunction (separate and isolate). This is the case in the mechanical models and 
Newtonian physics; 
 Recognition: From the 19th to the 20th century it is the partial recognition of complexity. The 
complexity is then disorganized. For instance in statistical models and Thermodynamic; 
 Reflection: The explicit complexity as described by Warren Weawer, appears in the middle of the 
20th century (Systemic Models and Complex Systems). Complexity is seen then as a scientific 
object explicitly and systematically investigated. 
Through these steps, complexity referred to several attributes (Emergence, Uncertainty, Chao, Contradiction, 
Hazard, Temporality, Interaction, Inseparability, Inter definition, High Organization, etc.). These attributes are 
found in many modern scientific disciplines. Like cybernetic, general system theory, information theory, 
catastrophe theory, theory of complex systems etc. 
The term infrastructure will be adopted in this thesis to characterize a system based on a network. With regard 
to infrastructure network, the complexity is justified by the high number of integrated technologies, system 
states, state variables and sensitivity to risk [75]. Moreover, infrastructures consists of large numbers of 
elements and relationships, with nonlinear interactions, time delays and unintended feedback loops that can 
lead to unpredictable behaviour [71]. From these attributes infrastructure network can be then considered as a 
complex system. 
In another perspective, despite the number of component, complexity could be a view of an actor relative to 
the objective. For instance a mobile phone can be simple in use, but complex in its components integration. 
This same phone will not have the same complexity for its architect and a student in electronic. A complex 
system at a given time for an analyst is defined in this thesis as a system composed of several entities, from 
different nature, whose functional dynamics differs from that of its constituents. 
This discussion brings us to the question “ is every complex system a critical system”. The next definition tries 
to answer that question. 
II.1.2 CRITICAL SYSTEM 
Components do not generate the same consequences in terms of failure. Their criticality depends on the 
fraction of provided service. [76] states that critical components are components whose failure could cause 
large negative consequences that affect system ability in providing allocated services [76]. This definition is 
not relevant in the context of interdependence. In such context, a minor component failure might have large 
negative consequences. 
A critical system has been defined with respect to the risk incurred by stakes. Similarly we define a critical 
component in relationship to critical system vulnerability: 
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Definition ‎II-1 : Critical component is a component whose failure puts the constitutive system in an 
undesired vulnerability state. 
The concepts of vulnerability and its assessment will be presented in the section ‎I.5:. 
II.1.2.1 CRITICITY CONCEPT APPLIED TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Figure ‎II-1: Global System overview 
Infrastructure network is named critical infrastructures, lifeline systems [77], systems-of-systems [77], critical 
infrastructure systems [78], critical system, complex system, technical infrastructure, socio-technical system, 
complex system, vital infrastructure, large-scale system, system of systems [23], super-system, technological 
networks [79] etc. 
Whatever the term used, their failure analysis involves many other entities which can be seen as 
interconnected systems or system of systems. We face then a systemic organization described by [80] as 
constituted of three sub-systems: operation system, information system, and control system. This subdivision 
is a low level one. In a high level, the global system is constituted of 5 sub-systems: Territory including 
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aggravation and mitigation factors, Stake, Flow, the Environment which is mostly made up by Feared Event 
and the Infrastructure network itself. These systems are presented in the Figure ‎II-1. In the context of this 
thesis, these systems are divided into four views: structural, functional, organizational, and external. Each 
view contains some elements of the global system. They are broken down as following: 
 Organisation: Territory, Stake; 
 Function: Flow; 
 Exterior: Feared event, Environment; 
 Structure: Infrastructure network. 
Consequently, in this thesis, a system will be defined as a set of interconnected entities facilitating flow 
circulation, in order to fulfil specified functions. The interaction between the subsystems shown in Figure ‎II-1 
will induce a certain vulnerability whose scope may be greater or less. Any analysis should then go through a 
modelling of all entities involved. 
The term critical system is used in the literature to refer to a set of interrelated elements integrating 
management and control processes [17]. A system criticality depends on its geographic, political-economic, 
and administrative context. Then criticality is justified from a societal perspective by the system in large size 
and high complexity [81]. We can conclude then that complexity is one of the criticality sources. Little (2003) 
defined critical systems as entities whose failure or destruction can have debilitating impact on defense or 
nation’s economic security [82]. 
Unlike system, infrastructure connotes civil engineering, reminiscent structures and buildings [17]. Societies 
proper functioning relies on infrastructure services. Without water, electricity, gas or roads a modern city could 
not survive. Infrastructure has several meanings. The definition provided by [83] is adopted in this thesis. 
Definition ‎II-2 : Infrastructure is a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made 
systems and processes that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a 
continuous flow of essential goods and services [83]. 
This definition underlines the fact that the term infrastructure is related to the flows functioning between 
components. 
In that way, network such as power grid, telecommunications and gas system can be viewed as Infrastructure. 
This view is enhanced by [84] who define infrastructure systems as “a collection of nodes and arcs with 
material flowing from node to node along paths in the network. 
Some infrastructure might be more critical than other. An infrastructure becomes critical when it provides 
some service without which society or the economy cannot engage in normal operations [79]. Critical 
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infrastructure are defined as those that provides life-essential services such as : shelter, food, water, 
sanitation, evacuation and transportation and access to financial resources [19]. 
They must be considered – to different degrees – as complex interconnected systems embedded in a rapidly 
changing environment. 
As a consequence, the systems may be operating closer to their limits [79]. Another definition is provided by 
[84]. The authors define critical infrastructure as “infrastructure that are so vital that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on defense or economic security” [84]. From this point of view, 
every system might be critical. Indeed, because of the interdependence, each system failure can impact on 
the economic security if any action is taken. The fact that no society can live without these infrastructures 
justifies the term critical related to their designation. Theses definitions seem too general in our sense. That is 
why we provide the following definition: 
Definition ‎II-3: A critical system is a system whose disruption leads to unacceptable risk for territories 
and stakes under consideration. 
From this point of view, networks, such as power grid, water, telecommunication, gas systems, and roads can 
be considered as critical system. 
Critical systems are composed of elements considered as individual entities called components [72]. 
Definitions of these elements are given bellow. 
II.1.2.2 COMPONENTS OF A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM 
Many terms are used to make reference to infrastructure network. Numerous concepts are difficult to 
differentiate. In this section we provide an accurate view on the components of a critical infrastructure system. 
 Territory 
Vulnerability analysis is performed by local authority related to a geographic area named the territory. The 
territory is a portion of geographical space that coincides with the spatial extension of a government’s 
jurisdiction [85]. It is the component that will mitigate or aggravate the feared event effect on the population. 
City like Paris or Conakry will be considered as territory. 
We have chosen to distinguish the territory from the population insomuch as there are some populations that 
have no stable territory1. It structures space as the localization of actions; a short of spatial framework of 
                                                             
1 This is true of some nomadic peoples. Otherwise territory can be uninhabited 
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every activity [86]. From these points of view, we define territory as a geographic zone administratively 
independent, supporting infrastructure networks. It might be a municipality, a city, a country etc.  
Many territories might be provided by a single network. Moreover one territory generally hosts many networks. 
Furthermore decisions taken by one of them might be different even contradictory to others. For this reason, 
they are separated from each other. Every territory is integrated in the system model. Territory is 
characterized by its limits, decision makers, set of actions, feared events and stretch. The stretch is the 
surface area. 
Infrastructure network provides flows to some entities whose preservation is essential for the territory. Such 
entity named stake is presented in the next section. 
 Stakes 
The stake is a material or immaterial entities consuming flow and providing a function whose deterioration is 
damageable or prejudicial for the society. It is assimilated to Societal Critical Function in [87]. 
For instance the stake can be a firm, a habitation, a government institution etc. 
The population is the group of people living in a given territory or likely to be affected by a feared event. It is 
the central element of our model and is divided into three dependent factors: psychological (stress, fear); 
physiological (age, sex, health), economical (healthiness or poverty). 
Feared event, factor, and flow are susceptible to affect stakes in their stenches. The action is on one of stake 
attributes. 
For instance an earthquake could change the mean time to the repair of one stake. 
Another possibility would be that stake resistance is superior to the feared event amplitude. It will then resist 
to the feared event. Affected stakes might lead to many consequences: Human, national security, 
environment, economy, cultural heritage, legislation, politics, education, comfort. 
Energy, matter, and information travel in the network through flow presented in the next section. 
 Flow 
Flow represents matter, energy and information circulating from sources to target nodes. Its circulation 
aptitude in network is a vulnerability indicator [88]. In this thesis flow is separated from the infrastructure itself 
and supposed to be discrete. This distinction is made because of that feared event might affect one without 
the others. It circulates at a nominal speed according to a circulation law. In this model the flow may fail and 
recover its good working state after a mean time to recover. 
The failure of a flow may affect other components (factor, stake, feared event, etc.). 
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15 types of flow have been identified in this thesis: Human, Electricity, Drinking water, Sewage, Information, 
Good, Gas, Car, Truck, Boat, Train, Hydro carbide, Waste, Plane and Money. 
Every type is endowed with some particular parameters. For example for the drinking water physic-chemical 
parameters are taken into account. Flow has also a resistance against feared events and factors. 
Network functioning is governed by the external environment presented in the next section. 
 External environment 
So far only the component effects on each other have been considered; nevertheless, the functioning of a 
component can also be altered by the operating environment. Environment effect is taken into account 
through component weight. The weight might be geodesic distance between nodes, or any relevant criteria for 
the analysis (cost, time). For the weight assessment, analyst determines the study context including: 
 Method: Detection Systems, Software; 
 Material: Emergency devices; 
 Methods: Maintenance process, norms and regulations; 
 Environment: Temperature, electromagnetic pulse, soil and subsoil; 
 Workforce: Operators, analysts, decision makers; 
 Moment: season, time. 
We argue that weights are time-dependent functions. For instance, in French power grid distribution, the cost 
depends on the period (less expensive in the nights) and the weather conditions (rain, snow, sun…). Edges 
weight obtained by environment parameters aggregation is out of the scope of this thesis. Edge weight 
determines the flows circulation. Because of that, environment affects the resulting robustness and reliance. 
Above systems are affected by feared event. Feared occurrence processes are presented in the next section. 
 Feared event 
Vulnerability analysis is performed against specified feared events. The analysis assumes the presence of 
anthropic or natural phenomena which is not under control. In the literature feared event is called Incident, 
Hazard [89], [21], disturbance, threat [78], elementary event, initiating events, perturbation [14], strain, danger, 
accident, uncertainty [43]. 
 Accident is a disruptive element that can change a system state [17] or chain of unintentional and 
fortuitous events causing damage. Incident is an event , which directly can result in considerable 
reduction or interruptions in the serviceability of a link/route/road network [21]; 
 According to the French Institute of Cyndinique, danger is the system tendency to generate one or 
 Modelling 
54 
 
more accidents; 
 Hazard is defined as “a generic class grouping a set of potential causes as well as causes’ 
generators” [90]. It is a natural or anthropic phenomenon, harmful to the human being, whose 
consequences appear because of the fact that safety measures have been exceeded [15]. Hazard is 
normally used for strains on a system stemming from non-man-made sources such as earthquakes, 
severe weather conditions or tsunami [19]. But in this thesis the concept is generalized to the others 
feared events; 
The term feared event will be adopted in this thesis. The adopted definition is given in the following. 
Definition ‎II-4 : Feared event is a natural or anthropic phenomenon for which it’s not possible to 
predict together the occurrence and the intensity, and susceptible to affect stake [91]. 
Thus, a feared event may be natural, climatic, technical, human, an act of sabotage, terrorism or war [14]. In 
the nature, there are mainly seven types of natural feared event that may affect the networks: earthquakes, 
earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, fires, cyclones, and storms. 
Feared event is characterized by the fact that it has a negative influence on the network functioning [89]. They 
are dependent. An earthquake can cause a tsunami or fire. In our model, feared event occurs with a 
frequency and amplitude. Its occurrence point is situated on the territory. From its occurrence time, the feared 
event will spread out on its stench according to a speed and a propagation mode. It will last for a given time. 
Component for which the resistance to the feared event type is below the amplitude will break down. The 
specificity of Feared event is that we cannot predict its occurrence date and its intensity at the same time. 
From this perspective, a predicted snowstorm with a determined intensity could not be considered as a 
Feared Event. On the other hand, if for some reason, this intensity cannot be approximated with an 
acceptable leeway, the snowstorm becomes in this case a feared event. 
It should be noted that a phenomenon which does not affect any stake could not be considered as a feared 
event. For instance, an earthquake in an inhabited area without infrastructure will not be a feared event 
whatever its frequency and its intensity are. Other parameters than frequencies and intensities are to be taken 
into account in the feared event analysis like failure mode, number and detectability of heralds signs. In this 
thesis feared events are represented by natural disasters, system elements failure (node, edge, flow, and 
factor). 
When affected by the feared event, the component will change state. According to [19], a vulnerable system 
goes from a planned state to an unwanted state. The authors show that for a system of n components having 
k faulty elements, the number of possible state of the system is a combination of these n elements taken k by 
k:   
 . 
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For a network with a size of 800 with three faulty components, the number of states is nearly 85 million. 
A system is then characterized by several states. System state is a particular combination of its component 
states [73]. Considering different states of the system represents one of the difficulties in vulnerability analysis 
which is the exploration of these states for consequence estimation. 
There are many approaches to assess the system state. Stochastic models like Markov or Poisson processes 
can be used to predict the behaviour of system in uncertain environment. But these methods lack the 
capability to completely capture the underlying structure of the system and the ability to adapt to failures of 
subsystems when strong interdependencies exist [23]. In this thesis, to predict system behaviour, a simulation 
is performed to obtain the system final state. One element could fail in various ways. Any flow will pass 
through a failing element. In the following, the element failure modes are presented. 
 Failure by unreliability: One component characterized by reliability different from 1 could fail during 
the simulation. The component will recover its working state after its mean time to repair; 
 Failure by flow: Another failure mode is given by flow congestion. A component will break down if its 
capacity in one flow overpasses flow quantity. Electricity overload well describes such situation. In 
particular, flow consuming component will fail if its consumption is more than the available flows; 
 Failure by influence: At least, a component will break down if it is linked to another failing component 
by an influence. 
 Failure by feared event, factor or flow effect: At the feared event occurrence, it will affect all 
components in its stench. Those for whom the resistance is under the feared event amplitude would 
fail. Otherwise factor can aggravate or mitigate feared event effects. In this thesis a feared event is 
characterized meanly by its occurrence probability and its amplitude. Three principal ways are 
presented by [14] to assess a feared occurrence probability: Statistical analysis of empirical 
disturbance (accident) data, Mathematical modelling combined with empirical component data, 
Expert judgments. We preconize to use vulnerability maps instead of expert judgement. In most 
cases, territories have vulnerability maps. On these maps feared event likelihood is distinguished by 
a colour. In such situation, each colour corresponds to a probability and amplitude. These elements 
could be used in the vulnerability analysis. The analysis will consist in this case to take into account 
high probability area and to make analysis for these areas. 
The main element of our model is the infrastructure network itself. Its modelling is presented in the next. 
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I.4: NETWORK MODELLING 
 
II.1.3 NETWORK DEFINITION 
Societies’ well-functioning relies on many aspects. Political stability and good finance seem obvious. On a 
technical aspect, the infrastructure provides citizen with goods and services. Among these infrastructures, 
networks such as power grid, telecommunication and gas systems occupy a prominent place. The definition 
provided by the American Critical Foundation [22] underlines that infrastructure is a set of interconnected 
components providing goods and services for society’s well-functioning. Infrastructure is the physical support 
for flow circulation. It is the main element in the system of systems overview. Its failure could lead to stake, 
territory or flow vulnerabilities. 
 
Table ‎II-1: Network classification 
The main issue in most territorial vulnerability analysis is the infrastructure network identification. Indeed, 
critical system for one stake is not necessarily critical for another one. In a report from the American Critical 
Foundation, it listed nine critical infrastructures: Transportation; Oil and Gas Production and Storage; Water; 
Emergency Services; Government Services; Banking and Finance; Electrical Power; and Telecommunications 
[22]. In a comprehensive way, we have classified infrastructure network according to the flow circulation and 
the physical structure. The structure is either artificial or hybrid. Artificial ones are totally man made. On the 
contrary, hybrid structure includes natural entity like shipping. Fully natural structures are not considered in 
our point of view as infrastructure network. 
According to Figure ‎II-1, infrastructure networks can be classified into the following classes: 
 Material artificial network; 
 Material hybrid network; 
 Energy network; 
 
Flow 
Mater Energy Information 
Structure 
Artificial 
Motorway network, Railway 
network, Drinking water 
system, Waste water system 
Power grid, 
Gas network, 
Computer network 
Hybrid Aviation system, Shipping  
Telecommunication 
system 
 Network Definition 
57 
 
 Information artificial network; 
 Information hybrid network; 
 Second level network: Second level network is the other network based on the previous. In this 
category figure Hydro Carbide, Hospital, Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC), Food, Audio Visual, 
Post, Bank and Finance. These networks rely on and use the previous ones. 
For instance a hospital network will use road and air for transportation, drinking water and sewage. 
The above list shows that infrastructure is mostly man made, but can be natural in some situation (air and 
shipping). Conducting an analysis for all systems is not feasible in real situations, because of budget and time 
reasons. The first difficulty faced by decision makers will then be the identification of the appropriate systems 
for the analysis. Due to the high relationship with other networks, power grid appears to be the most critical 
system [92]. But, others systems such as water, telecommunication, transport can be added [17],[92]. 
Another alternative in network identification consists in relying on current regulations. Recommendations are 
done by some institutions like the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) which recognizes five 
strategic networks (electricity, gas, water, rail transport, and internet). For the European Union, a critical 
infrastructure is defined as “those assets or parts thereof which are essential for the maintenance of critical 
societal functions, including the supply chain, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of 
people”. Based on this definition, it classifies infrastructure by sector shown Table ‎II-2. 
 
Table ‎II-2: Critical networks according to European Union, 2004 
In the absence of explicit regulation, selection and prioritization of critical systems can be done by a multi-
criteria approach. This approach might be based on decision maker’s objectives. 
Sector Sub-sector 
Energy 
Electricity 
Infrastructure and facilities for the production and transmission, with respect to 
electricity supply 
Petrol Oil production, refining, processing, storage and distribution by pipelines 
Gas 
Gas production, refining, processing, storage and distribution by pipeline 
LNG terminals 
Transport 
Road 
Rail 
Air 
Inland navigation 
Deep sea and short sea shipping and ports 
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Infrastructure modelling is then a challenging task. To achieve this goal, the approach adopted in this thesis is 
presented in the next section. 
II.1.4 NETWORK REPRESENTATION FEATURES 
 
II.1.4.1 MODELLING RULES 
Graph theory modelling is mainly chosen for infrastructure modelling. We decided to adopt this theory since it 
allows the representation of the majority of communication and transportation systems [79]. 
A finite graph         is defined by a finite set of nodes              ;         and a finite set of 
edges               ; (|E|=M). 
For example in the railway transportation, nodes are stations and edges are rails. 
The literature review allowed us to identify some shortcomings. 
As far as we are concerned we argue that: 
 Graphs should be oriented and weighted. The weight may be a loss (voltage drop), cost, or any other 
relevant criteria for the analysis; 
 There are several flows for each component. These flows can be information, service, energy, and 
goods. They transit from source nodes to target nodes; 
 Flows dynamic is determined by a circulation law; 
 Different types of nodes exist. They depend on the function performed in the network. 
 Edges are direction 
 
Figure ‎II-2: Undirected network 
1 
3 4 
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Figure ‎II-3: Directed network 
Not taking into account the edges orientation could screw the results of vulnerability analysis. In order to 
demonstrate that, let’s consider two unweighted graphs shown in Figure ‎II-2 and Figure ‎II-3. 
In Figure ‎II-2, the edges are not directed; the distance between nodes (1) and (5) is 2 units. On the contrary in 
Figure ‎II-3, edges are directed bringing this same distance to 3 units. Because of edge orientation, it is no 
longer possible to go from (1) to 5 through (2). Oriented graphs are found in many technological networks. 
This is the case of roads where highways are oriented as well as in power grid where power is transmitted 
from sources to targets. 
A modification of the distance has significant consequences on the network structural parameters. 
 Edge weight 
Related to infrastructure networks, edges are often weighted. The weight could be a length, cost, impedance 
etc. To show the importance of weight, let us consider the Figure ‎II-2. As in the previous example, the 
distance between vertices (1) and (5) through (2) is two units. And the distance between these same two 
nodes through (3) and (4) is three units. If we assign weights to the edges as in the Figure ‎II-4, these 
distances become 11 and 7 respectively. The second path is then the shortest. The shortest path between 
two vertices is closely related to the weight of the edges and not taking it into account can affect the structural 
parameters of vulnerability. In our point of view, the weight must reflect at least the geodesic distance, time 
and cost. 
 
Figure ‎II-4: Weighted graph 
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 The node type 
 
Figure ‎II-5: Network of same type of node 
 
Figure ‎II-6: Network with different types of node 
Network is composed of edges and nodes considered as its elementary entity [73]. In the modelling 
techniques, there are several types of components. [24] pointed out in-feed nodes, supply nodes, and source 
nodes. For [14] they are called generation, delivery systems and users. 
By analysing the above two networks (Figure ‎II-6 and Figure ‎II-5), one can say about the graph shown in 
Figure ‎II-5, that node (3) is the most important in term of flow circulation because of its central position. On the 
contrary in the Figure ‎II-6, node (3) is used as a transporting node; nodes (2) and (5) are the destination 
nodes, and (4) is a production node. This differentiation is performed through their shapes in Figure ‎II-6. In 
this configuration node (4) will be the most important. By removing it in the network, flow will not circulate 
unlike in the first case. The network structure is less affected by removing (4) than (3), but the function is 
much more dependent on (4) than (3). 
To tackle this problem and those cited above, we argue that nodes must represent a Source, a Treatment, a 
Target, or a Relay. This classification is based on the flow dynamic. The component type is determined for 
every flow. So a component might be source for one flow and treatment for another. 
 Source: A source component produces flow. For such component, the flow output quantity is 
superior to the same nature of input quantity. 
For example a nuclear power plant is a source for electricity flow. 
1 3 
4 
5 
2 
5 
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4 
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 Treatment: A Component treats a flow, whether by internal processes, it changes the qualitative 
attributes of this one. 
For example, a sewage treatment station is a treatment component in sewage network. 
 Target: A component is a target for a flow if for this one its output quantity is inferior to its input 
quantity. These nodes are those supply flows to relevant stakes. 
For instance they may be the last switching station or a water tower. 
 Relay: A node relays a flow if this one is only passing it. In such a situation, there is no production, 
no treatment, and no consumption. This is the case of subway stations. If it comes to edges, this 
function means transport. 
Considering the assumptions presented in this paragraph, any infrastructure can be modelled by a set of 
these four nodes and weighted edges. Network components are characterized by their reliability, the mean 
time to repair, a resistance against feared events, flows, and factors. There are other parameters like the 
testability not relevant in the context of this thesis. A component can carry many types of flow. According to its 
type, it would be endowed with a treatment coefficient for a flow. These parameters come from specialized 
database or from network manager. Reliability might include many local parameters: corrosion, sub 
component qualities etc. 
Interdependence might exist inside infrastructures. Cascading failure could result from interdependence 
occurrence. In the next section, we present interdependence modelling technique compatible with the graph 
theory. 
II.1.4.2 RELATIONSHIP TYPOLOGY 
Relationship is also called interdependence, dependency, dependence, interdependency [87], 
interconnectedness [87]. Those terms refer to relationship between two components of same or different 
networks. Because of interdependence, one network failure may affect other networks. For instance in July 
2012, a blackout in India affected over 620 million people. Activity of most affected areas where paralyzed. 
Interdependence science are relatively immature [93]. It is defined as a bidirectional relationship between two 
infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the 
other [94]. However, this definition does not take into account interdependence related to flow circulation. For 
this reason we define relationship as a process through which a component is provided in flow or affected by 
another component malfunction. Interdependence could be functional or representative of a constraint. 
They are the main cause of performance drop [95] and feared event propagation [17]. Because of them, the 
analyst might be placed in a radical uncertainty or ignorance situation [96]. The main difficulty in networks 
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modelling is therefore to take interdependence into account. The types of interdependence uncounted in the 
literature are presented in the next section. In the literature, interdependence study could be classified 
according to their type, their level and their visualization. 
[93] describes four types of relationship: functional (or physical), geographical, cybernetic and logical. 
 Physical relationship is due to flow exchange between components. For example, water system 
needs electricity to run properly; 
 Geographic relationship is related to component proximity. It occurs when two components are 
geographically close, and when the failure of one may cause the failure of the other. (E.g. explosion 
of a gas line damaging power lines nearby); 
 Cybernetic relationship comes from information transfer. This relationship can be found for instance 
between power grid control and monitoring systems and computer networks. Indeed, information 
required for monitoring must go through computer networks. 
 Finally, logical relationship is related to contextual, economic, social and / or political realities [17]. It 
is through this mechanism that, for instance the war in Libya increased fuel prices in European 
countries. 
In order to model relations, [84] have identified five types of relationship: 
 Input: In this relationship, the output of the first system is the input of the second; 
 Mutual dependence is related to two or more systems. In such relationship the output of each system 
is an input of the other system; 
 The Co-located relationship exists for systems positioned in the same geographic area. 
 Shared refers to components that have a common section of the infrastructure system; 
 Exclusive-or is associated to infrastructure system sections that support only one service at a time. 
Interdependence is categorized by [87] by level. The authors distinguish between direct (first order) and 
indirect (second order) interdependence. If, for example infrastructure   depends on infrastructure j, and 
infrastructure j depends on infrastructure k, there is a second order (indirect) dependency between i and k. 
Another approach is presented by [78]. The authors defined a graph as          . Where   is the set 
of nodes and   is the set of edges.   represents the adjacent matrix of the graph with     equal to   if there is 
an edge joining node   to the node   and   otherwise. Interdependence node are then seen by the authors as 
weighted and this weight depends on the loads of the two nodes. To visualize and communicate 
interdependences to the stakeholders, ‘‘cascade diagram’’ is introduced by [87]. 
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Figure ‎II-7:Example of cascading diagram by [87] 
 Lack of interdependence modelling 
Interdependences presented in the three previous sections have some shortcomings discussed in the present 
section. By considering [93] modelling the main lake is the confusion between logical and geographical 
dependence. These two relationships are similar. In both relationships, there is a state of one component that 
might lead to the other component malfunction. 
In another word, the model presented by [84] does not consider flow direction, nor component states. Indeed 
a component   might be dependent on a component   without   being dependent on  . Mutual dependence 
seems to be two relationships Input. It is also very similar to Share relationship. Indeed, only flows direction 
and component number varies. Moreover two components co-located in the same geographic area, might not 
be interdependent. Geographic proximity does not mean absolute colocation. Shared and Exclusive-or are 
similar. They represent logical dependence described by [93]. In addition, [84] do not differentiate types of 
Input. Indeed, depending on the flow nature many types of the relationship Input might exist. In the authors’ 
point of view, Input might include components of the same network. On the contrary relationships may exist 
only between network components carrying different flows. The model proposed by the authors does not take 
into account directed relationship, neither and the fact that in many realistic situations, one node can handle 
many flows. 
Finally, diagrams proposed by [87] allow interdependence representation but not their modelling for risk or 
vulnerability assessment. To overcome these shortcomings, our method is presented in the next section. 
 Relationship classification 
For interdependence modelling, we argue that physical, functional, and cybernetic dependences might be 
grouped under the name of Dependence. Indeed only the nature of the flows is different in these cases. 
Initiating 
Event 
SCF1 
SCF 1.1.1 
SCF 1.1.2 
SCF 1.1.3 
SCF 1.1.4 SCF2 Stop 
SCF3 Stop 
SCF 1.1 
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In addition, for reasons of etymology, geographic dependence is called Influence. In case of dependence or 
influence in both directions, it will be talked about interdependence or interinfluence. Dependence and 
Influence are specialization of Relationship. 
From this point of view, dependence is functional and influence is dysfunctional. Relationship might exist 
between components of same or different subsystem. 
Relationships exist between networks. These relationships are represented in the following table. 
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Table ‎II-3 : Relationship between networks 
Table ‎II-3 shows relations between networks. Relations between similar networks are not considered. High 
relations are represented by red arrays and low ones by orange arrays. The intensity of the relationship is 
traduced by the increasing grayling of the cells. The matrix is obtained by an intuitive approach based on the 
literature. It shows two types of relations. These relations are presented in the section ‎II.1.4.2. The main 
criterion retained is the quantity of flow consumed for de relation “dependence”. 
For instance railway has a strong dependence on the power grid because of the electricity consumption. But it 
is considered nondependent from the sewage. 
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II.1.5 NETWORK MODELLING TECHNIQUES 
 
II.1.5.1 RELATIONSHIP REPRESENTATION 
Interdependence identification is performed by the analysis. This step is a crucial one. Indeed, data are often 
non-existent, protected by confidentiality, or unusable. The required data consists of data relating to territories. 
 Dependence modeling 
Any arc between two nodes materializes dependence. In general, a component   depends on a component 
  whether there is a flow transiting between   and  . 
Dependence is represented by outgoing arrow pointing the next node in the flow direction. 
 
Figure ‎II-8: Dependence relationship 
Dependence situation can be found in the subway where stations need rails to exist. Station without incoming 
or outgoing communications would not have any sense. 
 Influence modeling 
A component   is influenced by a component    if there is at least one failure state of   causing an 
unacceptable failure state of  . Therefore the influence between components exists only for some states, 
named influence states. Components involved in influences are represented by a finite number of states. 
Among them, are at least three states: good working condition, degraded state and failure state. At the 
beginning, components are generally supposed to be in working conditions state. 
Influence is represented by a dotted edge. Figure ‎II-9 represents an influence edge. 
 
Figure ‎II-9: Dependence relation 
Taking into account the component states and the direction of flows, all types of links can be modelled either 
by dependence or by influence. 
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Influence could be encountered in a situation where the explosion of a water tower floods an electricity sub-
station. 
II.1.5.2 NETWORK COMPONENT CONNEXIONS 
Relationships, if they exist, are between components of networks and flow. In general, there are four natures 
of relationship: Node-Node, Node-Edge, Edge-Node, and Edge-Edge. 
Modelling techniques of these relationships are presented in the following. 
 Relationship Node -Node 
Relationships between two nodes of different types can be dependence or influence. Johansson and Hassel 
(2010) materialize dependence between nodes by an edge. We argue that dependence edges might be 
oriented like other edges. So, if a node (2) is functionally dependent on a node (1), this dependence is 
materialized by an oriented edge starting from (1) to arrive at (2) in Figure ‎II-10. 
 
Figure ‎II-10: Dependence Node-Node 
Influence may exist between nodes of the same type (explosion of a gas tank causing damage to another gas 
tank), or between nodes of different types (destruction of a water tower, flooding a substation). However, 
dependence between nodes of the same type will be represented by normal edges. 
 Relationship Node-Edge 
Relationships do not exist only between nodes. But they also exist between a node and an edge. In order to 
model influences and dependences between components, virtual edges and virtual nodes are introduced. 
Virtual component (edge or node) can carry all flows; its reliability is assumed to be 1. Every edge involved in 
a relationship instantiates a virtual edge. Virtual edges and nodes are represented by dotted components in 
Figure ‎II-11. 
 
 
Figure ‎II-11: Virtual components 
Dependence Node-Edge is illustrated in Figure ‎II-12. For influence, the dependence edge is replaced by an 
influence edge. 
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Figure ‎II-12: Relationship Node-Edge 
In some situations, a power line can be damaged by the explosion of a gas expansion station. In such 
situations, there is an influence from the gas station to the power line. 
Relationship Node-Edge is also encountered when a node can provide flows directly to an edge. 
This situation is those in sea and air transportation where tags transmit information to plane and ships. 
 Relationship Edge -Node 
The relationship Edge-Node represents a direct link without an intermit node. Influence Edge-Node is 
represented by Figure ‎II-13. In case of dependence, the influence node is replaced by a dependence node. 
 
Figure ‎II-13: Influence Node-Edge 
In some real cases, a water pipeline can supply a thermal power station. In such situations, there are 
dependence between the pipeline and the power station. 
 Relationship Edge-Edge 
The relation Edge-Edge is rare in a real situation. It represents the fact that two nodes could be linked without 
intermediary nodes. This kind of relationship Edge-Edge is represented in Figure ‎II-14. 
 
Figure ‎II-14: Relationship Edge-Edge 
Relationships between edges can be found in rail transport. Rails and electricity are closely linked to a 
functional point of view. 
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In the previous sections we have presented a modelling approach of involved entities in the networks 
vulnerability analysis. After determining the shortcoming of literature review on modelling by the graph theory, 
we presented a method including interdependences modelling. The different types of interdependence 
identified allow every situation modelling. Subsequently, we have determined the parameters of other systems 
and defined the interaction modes. 
The next section presents the dynamics factors to be implemented in the system model. 
II.1.5.3 DYNAMIC FACTORS 
Dynamic parameters are at the origin of the global fluctuation of the system state. Generally, all of the 
elements described in ‎II.1.2.2 are dynamics due to the change in their parameters. However in terms of 
participation in cascading failures, flows and aggravating factors are prominent. Flow  dynamic is regulated by 
circulation law [91]. That is why we present them in the following two sections. 
 Circulation laws 
The circulation law describes the path in the physical network. We argue that each flow in network might have 
at least one circulation law. Law takes into account the path in the network. In the absence of explicit function, 
circulation law of one flow will be equitably shared among component at any time. 
In the literature there are some models to determine the distribution of load of edges. [78] argues that when 
edge     is damaged, the load of the broken edge will be redistributed to the neighbouring edge connecting to 
node i and node  . The additional load received by edge     is defined by [78]: 
        
   
∑     ∑            
 (‎II-1) 
Where    and    are sets of neighbouring edges connecting to node   and node  . 
           
 ,   is an adjustable parameter which controls the strength of the initial load of edge. 
In this thesis the circulation law is a set of ordered components: 
                         (‎II-2) 
    is the circulation law of the flow f. 
 Mitigation and aggravation factors 
In the nature, some elements might mitigate or aggravate the stake consequences. 
For example a dam can mitigate vulnerability related to flood, but its failure is a source of aggravation. 
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Factor is related to elements (flow, feared event, stake, network component, interdependence, another factor 
etc.). When a factor is activated, it will affect parameter of elements in its stench (amplitude, frequency, speed 
etc.). 
Factors have several amplitudes related to the parameter types of elements that are susceptible to be 
affected. It reacts faster or slower depending on its action speed. Unlike the feared event, factor is active all 
the time. The action mode involves adding or subtracting factor amplitude and parameter type of the affected 
element. 
One factor may be affected by feared event types or other factor types. For each of these elements, it can 
resist up to a certain threshold. For example, a dam can withstand an earthquake in a certain level. Mitigation 
factor can be emergency devices. Those are defined by the American Critical Foundation, as “critical 
infrastructure characterized by medical, police, fire, and rescue systems and personnel that are called upon 
when an individual or community is responding to emergencies” [22]. 
I.5: VULNERABILITY MODELLING 
There is no methodology for vulnerability analysis accepted by all. From the point of view of the American 
Critical Foundation, vulnerability analysis is a “Systematic examination of a critical infrastructure, the 
interconnected systems on which it relies, its information, or product to determine the adequacy of security  
measures, identify security deficiencies, evaluate security alternatives, and verify the adequacy of such 
measures after implementation” [22]. The methodology presented in this thesis starts by focusing on the 
context. It tries to answer the following questions: 
 What is feared? This question is presented by some authors as "What can happen?"[18][28], [97]; 
 What is likely to be disrupted? 
 What consequences this might have? 
 What can be done? 
 When can it be done? 
Vulnerability analysis consists then in evaluating the system structure and function compared to a nominal 
state. The evaluation is made considering feared events and potential actions. The aims are to determine 
threats and feared events that might lead to large negative consequences. 
We define the vulnerability considering three elements: The System, the Stake and the Feared Event. 
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Figure ‎II-15 Elements of vulnerability 
As shown in the Figure ‎II-15, the vulnerability is functioning of the three sets: System, Stake and Feared 
event. 
In this thesis we are not interested in the direct effect of feared events on stakes. We will not talk about 
vulnerability in the case of a feared event that does not affect any stake. 
II.1.6 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VULNERABILITY AND RISK 
The concepts of vulnerability and risk are sometime confusing. The aim of this section is to explain the 
difference between these notions. 
To distinguish concepts of vulnerability and risk, let us consider a system to be analysed (Figure ‎II-16). 
 
Figure ‎II-16: Elementary system to analyse 
From the two standpoints (risk and vulnerability), output may be represented by a function   , a difference 
   , a wrong output   ̅, or probability of one or more of these elements. The system input is described by 
uncertain causes (  ) or a probability on these causes      . 
For instance let’s consider that the analysed system is an infrastructure network like a water network. The 
output in such case could be the quantity of water consumed, the increase or decrease of this quantity. In 
other words, the difference between the provided quantity and the nominal consumption. It could be also the 
quality of water. The input of the system could be an earthquake or the probability of a storm. 
The risk in the point of view of [98] is an entity composed of probability (     ) on the one hand and the 
consequences (  ̅ or    ) on the other hand. [99] for its own part related probability to undesirable result 
System 
S 𝐴𝑖  𝑃 𝐴𝐼  
Input Output 
 𝐹𝑖,  𝐹𝑖, 𝐹?̅? 
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Feared 
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(    ̅           ). Other authors define Risk as the cumulative effects of uncertain occurrences (  ) 
adversely affecting (  ̅ or    ) the goals (   ) [100], or the possibility that a fact (  ) having undesirable 
consequences (   ̅ ) occurs [101]. [102] argues that Risk is defined from a set of causes (   ) and 
consequences (  ̅ or     ) on the system [102]. [103] defines the risk as an uncertain event (  ) or condition 
(      ) which, if it occurs, has a positive (   ) or negative (  ̅) effects on a project objectives, [104]. 
From all these point of views, risk analysis deals with the outputs and the inputs without considering the 
system structure or dynamic. Only the effect of Input on Output is taken into account. The system state 
fluctuations are not taken into account. 
In the previous example the risk analysis will focus on the probability of having bad quality of water, or a loss 
of the quantity supplied. The risk could also be the effect of the earthquake on the quality or quantity of water. 
Vulnerability is also documented in many ways in the literature. As discussed in ‎I.1.2, there are two views of 
vulnerability: A system-based view and the event-based view. From these two views interest is focused on the 
system itself (structure and function) rather than on its outputs/inputs. 
 
Figure ‎II-17: Risk and vulnerability analysis 
For the water network, the vulnerability will focus on the way how the network will support the earthquake, or 
on how a perturbation in the network could have consequences in terms of water quality and/or quality. 
The fundamental difference between risk and vulnerability presented by Figure ‎II-17 is that the former focuses 
on the input and the output while the second concentrates on the system and its input (or on the system and 
its output, less frequently on the three elements). Vulnerability analysis will take into account the system state 
variation, contrary to the risk analysis. A framework for the vulnerability analysis is proposed in the next 
section. 
System 
S 
Input 
𝐴𝑖 ,  𝐴𝐼  
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II.1.7 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
A closed loop system is proposed for vulnerability view in Figure ‎II-18. The output is determined by decision 
makers and may be damage, prejudice, loses, service function (e.g. electricity consumption). Mainly, outputs 
are linked to stakes and might be part of the system itself, flow etc. The model input is the feared event. The 
system itself is broken down into network and stake. The stake is affected by feared event effects through 
components of infrastructure networks. The Feared event has a frequency and magnitude. It impacts on the 
structure and / or function of the network components. This influence is reflected by the component   which 
converts intensity and/or frequency on network parameters, (Failure rate, centrality, etc.). Through the 
obtained vulnerability model, damage or, a set of damage can be estimated. Likewise, network weak points 
can be determined and actions carried out. This task concerns decision makers which will use decision 
support models to inform population and define actions to be undertaken. 
 
Figure ‎II-18: Vulnerability view 
The framework for vulnerability analysis is embedded in a process presented in Figure ‎II-19. This process 
defines a methodology used for the developed Decision Support System. First the context identification is 
needed. The context is invariant of the analysis. It includes among other territories, stakes, networks, feared 
events, emergency devices, flows, decision levels, risk situation, decision phases, and decision makers. 
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Figure ‎II-19: Analysis framework 
The parameters of the context are difficult to determine. The analyst is assumed to be an expert of the area. 
After modelling step, vulnerability and risk can be assessed. A decision process would be needed if 
vulnerability and/or risk are not acceptable. The model for vulnerability assessment is presented in the 
following section. 
II.1.8 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
In the literature, authors agree on some vulnerability properties. We present below the ones which seem to be 
relevant from our points of view: 
 The vulnerability is not increased by edges adding; 
 Vulnerability is a function between [   ]  
YES 
NO 
Risk Culture Feared Event and 
relation intification  
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Relations and 
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END 
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 For different networks with the same size, the complete graph is the least vulnerable; 
 The path redundancy and the presence of complementary networks that can carry the same flows 
reduce the vulnerability; 
 The vulnerability is multi-dimensional [105]. This means that it is linked to several parameters. 
To assess the vulnerability, let’s consider a single system represented by Figure ‎II-16. 
For instance the system could be an entire network like a power grid, a component like a water tower. The 
output in this context is the flow such as electricity (or its parameters). The input is a feared event like an 
earthquake. 
As soon as the output is different from its nominal value, the system will induce an averred vulnerability. 
For a power plant, it will induce an averred vulnerability as soon as the intensity of the electricity is different 
from the nominal value. 
The concept related to the averred vulnerability in the literature is the robustness. Robustness is the structural 
component related to the network’s physical organization. The next section presents this concept. 
 Robustness 
Robustness is defined in various ways in the literature. The Table ‎II-4 shows some definitions. 
 
Table ‎II-4: Robustness definitions 
From definitions in Table ‎II-4 we deduce that robustness is the ability to withstand a constraint [24], or the 
ability to maintain its connectivity properties after damage of one or more of its components (nodes and 
edges) [36]. It means that the system will maintain its functions intact when exposed to disturbances [14]. In 
Definition Author 
A complex network is robust if it keeps its basic functionality even under failure of 
some of its components 
[106] 
Robustness is the extent to which, under pre-specified circumstances, a network is 
able to maintain the function for which it was originally designed 
[107] 
The degree to which a system or component can function correctly in the presence of 
invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions 
[108] 
Ability to resist imprecision [109] 
The ability for a system to withstand a strain [21] 
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the context of this thesis the function of component is to assume flow circulation. For this reason the following 
definition is provided. 
Definition ‎II-5 : The robustness is a system aptitude to assume flow traffic after a feared event 
occurrence. 
From this definition, the robustness of a component depends on its flow consumption. It is calculated only for 
component whose initial and final consumption are non-null. 
Let us note that      is the component   consumption in flow   before the feared event and      is 
consumption after the feared event. Robustness is under the following constraints: 
{
 
 
 
 
                        
                           
                                                    
                                                    
 
 (‎II-3) 
Robustness induced by a flow   to the component   for           is given by: 
       
|         |
         
 (‎II-4) 
     is the robustness induced by the flow   to the component  . In this thesis flows are supposed to be 
robust. Indeed they are not supposed to consume each other. In case of many flows consumed by a 
component  , the resulting robustness is the product of robustness. 
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Figure ‎II-20: Robustness evolution 
The Figure ‎II-20 presents the robustness evolution according to the final consumption (for     =2). It shows 
that the robusteness will increase with the final state consumption if this one is superior to those of the initial 
state. Otherwise it will decrease. 
If there is an averred vulnerability i.e. the robusteness is different from 1, the system will induce an Intensity of 
vulnerability. This intensity is related to the resilience presented in the next section. 
 Resilience 
The concept of resilience is different from that of robustness. The  
Table ‎II-5 shows the points of view of some authors in the literature. 
Definition Reference 
Capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, 
learning to bounce back 
[110] 
The ability of a system to withstand stresses of environmental loading [111] 
The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new situations and operating 
conditions 
(Comfort, 1999) 
quoted by [112] 
The ability of social units (e.g., organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, [113] 
Rnbp 
Cnp2 
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contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in 
ways that minimize social disruption and mitigate the effects of future earthquakes. 
The ability to bounce back from adversity and regain health. [114] 
The capacity to recover from extremes of trauma and stress is termed resilience. 
Resilience reflects a dynamic confluence of factors that promotes positive 
adaptation despite exposure to adverse life experiences. 
[115] 
Capacity of a system to experience disturbance and still maintain its ongoing 
functions and controls 
[116] 
 
Table ‎II-5: Resilience definitions 
From these definitions, the resilience implies that the system can adapt and find a new stable position close to 
its initial state after the occurrence of the feared event [14]. In the context of this thesis the resilience is 
defined as following: 
Definition ‎II-6 : Resilience is the aptitude of a system to retrieve its nominal state functioning after a 
feared event occurrence. 
According to this definition, the resilience is assessed by considering the nominal state of the system to be 
analysed. It determines the stake’s aptitude to recover this nominal state. Its assessment depends on actions 
efficiency and rapidity. After a simulation which leads to a new state, resilience depends on the cumulated 
time of the bad functioning states (  ), and that of the good functioning (   ). In our approach the resilience 
includes the maintenance means. Its assessment might respect some constraints presented in the following. 
{
                       
                                     
                                     
 (‎II-5) 
From these constraints; resilience is acceded by: 
      
  
     
 (‎II-6) 
The evolution of the resilience according to the cumulative good functioning state and that of bad functioning 
one is given by the Figure ‎II-21 and Figure ‎II-22. 
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Figure ‎II-21: Resilience for t1 equal constant 
 
 
 
Figure ‎II-22: Resilience for t2 equal constant 
According to these figures, the resilience variation is not linear. It depends on the simulation time. Then 
vulnerability is also time-dependent. 
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 Vulnerability 
The vulnerability includes two components: (Robustness); and a functional component related to its ability to 
recover a nominal state (Resilience). It supposes then the existence of an averred vulnerability, and has 
intensity. We defined the vulnerability as “the incapacity of a stake to resist to the occurrence of a feared 
event and to recover efficiently its nominal function during a given period of time”. A stake can be vulnerable 
to a feared event without being exposed to this event. The more a stake will resist to the feared event effects 
and will recover quickly its nominal functions, the less it will be vulnerable. The concept of vulnerability in the 
context of this thesis has many aspects divided into global vulnerability (for the entire network), specific 
vulnerability (for a component, a network or region), vulnerability induced by interdependences. These classes 
are named perspectives by [19]. The author pointed out three vulnerability classes: Global vulnerability, critical 
component and geographical vulnerability. These perspectives are not sufficient in our point of view. Indeed, 
many other parameters must be included in the vulnerability assessment. In this thesis, we consider the 
following aspects in the vulnerability analysis: Specific vulnerability for one element, network vulnerability for 
an entire network, territorial vulnerability and vulnerability induced by the relationships. 
The Figure ‎II-23 shows vulnerability classes. Specific vulnerability is composed of that of network component, 
stake, flow, and factor. In addition, vulnerability might be related to an entire network, a territory or it can be 
induce by an interdependence. By the fact that a territory could host many component, its vulnerability could 
include that of component, stake, flow or factor. 
 
Figure ‎II-23: Vulnerability Classes 
Vulnerability 
Network Territory Relationship 
Specific 
Vulnerability 
Stake Flow Factor Edge Node 
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Figure ‎II-24 illustrated the fact that vulnerability assessment is based on the system states. At the beginning, it 
is in an initial state supposed to be the good functioning one. Many feared events identified in ‎II.1.2.2 could 
occur at the time T0 and drop the system in another state. The element will be in a stable functioning state at 
T1. According to the deployed mean and the element maintainability it will stay in this state until the tile T2. It 
will get its initial state at the time T3. 
 
Figure ‎II-24: Robustness and resilience 
Vulnerability analysis is used for characterizing the lack of robustness or resilience [117], [9]. Robustness is 
the system's ability to resist its environment random evolution while resilience is its ability to recover its 
nominal function after feared event. Vulnerability is then composed of two elements: The robustness or 
resistance (   ) and the resilience (   ). 
The specific vulnerability is the vulnerability of a single element n (  ). The element can be a network 
component, a stake, a flow or a factor. To determine the function   , many constraints might be satisfied. 
{
 
 
 
 
   [   ] 
                             
                             
                                                            
                                                            
(‎II-7) 
Those constraints lead to the following truth table. 
   
    
0 1 
     
0 1 1 
1 1 0 
 
Table ‎II-6: Vulnerability truth table 
From these constraints, component   specific vulnerability is given by: 
Initial state S1 
Final state S2 
T0 
T1 T2 
T3 
Robustness Resilience 
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               (‎II-8) 
This equation shows that a component totally robust and resilient would be invulnerable. On the contrary to be 
totally vulnerable, the component must be totally unrobust and totally unresilient. For a constant resilience the 
Figure ‎II-25 plots the intrinsic vulnerability function of the robustness. The graph representing the intrinsic 
vulnerability for a constant robustness is similar. Vulnerability variation is linear and varies between 0 and 1. 
 
Figure ‎II-25: vulnerability graph 
Network vulnerability is that of an entire network. Network vulnerability arises from that of its components: 
    ∏       
 
     (‎II-9) 
   is the vulnerability of the component n, and N the number of component. Component includes nodes and 
edges. 
Territorial vulnerability assessment is performed in the same way as network vulnerability. The difference is 
that on territory there is a flow and stake in addition to network component. The relational vulnerability is the 
difference between the network vulnerability with and without the considered relations. These three levels will 
influence the number of edges and nodes used for the simulation. 
𝜗𝑛 
 𝑅𝑛𝑏  
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CONCLUSION 
In the above section we have presented a modelling approach of involved entities in the network vulnerability 
analysis. After determining literature review shortcomings on graph theory modelling, we presented a method 
including interdependences modelling. The types of interdependence identified allow every situation 
modelling. Subsequently, we have determined parameters of other systems and defined interaction modes. 
We have also presented a vulnerability model. It is based on network functioning simulation. From the nominal 
functioning, infrastructure can be disrupted either by the feared event or an internal failure. The vulnerability 
results from the way the system will reach the final state. We have thus seen that the vulnerability of a 
composed element is a function of that of its components. Once the estimation is made, it now remains to 
determine actions to reduce the vulnerability. This determination is based on a decision aiding process with a 
possibility to use a Decision Support System. The following chapter presents the process adopted for the 
decision aiding. 
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CHAPTER III  
DECISION 
AIDING 
Résumé en français 
Ce chapitre présente la mise en œuvre des éléments d’aide à la décision pour la gestion d’une crise induite 
par la défaillance des réseaux d’infrastructure. Elle est divisée en deux parties : La première partie traite des 
processus d’aide à décision, la seconde présente le système que nous avons développé pour 
l’implémentation des modèles du Chapitre II. Nous avons commencé par définir les éléments du contexte. 
Ces éléments contiennent le niveau de crise, la situation de risque, le niveau de décision, l’identification des 
décideurs, les décisions, les décisions potentielles et les problématiques liées à la décision. La méthodologie 
que nous proposons inclue la structuration et l’agrégation de ces éléments. Cette démarche est implémentée 
dans l’outil informatique. Nous avons aussi défini les caractéristiques d’un tel outil ainsi que les risques 
associé à un projet de développement. L’architecture adoptée est composée d’une base de données, d’une 
base de modèle, et d’une Interface Homme Machine. L’outil final permet entre autre de déterminer les 
attributs de chaque éléments du modèle, son évolution pendant le temps de la simulation, les évènements les 
plus redoutés, le temps de moyen de bon fonctionnement, l’effet des interdépendances, et l’interrogation de la 
base de données.  
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“You have your way. I have my way. As for the right way, the correct way, and the only way, it does not exist” 
Nietzsche 
 Decision aiding 
85 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we have presented the way of estimating the vulnerability. But this estimation is not an 
end in itself. Vulnerability assessment must also lead to decisions to reduce and manage it. This is the 
objective of this chapter. It presents the implementation of decision elements in a crisis induced by 
infrastructure network failure. It is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the decision aiding process, 
the second presents the system that we have developed to implement models in ‎Chapter II. We began by 
defining the elements of the context. These elements contain the crisis level, the risk situation, the decision 
level, the identification of decision makers, the decisions, the potential decisions and the decision problems. 
The methodology that we propose includes structuring and aggregation of these elements. This approach is 
implemented in a Decision Support System. We have also defined the characteristics of such a tool as well as 
the risks associated with the project development. The adopted architecture is composed of a database, a 
model base, and a Human Computer Interface. The final tool allows among others determining the attributes 
of each element of the model, its evolution during the simulation time, the most feared events, the effect of 
interdependences, and querying of the database. 
I.6: DECISION MAKING DIFFICULTIES 
Decision is one of human being’s main cognitive activities. In fact, man is a being who doubts. Through the 
doubt mechanism, it is in constant reflection in every decision process. This situation is further emphasized 
whenever more than one choice is available to him. In the network management, decisions are taken every 
time with or without decision process. But in some situations every action might lead to large negative 
consequences. In such a situation decisions might be streamlined and analysed [43]. 
Natural disaster management suits these kinds of situations. 
Every decision taken in crisis situation is to be justified and explained. To overcome these difficulties and 
reach objectives a decision aiding process is needed. 
The objective of the decision aiding is to provide a choice of actions by bringing together the different points of 
view of actors. The intention is not to seek optimal decisions. The process of decision support relies more in 
finding compromise. 
Decision making process difficulties are pointed out by [118]. They consist in: 
 The complexity of the problem; 
 Uncertainty of the problem; 
 Several different objectives; 
 Different conclusions that may derive from different perspectives. 
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Each decision is taken in a specific context. From the natural disaster context analysis we added to the 
difficulties of [118] three others: the decision-makers’ emotional states instability, the consequences extend, 
the justification needs [43]: 
 Complexity: Complexity is one of the difficulties in a decision making process [118]. It consists 
among others in uncertainty associated with outdoor environments, decision makers’ cognitive 
processes, difference and diversity of actions; decision makers’ objectives. The situation of disaster 
affecting infrastructure network could be seen as complex because of the fact that infrastructures are 
different from their constitutions and behaviours. It is therefore difficult for a decision maker to 
understand the overall functioning or evaluate consequences. In such situations, the complexity is 
enhanced by the high number of components and the interdependence between them. The use of a 
Decision Support System could give an overview of the context to the decision maker. It could also 
facilitate potential actions identification by interdependence analysis; 
 Emotional state instability: In most cases, decision-makers’ emotional states are stable. But in a 
disaster no one can claim to be free from fear, anguish or frustration. Disaster could affect not only 
infrastructure, but also a decision maker and his immediate family members. When affected, 
decision maker’s lucidity is disturbed. It seems logical and understandable that relevance of any 
assessment could be disrupted. Because software has no qualms, their uses can minimize 
judgmental errors in such a situation. In addition, they can reduce the stress and enhance the 
decision makers’ cognitive process [25]; 
 Consequences extension: Decision consequences are often acceptable and do not require any 
special justification. Conversely, there are situations where consequences may be unacceptable. For 
some of them, even if consequences are acceptable, they require a justification [43]. Natural 
disasters are especially suitable to such situations. Through interdependence phenomena disaster 
can extend beyond a nation limits. 
The Icelandic volcano in May 2011 well illustrates this kind of situation. Several flights have been cancelled by 
companies in several states. It was not easy to determine aircraft path to optimize international traffic. 
Decision Support Systems in such a situation will be helpful for decision makers; 
 The need of justification: Even insignificant actions must be justified in the context of disaster. Media 
pressures increase this need for justification. A Decision support system in this sense is a 
justification mean. 
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Figure ‎III-1 : Decision context 
To illustrate this situation, Figure ‎III-1 compares a current decision situation and disaster situation one. We 
can see that currently everyday decisions are not complex, their consequence scope is limited, they don’t 
need justification and the decision maker’s emotional state is quite stable. On the contrary, in a crisis situation, 
decisions are more complex, the consequence scope is high, decisions need to be justified, and the decision 
makers are emotionally instable. Thus, in natural disaster situations, the need of being helped seems obvious 
for decision making. Using computer software (Decision Support System) is therefore valuable for the crisis 
management. 
In decision aiding there are many methods, but there is not an affirmed one [44]. We have decided to divide 
our research on decision aiding into two categories as suggested by [119]: Decision theory building (decision 
process), and the Decision Support System application development. We begin by the decision process 
presented in the next section. 
I.7: DECISION PROCESS 
[49] argues that decision is not an act but a process carried out to solve problems. We share this point of view 
which is a common reference quoted by many authors in the decision aiding. For this reason the following 
definition is proposed 
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Definition ‎III-1 : Decision aiding is an interactive process between decision makers, stakes and 
subsystems with the aim of finding satisfying states for every involved entity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎III-2 : Decision-making process: source [120] 
The process of Decision Aiding shown in Figure ‎III-2 highlights the decision as being a process. It begins by 
the problem recognition. That will allow a better definition of the identified problem and alternative generation. 
Furthermore, best alternatives are to be selected among generated one after their analysis. The last step is 
implementation of the selected alternative. 
As it can be seen, a decision process is composed of many phases. Those are also named process progress 
states [52], criticality of the environmental context, artefact [44], decision mean time [54]. From Simon’s point 
of view decision has four main phases in the field of management: Intelligence, Design, Choice and Review. 
This point of view is shared by many other authors in the literature [121]. Simon’s process best suits 
management in industrial context than that of disasters. In fact, in such context it might be more than four 
phases. These phases are identified and described in the ‎Chapter III. With regard to [44], he presented four 
artefacts of a decision process: problem situation representation, problem formulation, evaluation model, and 
final recommendation. 
 The problem situation representation is set of   ⟨     ⟩ .   is the set of decision process 
participant,   is the set of stake carried by decision makers,   is set of engagement taken by 
decision makers about their own stake and about stake of the others decision maker. 
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 Problem formulation is the set of   ⟨     ⟩ .   is the set of viewpoints,   is the decision 
problem. 
 Evaluation model is the set of  ⟨             ⟩.   is the set of dimensions,   is the set of 
scales associated to each element of  ,  is the set of criteria,  is set of uncertainty distribution 
associated to   and/or to  ,   is the set of operators that allow synthetic information obtaining on 
elements of  . 
As it can be seen in [44]’s description, each phase is composed of many elements or grain. [44]’s model is 
quite similar to that of [52] and has the same limitations mentioned above. In this thesis, phases are especially 
designed for a crisis induced by network failure. But they could be adapted to other crisis situations. The main 
difference with [52]’s proposition is the integration phase. Indeed, network management is a complex task 
which needs the use of a Decision Support System. The process is then composed of five phases: 
Characterization, Modelling, Structuring, Aggregation and Integration. 
 
Figure ‎III-3: Decision phases 
The first step of this approach is to describe the decision context in the characterization phase. After this 
description, networks and interdependencies modelling would be performed in the modelling phase. The 
modelling approaches presented in ‎I.4: will enable the structuring of characterized elements. This helps the 
selection and the integration of an operational approach for the performance aggregation. 
The process is supported by a decision maker, an analyst and eventually a decision support system. Every 
step of the process presented in the Figure ‎III-3 is constitutive of some elements. [122] describes decision 
elements as constitutive of: Input, Output, Decision Makers, Analyst, Decision Support System, and Decision 
process. The main limitation of [122]’s model is the non-integration of the decision level and the risk situation. 
To overcome this shortcoming, we provide the description presented by the Figure ‎III-4. It describes decision 
as a process in a crisis level and a risk situation. It is composed of many phases. Each phase is endowed 
grains. According to the context, a decision method would be used to transform the inputs into outputs. The 
inputs can take many forms. They are identified by the analyst. The outputs are set of recommendation, 
and/or justifications. Notion of analyst and decision maker are presented in ‎Chapter III. 
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The next section describes the first step of our approach, the decision context characterization. 
 
Figure ‎III-4: Decision aiding process elements 
III.1.1 DECISION CONTEXT CHARACTERISATION 
Some experiences show that the problem formulation influences decision maker’s behaviour [44]. Simon 
quoted by [44] shows that in the decision theory it is admitted that decision makers know their problems. This 
hypothesis is not validated according to Simon. It is then necessary to determine the decision context in order 
to better understand [66]. The aim of characterization is to understand the need of the decision makers. It 
leads to decision characteristics. Those are called by [52] aspects of reality, or invariant. Characteristics are 
supposed to be sufficiently stable for every phase. Their change may put in another sub-process. Our 
approach considers the context as a set of six components: 
   ⟨                ⟩   (‎III-1) 
Where     is the crisis level, RS the risk situation,  , decision level,    the decision makers,  decisions, 
   the decision problems. Problem formulation in our point of view may integrate crisis level, risk situation 
and decision level. These elements have not direct impact on the decision model, but they could change the 
decision maker’s behaviour and indirectly the final decision. These components are presented in the following. 
III.1.1.1 CRISIS LEVEL 
Crisis level analysis is investigated by many institutions and governments. The FEMA (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) pointed out four levels in a crisis management: Preparedness, Mitigation, Emergency 
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Response, and Recovery. [123] pointed out three levels: pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis. These phases are too 
simplistic especially when it is induced by natural disasters. From our point of view, crisis is composed of the 
following phases: 
 
Figure ‎III-5: Crisis level 
 Investigation: To identify the feared events and the stakes: This is the phase of ignorance which 
aims to identify risks; 
 Awareness of the situation: In this phase, the risk is known, stakes are aware  of the situation which 
means the beginning of cognitive processes to integrate the risk culture; 
 Simulation: Aims to evaluate different scenarios through models more or less elaborated; 
 Warning: This is the phase where we assist to the appearance of the feared events’ signs; 
 Crisis: Occurrence of the feared event; 
 Replication: The event is over but the risk of recurrence is high. Replicas are seen especially when it 
comes to earthquakes; 
 Post-event: The crisis is over, but it remains to rebuild and repair damages; 
 Stability: This is the last phase. Choices are evaluated and feedback formalized. 
We consider that each of crisis level corresponds one or more decision phase. The Table ‎III-1 presents 
decision phases for every crisis level. 
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Crisis Level Decision phase 
Investigation Characterisation, 
Awareness Characterisation 
Simulation Characterisation, Modelling, Structuration, Aggregation, Integration 
Warning Characterisation 
Crisis Characterisation, Modelling, Structuration, Aggregation 
Replication Characterisation, Modelling, Structuration, Aggregation 
Post-event: Characterisation, Integration 
Stability Characterisation, Integration 
 
Table ‎III-1: Phases by crisis level 
Table ‎I-1 shows that the characterization phase is present at many crisis levels. In fact to be efficient, our 
model needs to be characterized before the disaster occurs. The next section presents the risk situation. 
III.1.1.2 RISK SITUATION 
 
 
Figure ‎III-6: Crisis situation inspired from [54] 
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The risk situation depends on available information and knowledge. [54] has identified three situations in risk 
analysis: total uncertainty (incomplete information and knowledge is not exhaustive), risk (full information, 
exhaustive knowledge), uncertainty (between the two situations, with subjective probabilities). 
Figure ‎III-6 draws crisis level according to the risk situation pointed out by [54]. Based on crisis level, it shows 
that phases of stability, post-event crisis and simulation are in a risk situation; phases of warning in an 
uncertain situation; phases of replication, awareness, and investigation in a total uncertain situation. Decision 
levels are presented in the next section. 
III.1.1.3 DECISION LEVELS 
Decision level corresponds to the decision aiding process horizon. Literature presents three typical levels of 
decision: operational level, tactical level, and strategic level [54]. Decision levels are represented on three 
axes: Information (accurate-global), impact (local-national), and scientific dimension place (low-very 
important). To these axis might be added: problem’s definition (how well it is defined); states’ variables 
quantification; nature (technical, organizational, etc.); complexity; goal (general, local); scope (long term, short 
term); coherence; and data certainty. 
 
Figure ‎III-7: Decision level 
Strategic decisions contrary to managerial decisions must be made in environment with imprecise and 
uncertain information [124]. The authors emphasize that most strategic decisions are made in groups [124]. 
Level depends on analysis phase. Figure ‎III-7 shows the situation of Lourdes on a scale from   to   , plotted 
in a radar diagram presented in [125]. It can be noticed that phases of simulation and stability are in an 
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operational level, phases of investigation, post-event, and awareness in a semi-strategic level, phases of 
crisis, replication and warning in a strategic level. 
III.1.1.4 DECISION MAKERS IDENTIFICATION 
One of the decision process issues is to answer the question: Who is going to be helped by the decision or 
take decisions? Decision makers are also named actors or stakeholders. The following definition is adopted in 
this thesis. 
Definition ‎III-2 : Decision maker is individual or individual group of which by their value system, 
whether at first degree because of their intentions or second degree by the way they involve those of 
others, directly or indirectly influences decision [52]. 
Any decision aiding should start by their identification [126]. It follows that disaster crisis management involves 
several decision makers: constituted profession, composed of experts, local authority and rarely an isolated 
individual. Decision maker has objectives, preferences, elimination criteria, information system. Final 
decisions are validated through their objective’s systems. 
By way of illustration, Table ‎III-2 shows Martel’s identification approach by decision makers’ participations and 
influences quoted by [54]. 
 Directly involved Indirectly involved 
Influence the problem Fiduciaries Invisibles 
Affected by the problem Concerned and active Concerned and passive 
Influence and is affected by the 
problem 
Traditional Behind curtains 
 
Table ‎III-2: Martel's decision maker identification 
[127] described six types of actors for Decision Support Design: initiator, analyst, developer, validation team, 
user, decision maker. This identification is less applicable to disaster management. Indeed one decision 
maker might influence and be affected. Then, identification by implication and objective categories seems 
more relevant. 
Category Example 
Category 1: International 
Word, Continental 
Community 
Category 2: National Country 
Category 3: Regional City 
 Decision aiding 
95 
 
Category 4: Infrastructure manager EDF, GDF 
Category 5: Local Operator 
Local operator 
Site 
Category 6: Citizen  
Category 7: Emergency Hospital 
Category 8: Analyst  
 
Table ‎III-3: Decision maker categories 
In Table ‎III-3 eight categories have been identified from high objective level (International) to the low objective 
level (component). 
Crisis Level Decision Maker 
Investigation Analyst, Local 
Awareness Analyst, Local 
Simulation Analyst, Local 
Warning Emergency, Local 
Crisis Emergency, Component, Local, National,  
Replication Emergency, Component; Local 
Post-event: Analyst, Local, National, 
Stability Analyst, Local, National, International 
 
Table ‎III-4: Decision maker per crisis level 
Each crisis level concerns especially some categories shown in the Table ‎III-4 which underlines the place 
taken by the analyst and the local decision maker. The next sections will present decisions that could be taken 
in a general way. 
III.1.1.5 DECISIONS 
Decision makers are likely to make arrangements and take decisions to solve identified problems. Decision is 
also called action. It is defined as following 
Definition ‎III-3 : Decision represents a possible contribution to the overall decision and likely, given 
the sub-process, to be independently envisaged, and to serve as a point of application through to 
decision aiding [52]. 
Simon distinguishes two types of decision. The first is programed and repetitive, the second is unscheduled, 
unusual and unstructured. From this standpoint the decision-making in a disaster context is obviously an 
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unscheduled decision. In networks’ vulnerability analysis, all decisions are finite. Their numbers directly 
proportional to the number of components being high, they should be defined by a description instead of an 
exhaustive list. Furthermore, the environment of a natural disaster is changing. Decisions are then becoming 
progressive. They are also fragmented in as much as the results of the decision process involve combinations 
of several elements of the actions’ set. 
Another characteristic is the fact that actions are dynamic and depend on the phases. In addition, decision 
maker can act or evaluate only some of them. This evaluation is not static. 
We have identified seven categories of action. The identification is made in a generic way in order to be 
expandable to other studies. These categories are based on a network vulnerability’s model presented in 
[128] and [91]: 
 Action on network components: Action on component may be changing some of their structural 
parameter; reliability etc. It can also consist in adding or removing component; 
Building new roads, airfields, increasing the reliability of a power plant are example of action on network 
component. 
 Action on flows: Action on flow consists in changing its speed, reliability, resistance, circulation law. 
Adaptation of this law can contribute to streamlining of the entire network; 
This is especially what happens on the power grid, where electricity is supplied to vital structures. 
 Action on factors: For example increasing hospital autonomy by providing generators or additional 
beds; 
 Action on stakes: The evacuation of an area, the riser of a transformer, information; 
 Action on interdependences: Interdependence might be a cause of cascading failure, when one 
component failure impacts on other components’ failures. Acting on these interdependencies can 
help to significantly reduce network’s vulnerability. 
 Action on feared event: feared event is characterized among other by its propagation speed. 
Decision maker could take some measures to reduce it. 
Through these categories, we consider that actions are vectors of several sub-actions. Decision problems 
from these actions are presented in the next section. 
III.1.1.6 DECISION PROBLEMS 
Problems correspond to the manner of envisaging and formatting conclusions and decisions. Bernard Roy in 
[52] has identified four problems in decision aid. Choice (  ), which takes the form of a subset selection; 
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sorting (  ), which corresponds to a form of assignment to predefined categories; rank (  ) which takes the 
form of a ranking actions, and description (    for describing and structuring.    precedes other problems 
[66]. In natural disaster context, we pointed out two others problem: acceptance and change management, 
and planning problem. 
 Problem ω acceptance and change management 
In disaster context, the four classical problems of decisions are not sufficient for describing all situations. 
Indeed, there’s a problem of acceptance and change management. One situation might be well described but 
not accepted. The problem   is encountered in post crisis phases. 
 Problem κ of planning 
The problem of planning is justified by dynamism of actions and uncertainties. These problems, function on 
the study phase, are presented in Table ‎III-5. 
Phases Problem Objectives 
Investigation     ,   ,     Identifying risk 
The awareness of the situation   ,     Establishment of the culture of risk 
Simulation   ,     Elaboration of scenarios 
Warning       Information et communication 
Crisis                  
Minimize the consequences for 
stakes 
Replication                  
Minimize the consequences for 
stakes 
Post- Event 
     ,      , 
        
Restoration of affected infrastructure, 
action planning 
Stability       ,     Formalization of a feedback 
 
Table ‎III-5: Problem per phase 
Table ‎III-5 underlines the importance of the crisis and replication phases where all problem exists. After the 
context characterization, the system modelling is needed before the decision itself. The elements of the model 
are presented in the next section. 
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III.1.2 SYSTEM MODELLING 
Vulnerability analysis is related to some systems. The decision aiding process is based on models of the 
identified systems. The need of a model is emphasized in the decision definition in [52]. It is a simplification of 
the problem. Decision problem modelling is also named formalization [43]. The role of the modelling is to 
understand the dynamic. According to the problem, many kinds of the system modelling can be used. Mainly, 
there are mathematical (decision elements description by functions or values) and graphical models (decision 
tree, graph), and arrays. We used graphical modelling by a graph theory. The modelling approach is 
presented in the ‎Chapter II. A system model consists of: 
  ⟨                       ⟩ (‎III-2) 
Where FE is the Feared event, NT is the network, ST is the stake, FL is the flow, FC is the factor, IN is the 
interdependence, TE is the territory, VM is the vulnerability model. This model is presented in ‎II.1.8. After the 
modelling the structuration will allow to apply a decision process. Decision structuration is discussed in the 
next section. 
III.1.3 STRUCTURATION 
Structuration is called by some authors exploitation [54], evaluation model [44], It is the decision process 
invariants formatting for an operational approach implementation. We call "structure" set of elements resulting 
from the structuring process. Structuration consists in identifying potential action, decision makers’ 
preferences systems, criteria evaluation and scenario building. 
III.1.3.1 POTENTIAL DECISION 
In decision making, decision could be classified in many classes: potential, efficient, fictitious etc. Efficient 
action is not dominated by another action. Real action comes from a project completely developed and can be 
put in execution. Fictitious action is an idealized project. Realistic action corresponds to a project that 
implementation can be reasonably expected [52]. Reference actions; serve to limit the categories to which 
potential actions are affected. 
In the ‎III.1.1.4, we have identified actions in a generic way. The aim here is to identify potential action. An 
action is potential if it is temporarily considered possible by at least one decision maker or presumed by the 
analyst [62] [54] [64], [52]. Potential actions will be evaluated according to the criteria presented in ‎III.1.3.3. 
Potential actions are evaluated according to decision makers’ preference system presented in the next 
section. 
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III.1.3.2 PREFERENCES SYSTEMS 
Actions cannot be compared one by one because of their generic definition. To accomplish this comparison, 
decision makers, or the analyst judging by their names, must develop a relational preference system. This 
system reflects diverse views that can be opposed, or even contradictory. Thus, the system must tolerate 
ambiguity, contradiction and learning wherever possible [52]. Preference systems are also called “approach 
and the dominant culture” [54]. They are set of beliefs, attitudes and assumptions shared by a group as a 
result of past experiences [54]. We have determined the preference system for decision makers in Table ‎III-6. 
There are four basic preference situations:   (indifference),   (strict preference),   (low preference),   
(incomparability). The totality of a decision maker’s preference can be grouped into the fundamental relational 
system of preference, or in the grouped relational system of preference [52], including the outranking relation 
     the presumption of preference      general preference    , non preference    , K-preference      
Phases 
Decision maker 
Local operator Network manager 
International, 
National 
Investigation I,P,Q R,P,Q,I R,S 
The awareness of the 
situation 
I,P,Q I,> , R,S 
Simulation I,P,Q I,> , R,S 
Warming I,P,Q I,> R,S 
Crisis R, I,> R,S R,S 
Replication R, I,> R,S R,S 
Post- Event I,P,Q R,I,S R,S 
Stability I,P,Q R,,I,S R,S 
 
Table ‎III-6: Relational preference systems 
Table ‎III-6 illustrates systems accepting and refusing incomparability:                    
                 Decision makers of category   admit incomparability in critical phases. This is due to the 
fact that before these phases data are available at the local level. Risk for stakes allows taking time needed 
for the analysis. This situation is similar for the second class, except the investigation phase - where data are 
less available. However, in line with regulatory requirements, and facing potential communication and 
collaboration process, decision maker has to accept the incomparability at the international and national level. 
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III.1.3.3 CONSEQUENCES 
The consequence could be called indicators or impacts, damage, prejudice. They are defined as a 
progressive effect of system failure through time, on users [17]. The term damage alludes to materials 
damage, loss refers to human lives [129] and prejudice concerns peoples damages [1]. Generally, an action 
has several consequences [64]. We have identified 13 categories of consequences induced by infrastructure 
networks’ failure: These criteria are presented in the Table ‎III-7. 
Consequences State 
System 
Failure cost, Flux losses, flux congestion, Reparation, 
interruption in communication and transportation 
Human Number of deaf, number of injured, number of traumatized 
Environment Affected ecological systems, , affected species 
Economy Employment losses, insurance, cost, reconstruction 
Patrimony Branding 
Legislation  Norms 
Politic Political stability 
Education  
Comfort Indoor temperature 
Cognitive factors 
Risk acceptation, risk knowledge, change management, 
population training 
Cultural factors  
Organization/institutions  
Security Increase in crimes 
 
Table ‎III-7: Decision making criteria 
Table ‎III-7 shows the wide variety of disaster consequences. Some of them can be determined by the 
vulnerability model presented in ‎II.1.8. Others will be determined by experts’ judgments. Potential actions will 
be evaluated according to some modes presented in the next section. For instance, the loss of flow, affected 
people can be determined by the model. On the contrary, the political effect has to be determined by expert 
judgment. 
III.1.3.4 EVALUATION MODE 
Decision makers must evaluate potential decision according to the consequences. The evaluation can be 
performed by one of the following modes. These modes represent the granularity.  
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 Evaluating actions’ scenarios after feared event scenarios; 
 Evaluating actions’ scenarios after the elements of feared event scenarios; 
 Evaluating elements of actions’ scenarios after elements of feared event scenarios. 
After decision evaluation, a multicriteria aggregation will be used to determine best decisions. The 
aggregation methods to be used are presented in the next section. 
III.1.4 MUTICRITERIA AGGREGATION 
Criteria are derived from actions’ consequences [64] and allow their assessment. They represent 
consequences function for which one seeks to determine the maximum or the minimum [43]. In this thesis the 
main criterion in the decision point of view is the vulnerability function determined ‎II.1.8. The vulnerability 
function could be seen as certain criterion. But there are other criteria related to consequences to be taken 
into account. Their assessments are out of the scope of this thesis and will be performed through expert 
judgment. Hence there are two main types of criteria in the context of this thesis: 
 Assessed criteria: Vulnerability, resilience, robustness etc; 
 None Assessed: Environment, Economy, Politic etc. 
Criteria aggregation is sometimes called exploitation [54]. In the literature, several decision aiding methods for 
aggregation can be found. With regard on MCDA the difference resides in multicriteria aggregation 
procedures [54]. Methods of multicriteria decision aiding can be divided into three families, called operational 
approaches for aggregating performance in [47], [43]: single synthesis criterion, outranking, local interactive 
judgment with iterations try-error. [67] also identified three families: The classical approaches, outranking, and 
utility functions. [126] argues that criteria should be limited in number, complete, including goals, significant,  
operational, able to discriminate actions and bear comparison of all actions performance. To choose an 
adapted method [54] proposed seven questions: 
 Stakeholders in the decision, are they numerous or not? 
 How to think or what cognition procedure is used by decision makers? 
 What is the problem referring to? 
 What information is available? 
 What level of compensation does the decision-maker seek? 
 What are the basic assumptions available? 
 Is there any software that takes up the principles? 
Multiattribute methods allow solving programs that provide satisfactory solutions of various criteria on the 
basis of linear combination or nonlinear functions. Outranking methods do not follow the axiom that all 
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consequences are comparable. They therefore agree to the incomparability [43], [54]. For these reasons 
outranking methods are chosen for the aggregation. 
In Figure ‎I-5 and Figure ‎I-6, methods of type A (ELECTRE) and Type C (PROMETHEE) suit more to the 
context of this thesis. The aim here is not to make a comparative study of these approaches but to justify the 
chosen method: ELECTRE. We have rejected PROMETHEE because of the fact that in the context of this 
thesis decisions are defined in a generic way so considered as infinite according to the number of 
components. In fact, PROMETHEE method is defined for finite actions [130]. Otherwise, the analysis 
performed in the ‎III.1.1.6 shows many problems in disaster management. This is not the case for 
PROMETHEE which is mainly for ranking problem [130]. The reader can see ‎Chapter I for a comprehensive 
comparative literature review. For the reasons cited in ‎I.1.4.2, we have chosen the ELECTRE methods. Such 
methods have many variants. We use those proposed by [62] to select the appropriate method for each 
phase. The result of this analysis is given in the Table ‎III-8. 
 
Figure ‎III-8: ELECTRE methods by [62] 
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Table ‎III-8 shows for each crisis level the dominant problem and the aggregation method. 
Phase Problem Method 
Investigation Sorting ELECTRE TRI 
The awareness of the situation Ranking ELECTRE IV 
Simulation Ranking ELECTRE IV 
Warning Choice ELECTRE IS 
Crisis Choice ELECTRE IS 
Replication Choice ELECTRE IS 
Post- Event Ranking ELECTRE IV 
Stability Sorting ELECTRE TRI 
 
Table ‎III-8: Aggregation methods 
Choice problem is dominant in the level of warning, crisis and replication phase. This results from the fact that 
in these situations the most important is to determine best decisions into the potential ones. Because of data 
imperfection ELECTRE IS is recommended. ELECTRE IS is a further version of ELECTRE Iv which takes into 
account the notion of veto threshold. This method is the current version of choice problem [69]. 
Sorting problem is dominant in the phases of investigation and stability. In fact, during these phases, the main 
objective is to categorize decisions. For this reason, ELECTRE TRI is proposed. 
Ranking problem is encountered and predominates in the phases of awareness, simulation and post-event. In 
these phases it is more relevant for the users to rank decisions in order to select best ones later. For this 
reason we use ELECTRE IV. This method is the only ELECTRE method which does not make use of the 
relative criteria importance coefficients [69]. 
III.1.5 INTEGRATION 
The integration is the set of operations to speed up the process by using a decision support system. The 
elements of this phase are described in the next section. 
I.8: THE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM (DSS) 
Disasters have always been societies’ destabilization source since the beginning of human societies. In the 
past, they were attributed to divine wrath sign. Afterward, we begin to understand their manifestations. Actual 
knowledge allows disaster description through models more or less established. But it is still hard to eliminate 
causes even if those are identified. The last line of defense is prevention. Decisions applicable to complex 
infrastructures are then needed. 
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The aim of this chapter is to describe a method to develop a decision support system (DSS) for infrastructure 
network failure analysis in a context of natural disasters. DSS engineering is a complex problem. That 
complexity is related firstly to the diversity and different uncertainties related on one hand. On the other hand, 
we face the networks structural and functional complexity. In the actual state of knowledge, it is hardly 
possible to predict the occurrence date of some feared events. The best way to reduce impacts remains crisis 
management. This is achieved by implementing an effective process in a Decision Support System. In fact, 
one of the challenges in the crisis management is the decision makers’ responsiveness. Indeed, every second 
counts, decisions must be taken quickly. Using simulation tool seems essential in such situations. The 
objective of this chapter is to present the Decision Support System for infrastructure network vulnerability 
analysis. The developed system is called VESTA. The next section presents its features. 
III.1.6 DEFINITION AND FEATURES 
Nowadays, there are computer systems in almost all areas of life. Applications can be embedded in 
equipment from the simplest to the most complex. They exist in common device like TV, but also in large 
carrier aircrafts or in satellites. To this variety of embedded applications can be added software for 
management, forecasting, scientific computing, engineering, decision support etc. For those reasons, one of 
the issues in software engineering is taking into account the nature of the developing system. 
Many terms are related to Decision Support System in the literature: artificial intelligence, data mining, on-line 
analytical processing, knowledge management [15], Group Support System (GSS), Executive Information 
System (EIS). In general, a Decision Support System is a computer-based system for decision support [131]. 
There are many definitions in the literature. We divided these points of views into three groups: 
 Definitions focusing on the characteristic [131], [120]; 
 Definitions on the objective [25], [15]; 
 Definitions on the architecture [121], [119]. 
Table ‎III-9 summarizes these views. 
Definition Reference 
A flexible, adaptive, responsive and interactive computer based system for decision support [131] 
An integration of computer hardware and software that is designed to complement the cognitive 
processes of humans in their decision making 
[25] 
Computerized system which improves the activity of decision-makers situated on different levels 
in the chain of command (from supervision of different processes to leading positions in politics) 
[15] 
Computer technology solutions that can be used to support complex decision making and 
problem solving 
[120] 
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Computer based systems, which help decision makers utilize data and models to solve 
unstructured problems 
[121] 
DSS is defined as a computer-based interactive system that supports decision-makers rather 
than replaces them; utilizes data and models; solves problems with varying degrees of structure: 
non-structured (unstructured or ill-structured) (Bonczek et al, 1981), semistructured (Bennett, 
1983, Keen and Scott Morton, 1978), semistructured and unstructured tasks (Sprague and 
Carlson, 1982), and structured, semistructured, and unstructured (Thierauf, 1982); and focuses 
on the effectiveness rather than the efficiency of decision processes (facilitating decision 
processes) 
[119] 
 
Table ‎III-9: Decision Support System definitions 
In this thesis the definition proposed by [121] will be adopted. 
Definition ‎III-4 : Decision Support System is a computer based system, which helps decision makers 
utilize data and models to solve unstructured problems [121]. 
Thus, the main objective of the designed Decision Support System as those of many other is to focus on the 
use of interactive calculation in semi structured decision-making [132]. To overcome this objective, the 
Decision Support System must be able to do some tasks. [121] and [15] determined some of them. The 
authors argue that Decision Support System should: 
 Provide support for decision making, but with emphasis on semi-structured and unstructured 
decisions; 
 Provide decision making support for managers at all levels, assisting in integration between the 
levels whenever appropriate; 
 Support decisions which are interdependent as well as those that are independent; 
 Support all phases of the decision making process; 
 Support a variety of decision making processes, but not be dependent on any one; 
 Be easy to use. 
To overcome these objectives, Decision Support System must have some features. Their features depend on 
the use. Those were described by Sprague and Carlson through the ROMC approach [133]: 
Representations, Operations, Memory Aids, Control Mechanisms. With regard to decision support systems in 
a disaster setting, they might be flexible, adaptive, responsive, interactive[131], progressive and controllable 
[25]. To these features, we have identified several others specific to natural disaster context: response time, 
geographical distribution, views, simplicity, portability, ergonomic, adaptability and efficiency. 
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 Response time: Temporality is an important concept in the functioning of computer system in 
general. To be efficient in crisis management, Decision Support Systems must provide the required 
results in desired time. The response time must be very short in a context of disaster - of the order of 
some seconds. Because of the fact that every second counts in a disaster, decision support system 
functioning must be real time. In fact a Decision Support System may go unused if the manager 
cannot get the information in a timely fashion[25]; 
 Geographic distribution: The interest of geographical distribution is to avoid complete paralysis at the 
occurrence of large-scale disaster. Geographical distributed software is less vulnerable than those in 
one place. To be distributed, the Decision Support System could be based on the client/server 
functioning or on Application Service Provider (ASP). Most geographically distributed applications 
are based on Client / Server functioning. In such situation application is often on Internet. Client 
sends requests that are processed by the server. The result is then transmitted to the client. A 
variant of the client-server process is the use of Application Service Provider (ASP). In this case, 
requests are sent to an agent who makes the connection between the client and the server. After the 
request processed by the server, results are sent directly to the client. 
 
Figure ‎III-9: Client-Server functioning 
 
Figure ‎III-10: Application Service Provider functioning 
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The architecture of the designed Support System in this thesis will be based on the client/server architecture. 
This one is less vulnerable in a natural disaster situation because of the fact that the Decision Support System 
is not located on the decision maker’s computer; 
 Views: The system view for a given user is his way to see functions or to access to treatment. The 
system must be able to manage multi-views by taking into account users’ profiles. In instance, for 
some users, it will consist in being informed about the vulnerability of a specific region; 
 Ease of use: One of the software disposal causes is the difficulty of getting started. Simplicity implies 
an easy, fast, intuitive and handy - especially in crisis management. Ergonomic aspect plays a 
significant rule in the software use frequency. Ergonomic will encourage decision makers to use the 
software in the simulation phase. The acquired use habit will help them to be more reactive in the 
crisis management. Hence, Decision Support System is designed to be evolving as the user 
becomes more familiar with the technology and to be interactive and controllable [25]; 
 Portability: Emergency devices are not immune from destruction in major disasters. Neither is the 
server that hosts Decision Support System. At the time of the internet and smart phones, the 
application must be multi support for efficiency. It must run on maximum support: laptop, touchpad, 
smart phone; 
 Adaptability: In ‎III.1.1.1 we have identified several phases in the crisis management. The decision 
support system must be deployable during all these phases. It must be designed to meet new 
demand [25]; 
 Efficiency: The cost is the primary cause of software engineering projects abandonment. Cost 
analysis must be performed and updated along the project. 
Whatever its characteristics, Decision Support System categorization can be performed according to three 
views: The nature of the decisional problem, the number of users, the technology generation. From the 
decision problem nature point of view, according to Donovan and Madnick (1977) quoted by [15] Decision 
Support System is divided into two categories: 
 Decision Support System for structured problem; 
 Decision Support System for semi-structured problem. 
From this point of view Decision Support System in the disaster management is in the category of semi-
structured problem. Indeed, for the Decision Support System proper functioning crisis must be prepared in 
advance. But anyway, the feared event occurrence always causes decision context deconstructing. From the 
number of users point of view, [134] pointed out three categories of DSS: 
 Single user Decision Support System; 
 Group Decision Support System; 
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 Organizational Decision Support System. 
From this point of view, we argue that Decision Support System must be an organizational one because of the 
fact that a crisis management involves several institutions. From the Decision Support System generation 
point of view, [132] pointed out Data Oriented Decision Support System and Model Oriented Decision 
Support System. These categories are completed by [15] and [135]. 
 Data oriented Decision Support System; 
 User Interface oriented Decision Support System; 
 Model oriented Decision Support System; 
 Knowledge oriented Decision Support System; 
 Communication – based Decision Support System; 
 Document-driven Decision Support System; 
 Web-oriented Decision Support System. 
Model-Based Decision Support System is based on stages. [120] have identified three of them: Formulation, 
Solution, and Analysis. For these reasons, we argue that Decision Support System for infrastructure network 
vulnerability analysis must be data oriented and/ or Model oriented. 
Above characteristics lead to some risks in the project. These risks are described in the following section. 
III.1.7 THE RISK OF THE PROJECT 
Decision Support Systems can have many objectives. Some of them are designed for specific purposes. The 
others seek a wide audience. Many processes outside the engineering one are imbricated to meet the 
objectives. Software engineering is then a complicated project. It demands skills in several areas and contain 
numerous types of risk. Risk is located at all levels: programming, project management etc. The above 
identified risk management must be integrated into all phases of the project. 
 Financial: Financial risk is the risk of excessing the initial budget; 
 Temporal: Time overrun risk is due largely to poor planning. Milestones and deliverables must be 
defined for each phase; 
 Human: Major failure risk is located at the human level. For the user, we can face resistance to 
change. Then, the final product could not be accepted. In addition, the developer himself might 
misunderstand specifications or lack required competences. Managers must incorporate change 
management and training at the beginning of the project to manage human risk. 
 Technical: Technical risk is related to software reliability and performance. It also includes coding, 
maintenance and quality problems. 
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The diversity and apprehension complexity of these risks justified the projects high level of failure. Decision 
Support System engineering must respect some process to minimize or eliminate these risks. The following 
section presents a process used to design our Decision Support System. 
III.1.8 SOFTWARE ENGINEERING PROCESS 
Decision support systems are a specialisation of computer systems [15]. For this reason, Decision Support 
System engeniering process is part of the software engieering one. The adopted development process in this 
thesis is based on engineering approach pointed out in [136]. The overall development process is divided into 
several sub-processes: development, project management, change management, update and maintenance. 
These processes are presented by the Figure ‎III-11. Each process consists of non-linear multi-steps. 
 
Figure ‎III-11: Processes 
 Project management: The process management process encloses other processes and specifies 
them. It defines the execution time and allocates budget; 
 Development: Development is the coding process itself. It is the process that manages the software 
development; 
 Change management: This process defines necessary change needed to accept the application; 
 Update and Maintenance: Update process integrates the new laws, life mode changing, emergence 
of new technologies, new user requirements etc. 
The objective of this section is to provide a process for the design of a Decision Support System for natural 
disaster crisis management. The resulting process is based on the literature review. In the following are 
presented those which inspired us: the waterfall model, the prototyping model and the spiral model. 
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 Waterfall model 
The specificity of the waterfall model is the step organization. Those are organized sequentially (linear). 
Waterfall model is based on a continued document-driven milestone approach [137]. That means that every 
step takes as an input (validation criteria) from the output of another step etc. At the end of each step is 
provided deliverables in standardized formats: Plan, feasibility report, design document, source code, and 
review report. This model is particularly suitable for structures with staff high mobility. 
The main problem in waterfall model is its linearity. Indeed, the output and the specifications of one step are 
assumed accurate and usable for another one. Furthermore, the model assumes that the specification is 
stable. This is not always the case. 
 
Figure ‎III-12 : Water-fall model by [138] 
Figure ‎III-12 shows water-fall diagram proposed by [138]. It shows the linearity of the model. In such a model 
a mistake at one step could have high consequences on the other steps in term of error cost. 
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 Prototyping model 
The idea of the prototyping model is to focus on the prototype development instead of the final model [136]. 
The prototype is then developed and presented to the customer according to the producer understanding. 
This method allows achieving an enhancing version through trade or by a further analysis of specifications. 
The prototype model requires a lot of exchanges between the parties involved. It involves a lot of iteration and 
versions. Those are expensive and impact on the realization time. 
 Spiral Model 
Spiral model implementation is operated by cycle [138]. 
 
Figure ‎III-13: Spiral model by ref [138] 
In the Figure ‎III-13 each cycle is divided into four quadrants: Determination of objectives and alternatives, 
assessment of alternatives and risk identification, definition of the implementation from the risks, planning the 
next cycle. Spiral model is a risk-based model. 
There are other processes in the literature such as the cycle in V, the 2TUP etc. Given the diversity of 
method, we present ours for Decision Support System engineering process. It is a mix of linear and cyclic 
processes. 
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 Adopted process 
From these previous processes and the engineering approach we propose a Decision Support System 
engineering process. Like every process, the goal is to produce required software for users. It is composed of 
many sub processes including analysis, design, construction, and implementation [121]. It includes many 
steps not necessarily disjoint. Figure ‎III-14 presents adopted steps to design our Decision Support System. 
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Figure ‎III-14: The process of developing a DSS for vulnerability management 
 Specification: The specification step consists in the establishment or/and interpretation of client 
needs. The data collection is an important action for the specification. The context is targeted in 
order to better define problems and objectives. Main features are deduced from rules and business 
constraints. The final specification document determines responsibilities, resources etc; 
 Feasibility analysis: The feasibility analysis is based on elements provided in the previous step. It 
aims to estimate allocated resources, to determine costs, implementation time, required effort, used 
technology and risks. It naturally leads to identifying versions and delivery dates; 
 Design: The design is the technical modelling. This step reflects implementation models. Modelling 
may have more or less fine granularity and depend on the field. We argue that lower-level modelling 
must be adopted at the expense of a high-level modelling. There are three main areas in the design 
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of Decision Support System: data, function, and Human Computer Interface (HCI); 
 Planning: Planning aims to determine milestones in the realization of the application; 
 Development: Development is the phase of application coding; 
 Review: The review encloses set of testing operations, assemblage and integration. The importance 
of the test phase is to ensure the coherence of functions compared with the specifications; 
 Validation: Before integration the model must be validated. Validation differs from the review by the 
fact that it is carried out jointly with the customer. At this step there are estimated tangible and 
intangible benefits as well as the system lifetime. [66] presents two major criteria for validation; 
 Theoretical significance: the method used must be meaningful in terms of used information; 
 Operational meaning in the sense that the client must be able to understand and use the model 
results. 
Maintenance and updating: Maintenance and updating phase is continuously performed along the software 
life. It allows among other the integration of new features following customer's need evolution. Each of the 
steps is a grain of the process. 
Figure ‎III-15 presents different elements included in every step. They must be defined unambiguously and 
repeatable. The repeatability of a step is crucial insofar as it is not immune from errors. 
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Figure ‎III-15 : Step 
Each grain has starting condition and exit criteria. It is based on identified methodologies, specifications, 
standards and business rules. A grain lasts a certain time and requires resources, men and skills. 
In the next section we are presenting the design step shown in Figure ‎III-14 applied to the context modelling. 
III.1.9 CONTEXT MODELLING 
To design the future decision support system, the working context has to be modelled. For the modelling 
need, we used an object approach. There are several graphic formalisms related to object modelling: the 
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binary model NIAM (Natural Language Analysis Method), IDEF1X (Integration Definition for Information 
Modeling), ULM (Unified Modeling Language). UML is designed to represent, specify, construct, and 
document software systems. It allows building several models of the same system. Each model highlights one 
aspect: organizational, functional, static and dynamic. Any system designed in UML is then composed of 
interacting objects. According to their behaviour, object will perform specific operations. Otherwise UML 
allows generating automatically a part of the code. For those reasons UML is chosen for the context modeling. 
Many UML tools are available: Rarional Rose, MagicDraw, MEGA Designer, Modelio, Objecteering, 
PowerDesigner, Visual Paradigm, Win'Design, StarUML, argoUML, boUML, Together, Poseidon, Pyut, 
Umbrello etc. Our choice has been StarUML [139] because it is free and open source. 
The methodology used in this thesis is inspired from those presented [140]. This approach included actors 
identification, building the static context diagram, relationships between use cases, use cases for human 
actors, sequence diagrams and activity diagrams. Those are presented in the next sections. 
III.1.9.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ACTORS 
An actor is an external person or a process that interacts with the system. An actor gets observable result 
from the system while a secondary actor is asked for further information. Actors can be human or connected 
systems. Several kinds of actors are identified: International, National, Regional, Infrastructure Manager, 
Local Operator, Emergency, Citizen and the Analyst. For each of them several use cases are defined. In a 
general way, we defined 14 scenarios. Figure ‎III-16 shows all the human and non-human actors. The role of 
every actor is defined in the following: 
 International: Vulnerable area, network; 
 National: Vulnerable network; 
 Regional: Vulnerable area, network; 
 Infrastructure Manager: Vulnerable network, area; 
 Local Operator: Vulnerable component; 
 Emergency: Vulnerable component, stake, area, failure time, feared event; 
 Citizen: vulnerable area; 
 Analyst: the analyst is the actor who can do everything. 
Because of the fact that the Decision Support will be used by many persons at the same time, it is interesting 
to know the number of each actor connected to the system. The static context diagram in the next section will 
give this a view on the connected user number. 
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III.1.9.2 THE STATIC CONTEXT DIAGRAM 
The static context diagram is not a standardized UML diagram. It allows specifying the number of actor 
instance connected to a system at a given time. For example many citizens could connect to the system to 
know the vulnerability of their regions. 
 
 
Figure ‎III-16: Static Context Diagram 
Figure ‎III-16 shows also non-human actor like the vulnerability assessor. Those will be implemented during 
the coding phase. Every connected user can interact with the system through use cases. These have been 
identified and the relation between them is given in the next section. 
III.1.9.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USE CASES 
A use case is a visible functionality for an actor. It represents provided service by the system, without 
imposing the implementation mode of this service. For a use case there are two specifications: the first is a 
functional view described by sequence or activity diagrams. The second is a technical view described 
textually. 
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Figure ‎III-17: Relation between use cases 
Figure ‎III-17 shows the relationships between use cases. For example the network modelling includes those 
of relations. The latter may be an extension of the vulnerability estimation. The next section shows the use 
case for human actor. 
III.1.9.4 USE CASES BY HUMAN ACTOR 
The use cases by human actor specify actions to be performed. The example in Figure ‎III-18 shows that a 
local actor can determine among other critical components, effective actions, feared events etc. 
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Figure ‎III-18: Use case for local operator 
The critical component determining is shown in Figure ‎III-18. It calls upon vulnerability assessment and 
network modelling. For every use case, we had determined the sequence diagram presented in the next 
section. 
III.1.9.5 SEQUENCE DIAGRAM OF USE CASE 
Sequence diagrams are used to illustrate use cases temporal aspects. Sequence diagram is usually related to 
the system function (i.e. a use case). For each use case, we represented a sequence diagram. Figure ‎III-19 
shows the sequence diagram in the vulnerability analysis by a human actor. 
Local operator
Log in
Crtitical component
Feared hazard
Feared scenario
Efficient action
AuthentificationSystem
<<actor>>
VulnerabilityAssesser
<<actor>>
ScenerioModeller
<<actor>>
NetworkModeller
<<actor>>
HazardDataModel
<<actor>>
DecisionModel
<<actor>>
 The Decision Support System (DSS) 
118 
 
 
 
Figure ‎III-19: Sequence diagram for vulnerability analysis 
The analyst begins by drawing the network. Afterward he will select elements of the system. The DSS will 
generate then interdependence, feared event scenario and vulnerability. 
To complete sequence diagrams, activity diagrams are used. They are presented in the next section. 
III.1.9.6 ACTIVITY DIAGRAM BY USE CASE DIAGRAM 
Sequence diagrams show only the nominal use case. Functioning particularities representation could be 
harmful for the chart readability. That is why we used the activity diagrams in addition to sequence diagrams. 
 : Analyst
 : DecisionSupportSystem  : NetworkModeller  : RelationModeller : ScenerioModeller : VulnerabilityAssesser
1 : draw territory limits()
2 : selecte flows()
3 : selecte stake()
4 : selecte factor()
5 : selecte network()
6 : generate relation()
7 : selecte relation()
8 : selecte hazard()
9 : generate scenario()
10 : selecte scenario()
11 : selecte action()
12 : vulnerability()
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Figure ‎III-20: Activity diagram for vulnerability analysis 
Figure ‎III-20 shows the activity diagram for the use case vulnerability analysis. 
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The modelling itself relies on a process. Concerning UML, there are two relating approaches: The RUP 
(Rational Unified Process) and the MDA (Model Driven Architecture): 
 The RUP is a method for object-oriented software development. It is an implementation of the 
Rational Unified Process society method. It consists in set of guidelines to produce software from 
specification. Each directive defines who is doing what and when. The RUP is driven by use cases. 
These are used to analyse the project requirements. The commercial product is provided in the form 
of a web site reserved for Rational SoftWare customers. 
 MDA is model-driven architecture. The objective of the MDA is the design of systems based on 
single domain modelling by ignoring technological aspects. It is a software realization process based 
on business models. 
There are also other methods such as the Larman agile methods (Extreme programming, Dynamic software 
development method (DSDM), adaptive software development, Feature driven development, Crystal clear). 
An agile method is a method of software development which involves maximum customers. The concept was 
born of a manifesto signed by 17 personalities, methods creators and company executive. 
None of this model was applied in this project. These processes suit better long term projects involving many 
people and/or organizations. 
The architecture of the system is determined after the modelling. Adopted architecture for the designed 
Decision Support System is presented in the next section. 
III.1.10 ARCHITECTURE 
The architecture adopted in this thesis for the Decision Support System design is those proposed by [121]. 
This architecture is composed of three parts: Human Computer Interface, Data base, and Model Base. [25] 
added to these parts a data analysis capability. In our approach this module is managed by the database 
management system. In some situations, a spatial Decision Support System can be endowed with prominent 
spatial components [26]. 
 
Figure ‎III-21: Decision Support System structure by [121] 
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Figure ‎III-21 represents the architecture proposed by [121]. Database is endowed with data analysis 
capability performed by a data base management system (DBMS). The Model Base is related to a normative 
model implemented in a Model Based Management System (MDBS): It allows giving unobtrusive solutions 
and evaluating tradeoffs between actions, and possibly providing those to be implemented. The Human 
Computer interface is related to a Dialogue Management System. 
The next three sections describe the architecture elements of the designed Decision Support System. 
III.1.10.1 THE HUMAN COMPUTER INTERFACE 
The Human Computer Interface represents all windows accessible to users. It allows interaction between 
decision makers and the other components. Three steps have been followed for the design of the Human 
Computer Interface: The prototyping, the design and the management. 
 Prototyping: There are several tools for Human Computer Interface prototyping: UI Stencils, Dot Grid 
Book, KeynoteKungFu, Balsamiq, Axure RP, Mockinbird, MockFlow, FlairBuilder, MasterPages, 
Fireworks, DaftBoard, Notable, ConceptShare, DraftBoard. Among these tools Axure seems to be 
the most complete and professional. We used Balsamiq because  it is easy to use [141]. The 
Figure ‎III-22 presents the prototype of the feared event panel. 
 
 
Figure ‎III-22: Human Computer Interface with Balsamiq 
 Designing the Interface: The next step was to build the Graphical User Interface by using 
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WindowsBuilder - an Eclipse IDE plug [142]. The choice of WindowBuilder was also motivated by its 
simplicity and the fact that we have chosen Java as a development language. 
 The dialogue management system related to the Human Computer Interface is implemented through 
Java Classes. 
The Decision Support System developed is composed of nine panels: 
 Connexion 
The identified actors might log in via the log in panel shown by Figure ‎III-23. Every type of actor can perform 
specified manipulation in the Decision Support System. Those are defined in the modelling phase by the use 
case for human actors. This page gives the access to the other functionalities of the application. There are 8 
user's profiles (International, National, Regional, Infrastructure manager, Local operator, Citizen, Emergency, 
and Analyst). Profiles are created by the analyst. A usual user can only create a citizen profile which has 
narrow access to the application's functionalities. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎III-23: Log in Panel 
 Import 
The software enables the user to import a map as a picture or to select an area from a real map (using 
Google maps for example). Then, specify the boundaries of the geographic area to work on. If the user 
doesn't find a map, the software offers the possibility to draw the territory and represent it by its boundaries on 
the zone. Territories are resizable (zoom, changing the boundaries, extension...). 
 Drawing 
If data are not available in the specified format, the analyst might draw needed element on the drawing panel 
shown by Figure ‎II-24. He/she can draw networks, place feared events, factors, flows etc; 
 Decision aiding 
123 
 
 
 
Figure ‎III-24: Network drawing 
 Parameter filling in 
Component attribute are available via this panel (Figure ‎III-25). The user can change every parameter if 
needed according to his right. The user can specify the settings for each item in a separate window. 
 
 
Figure ‎III-25: Node Parameter 
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 Simulation 
The simulation panel allows the user to specify simulation parameters like the time, the step. The simulation 
panel displays the behaviour of the system during the simulation. The user can stop the simulation at any 
time. 
 Calculation 
After the simulation, the calculation result is displayed in this panel. The user can visualize his need by 
selecting the format of the result. This format could be a graph or a table. 
 Decision 
According to the result, the user can take some actions to change one or more elements. 
 Final Recommendation 
The final recommendations come from the decision process and are displayed on the recommendation panel. 
 Data base 
In the database panel; the user can request much information about the database. 
Information provided by the user will be stored in the database presented in the next section. 
III.1.10.2 THE DATABASE 
Decisions emerge from the processing performed on data located in a database. For this reason, Decision 
Support System performance is correlated to those of the database. Data may take various and varied forms 
(digital, paper etc). Its description is therefore essential before the system engineering. Database 
management and manipulation is usually performed through a database management system (DBMS). A data 
manipulation language can be superimposed to the system to facilitate consultation, update, and delete 
operations. Database Management System is generally related to a description model. 
The most adapted to the context of this thesis seem to be the relational model and the object model. The next 
two sections present these models before justifying the chosen approach. 
 Decision aiding 
125 
 
 The entity relationship model 
Entity relationship model is based on the real world description from concepts of entity and relationship. The 
entity represents a real world object. Entities have properties used to describe them. These are called 
attributes. Relationship is a link between entities. 
Entity relationship model was proposed in 1970 by E. Codd to resolve hierarchical and network models 
limitations. It is based on set theory and relations and is adapted to a functional point of view. We are then 
interested in what is made by the system at the expense of how it makes it. Data treatment is not described by 
this model. It ensures data independence compared to the program. It is part of the MERISE method that is a 
more generalized method. There are three main levels in the model entity relationship model: 
 The conceptual level: The conceptual level describes entities of the domain, and the relationships 
between these entities. The conceptual level gives rise to the entity relationship diagram which 
presents the system from the data point of view; 
 The logic level: The logic model reflects the conceptual model in suitable implementation formalism. 
It leads to the relational model; 
 The physical level: The physical model translates the concrete way of how the model is implemented 
into the selected Data Base Management System. 
 The object model 
An object is an identifiable entity in real word. It is the equivalent of a class in the entity-relationship model. 
Any object has a set of attributes, its structure and a set of methods, i.e. its behavior. 
In this thesis we used an object approach to model the database. This choice is motivated by the fact that the 
object approach allows to represent treatments performed on data in addition. The UML class diagram has 
been then used to model software data. The discovery of objects in the system can be done either by use 
case diagrams breakdown or by data-driven decomposition. The data driven decomposition is used in this 
thesis. This approach was used because of the fact that we were the analyst and the client of the study. 
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Figure ‎III-26: Class diagram with StarUML 
The database has been modelled by 29 classes. The Figure ‎III-26 presents an extract from StarUML. We can 
distinguish the feared event, the stake, and the flow. They represented the fact that flows are consumed by 
stakes. At the occurrence of the feared event, flows or stake could be affected. The overall model is presented 
in the annexe. 
Several tools for database management exist: DB2 (IBM), Visual FoxPro (VFP), Access (Microsoft), Oracle 
(Oracle Corporation), MySQL (open-source). 
III.1.10.3 MODEL BASE 
The model base is composed of the vulnerability model presented in ‎Chapter II. The reader is invited to see 
that chapter for more information. 
Flow
+flowName
+flowCirculationLaw: CirculationLaw[0..*]
+flowNominalSpeed
+flowParametre: FlowParameters
+flowType: TypeFlow
+flowMeanTimeToRepear
+flowResistance
+flowReliability
+flowMeanTimeToRecover
+onLeftClic()
+addNewParameters()
+stayCentred()
+getNumberOf()
+changeParameter()
+resize()
+dragAndDrop()
+getTerritory()
+breakDown()
+isAffected()
+circulate()
Stake
+stakeName: String
+stakeQuantity
+stakePosition: Point[1..*]
+stakeColor: Color
+stakeIcone: Icone
+stakeInitialQuantity
+stakeReliability
+stakeMeantimeToRecover
+onLeftClic()
+addNewParameters()
+changeParameter()
+resize()
+dragAndDrop()
+getTerritory()
+breakDown()
+isAffected()
Hazard
+hazardFrequence
+hazardName
+hazardDuration
+hazardAmplitude
+hazardIcone
+hazardSpeed
+hazardType: TypeHazard
+hazardColor: Color[1]
+hazardTerritory: Territory
+hazardOccurenceDate
+onLeftClic()
+stayCentred()
+addNewParameters()
+getNumberOf()
+changeParameter()
+resize()
+dragAndDrop()
+getTerritory()
+occur()
+consume
+isConsumed
Stake_Flow
+fluxConsumpiton
+addNewParameters()
+changeParameter()
Hazard_Stake
+dropQuantity
Hazard_Flow
+dropedNumber
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III.1.11 CODING 
Based on the infrastructures, the Decision Support System started in the DOS and UNIX environments 
around the late 1970s and then moved to windows in the early 1990s [120]. The development of the 
application can be done using several approaches: programming 'in line', event-driven programming, 
procedural programming, object programming. The object approach requires modelling the context before 
designing. This solution was chosen because it is compatible with the context modelling and the database 
design. 
We have chosen Java as language development because of its portability. In addition, Java is free and can 
run on different computers such as PC, MAC without any change. It was fully implemented by using swing as 
an API for graphics and JUNG to represent the network [143]. 
III.1.12 DSS FUNCTIONALITIES 
In the literature there are several Decision Support System for disasters management. Their applications are 
related to many disciplines: pollution control, water resource management, flood, forecasting, prevention of 
epidemic etc [15]. 
Table ‎III-10 gives a recapitulative given by [118] completed by those of [15]. 
Name Author Environment Complements 
NIMPRO (Network Interdiction 
Mitigation and Protection) 
[26] VB 6 
MapObjets 2.4 
ILOG CPLEX 10.0 
GIGASOFT 
ProEssentials 5 
 
TELEFLEUR (TELEmatics-assisted 
handling of FLood Emergencies in 
URban areas) 
NATIONAL 
OBSERVATORY OF 
ATHENS 
  
L-THIA (Long-Term Hydrologic Impact 
Assessment) 
Purdue 
University, United 
States of America 
 
BDD Oracle 
Web Technology, 
Code PERL 
The proDEX (complex environment 
pollution issues) 
University of 
Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
Pyhton 
GIS Architecture,  
Distributed relational 
database 
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TELEFLEUR (TELEmatics-assisted 
handling of FLood Emergencies in 
URban areas) 
NATIONAL 
OBSERVATORY OF 
ATHENS 
  
L-THIA (Long-Term Hydrologic Impact 
Assessment) 
Purdue University, 
United States of 
America, 
  
The proDEX system (nvironmental 
protection, air and soil pollution control) 
University of 
Ljubljana, Slovenia 
Pyhton  
 
Table ‎III-10: Decision Support System in the literature 
None of these systems take into account the vulnerability calculation in a generic way. The Decision Support 
System for Interdependent Network Vulnerability Analysis realized in this thesis is different from existing 
systems. It contains an ergonomic graphical user interface which allows the user to choose different 
possibilities depending on his rights. The main functionality of the VESTA are summarized by the 
Figure ‎III-27. 
 
Figure ‎III-27: Functionalities of VESTA 
The simulation time is given by the analyst. He/She can rely on the feared event characteristics to assess this 
time. The DSS is adapted to phases before the crisis. The connection, import, simulation and drawing have 
been presented in the ‎III.1.10.1. The next section presents the system possibility related to vulnerability 
assessment. 
III.1.12.1 PARAMETER CALCULATION 
VESTA is able to calculate vulnerability parameters of one element. The parameter could be the intrinsic 
vulnerability, the resilience, the robustness etc. The concerning element could be a network component, flow 
or stake. The result is displayed in form of histogram. 
• ID 
•PW 
Connexion 
•Map 
•Drag & Drop 
Import/drawing 
•Time 
•Step 
Simulation 
•Vulnerability 
•Feared 
Scenari 
Calculation 
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Figure ‎III-28: Parameter calculation 
The Figure ‎III-28 represents the vulnerabilities of six components. The user could also select more or less 
components. The displayed parameter could be different form the vulnerability and could be resilience for 
example. It shows that the component C4 is less vulnerable for the feared event. Otherwise C3 is the most 
vulnerable. 
III.1.12.2 EVOLUTION OF THE PARAMETER 
The Figure ‎III-28 shows that the component C3 is the most vulnerable one. The user can visualize the 
evolution of this parameter in the simulation time. 
 
Figure ‎III-29: Evolution of a parameter 
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Figure ‎III-29 shows the evolution of the vulnerability of the component C3 from the instant 5 to the instant 15. 
We can then analyse what states lead to the maximum vulnerability. 
III.1.12.3 FEARED EVENT OR SCENARIO 
One of the aims of vulnerability analysis is to determine feared events and scenarios. The DSS is able to build 
a histogram of scenario about one parameter of selected component. 
 
Figure ‎III-30: Feared event or scenario 
Figure ‎III-30 presents the resilience of the component C3 for six scenarios. It shows that S6 is the worst 
scenario in term of resilience for this component. Indeed for this component, the resilience is zero. On the 
contrary, this component is very resilient to the first scenario. 
III.1.12.4 THE FEARED EVENT OCCURRENCE POINT 
The consequences of feared event often depend on the societal position of the occurrence place [117]. The 
vulnerability and other parameters depend on the occurrence point of the feared event. VESTA can for one 
component specified parameter show on the map corresponding values. 
Figure ‎III-31 shows for the component C3 the vulnerability according to the occurrence point. The first 
vulnerability was calculated for the occurrence point P5. But as we can see when the same feared event 
occurs at another point, the vulnerability is quite different. The worst occurrence point is in this case the point 
P1. 
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Figure ‎III-31: Feared event occurrence point 
III.1.12.5 TIME TO BREAK DOWN 
In the ‎II.1.2.2 we have seen that one component could fail in several ways. VESTA could show for selected 
scenario the breakdown time relative to the simulation time. 
 
 
Figure ‎III-32: Time to break down 
Figure ‎III-32 presents for six scenarios the breakdown time of the component C2. The user can click on a 
scenario to see that the realization condition S5 is the worst one with a ratio of 33%. 
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III.1.12.6 MINIMUM VALUE OF ONE PARAMETER 
Every component has many parameters. Decision consists also in changing one or more of these parameters. 
It is then valuable for the user to know the threshold of a parameter for one or more feared events. The 
component will break down if the considered parameter is above or below the threshold. VESTA allows such 
representation. 
 
Scenario 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Mean time to recover 23 33 9 12 7 
 
Table ‎III-11: Minimum value of one parameter 
Table ‎III-11 shows the minimum mean time to recover the component C2 which might have to stay functional. 
It shows that the scenario S5 is the best in terms of Mean Time to recover for this component. 
III.1.12.7 EFFECT OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
Interdependence when activated could change the behaviour of the system. The user can select a parameter 
of a component and see the effect of one or more interdependence on it. 
 
Figure ‎III-33:Effect of interdependance 
The Figure ‎III-33 shows the vulnerability of the component C4. Each situation is plotted with regard to four 
interdependences (without interdependence in blue and with four interdependences in red). It shows that the 
interdependence I4 has more effect on this component. 
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III.1.12.8 REQUEST ON DATABASE 
VESTA allows the user to request the database. For example the user might wish to know: 
 Who are the decision makers for one territory? 
 What is the reliability of a specific component? 
The main contribution of this system is to allow users to draw a network in an easy way, adding or deleting 
nodes and edges. It allows to analyse system dynamicity. 
Another contribution of this system is to simulate a feared event and simulate what will be the results of the 
event. This system offers to the users a double way to simulate a feared event: network drawing and 
simulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Natural disasters affecting infrastructure networks are destabilizing events for the society. In such crisis 
management the use of computer systems is required. Decision Support System for crisis management 
should be effective and efficient. 
The objective of this chapter was to present a vulnerability model-based Decision aiding. Every component of 
the architecture is described. The proposed decision process is particularly suitable for infrastructure network 
failure management. It includes all the steps of the crisis management. It allows an estimation of infrastructure 
network vulnerability taking into account interdependences. Thus it is possible to deduce among other 
vulnerable areas, critical components and the most threatened stakes. As future work, we hope to deploy this 
application on the internet and on mobile devices (smartphone, tablet). To validate our study, we applied it on 
two case studies presented in the next section. 
 135 
 
CHAPTER IV  
CASES STUDY 
Résumé en français 
Ce chapitre présente les cas d’études. Nous avons dans un premier temps générer un cas d’étude avec 
suffisamment de possibilités pour tester les modèles décrits dans les deux précédents chapitres. Nous avons 
pris soin de les rendre les plus réalistes possible. Dans un premier temps nous avons procéder à une 
simulation manuelle sur des cas simplistes. Puis nous avons utilisé des programmes pour des cas complexes 
pour finir avec l’outil développé. Nous avons poursuivi notre démarche de validation en appliquant le modèle 
à un cas réel. La ville de Lourdes a été choisie pour les enjeux qu’elle représente en termes d’image de la 
nation. En effet, Lourdes est une ville de pèlerinage située dans une zone à haute sismicité. Conscient de 
cette situation, les autorités ont entrepris une démarche de réduction de la vulnérabilité de la ville. 
L’application de notre modèle à la ville a permis de faire des propositions d’actions préventives. 
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“I decided that it was not wisdom that enabled poets to write their poetry, but a kind of instinct or inspiration, 
such as you find in seers and prophets who deliver all their sublime messages without knowing in the least 
what they mean” 
Socrates 
 
 
"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But, in practice, there is" 
Jan van de Sneptscheut 
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INTRODUCTION 
Once the models have been defined, the validation is a crucial step. One way to validate is to perform a case 
study which is the objective of this chapter. It presents two case studies. The first one is an example with 
sufficient elements to test the models described in the two previous chapters. We took care to make them the 
most realistic possible. At first, we carried out a manual simulation on simplistic cases. Then we used 
programs for complex cases to finish eventually with the developed tool. We continued our validation 
approach in applying the model to a real case. The city of Lourdes was chosen because of its geographical 
situation which makes it particularly vulnerable to earthquakes. Indeed, Lourdes is in a high seismicity area. 
Aware of this situation, the authorities have undertaken a process of reducing the city vulnerability. The 
application of our model to the city aimed at making proposals of preventive actions. 
I.9: GENERATED CASE STUDY 
In this chapter the case study is a generic network presented in Figure ‎IV-1. The aim here is to validate the 
model shown in ‎Chapter II. The network is hosted by two territories T1 and T2. 
 
Figure ‎IV-1: Case study 
Two generic flows circulate in the networks: Flow A (red) and flow B (green). Flows are supposed to be 
discrete. The network is composed of two source nodes (3) and (5); five relay nodes (1), (2), (4), (6), (7) and 
three target nodes (8), (9) and (10). Source nodes produce flows. Target nodes are flow destinations. The 
number on each flow corresponds to its quantity. For instance there are 2 types of flow A (red) in the relay 
node (6). The network provides two stakes: a firm (S1) and a human stake (S2). Each of them consumes 5 
flows A per second and 1 flow B per second. All components of the network (nodes and edges) can resist 
over 5 degrees earthquake on Richter scale. Their storage capability is 5 flows A and 5 flows B. For source 
nodes, production capacities are 5 flows A per second and 1 flow B per second. The node (7) is positioned 
under sea level. Water is retained by a barrier. 
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IV.1.1 CONTEXT 
Because of edge weight depends on the environment, the methodology begins then by its identification. In 
many realistic situations, infrastructure networks provide many territories. Territory might be a city or a 
country. As a rule, territories are administratively independent. For this reason its specificities are determined. 
Flows circulate in network according to many rules. Otherwise many of their characteristics influence network 
vulnerability. These characteristics and parameters are analysed. 
Robustness and resilience analysis are performed for one or many feared events. According to its frequency 
and amplitude, damage is more or less important. So, feared event assessment is described. Feared event 
might encounter some factors that can mitigate or aggravate them. For example, a dam or a barrier prevents 
territory from flood but if it comes to rupture the consequences can be worse than the impact of the flood itself. 
The way of taking them into account is indicated. 
From these elements, network good functioning is determined by a nominal state. Feared event will affect the 
system and drop it in a new state. From these states, the vulnerability assessment through robustness and 
resilience is investigated. Next sections present how to integrate all these parameters and their attributes in 
the models. Parameters consist in environment, Territory, Flow, Mitigation and aggravation factors and feared 
events. 
The following section discusses how the working environment influences the network model. 
 Environment 
Figure ‎IV-1 shows weighted edges. Edge weight is indicated by a number. For example the weight of the 
edge (7)-(1) is 5. The notation (7)-(1) stands for the edge between node (7) and node (1). Weight might be 
geodesic distance between nodes, or any relevant criteria for the analysis (cost, time). For instance, in French 
power grid distribution, the cost depends on the period (less expensive in the night) and the weather 
conditions (rain, snow, sun…). Edges weight obtained by environment parameters aggregation is out of the 
scope of this thesis. Edge weight determines the flow circulation. Because of this fact, environment affects the 
resulting robustness and reliability. Network might be hosted by many territories administratively independent. 
Territory attributes influencing the model are presented in the next section. 
 Territory 
Territory is the geographic area gathering the other elements. Many territories might be provided by a single 
network. Territories are administratively independent. Decisions taken by one of them might be different or 
even contradictory to others. Hence the need to separate them is crucial. Territory is characterized by its 
limits, decision makers, set of actions, feared event and a stretch. The stretch of one element is its influence 
area. In this case study, territories stretches are respectively 10,000,000 m2, and 5,000,000 m2. They are 
threatened by an earthquake. 
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Territory networks are supported by flows circulation. Their parameters are presented in the next section. 
 Flow 
In the case study, the speed of flow A is 3 units per second. The speed of flow B is 1 unit per second. The 
circulation flow is described as following: 
 Path of flow B produced in (3) is: (3)(2)(4)(8)(S2); 
 Path of flow B produced in (5) is: (5)(1)(9)(S1); 
 The 5 flows A produced in (3) are distributed in five different paths: 
o  (3) (2) (7) (9) (S1); 
o  (3) (2) (7) (1) (9) (S1); 
o  (3) (2) (8) (S2); 
o (3) (2) (4) (8) (S2); 
o  (3) (2) (4) (6) (10) (S2). 
 The 5 flow A produced in (5) are distributed in two paths: 
o Two flows follow the path (5) (6) (10) (S2); 
o Three flows follow (5) (1) (9) (S1). 
Networks and flows are affected by events such as natural disasters. Modelling of these feared events is 
discussed in the next section. 
 Feared events 
Feared event is characterized by some parameters: Amplitude, frequency, propagation speed, surface, 
duration, and occurrence point. One earthquake is considered in the case study. Its parameters are shown in  
Table ‎IV-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table ‎IV-1: Feared event parameters 
From its occurrence point, feared event is situated at 1,000 meters from node (7), 3,000 meters from nodes 
(4) - (1); 2,500 meters from edge (2)-(7); 2,800 meters from edge (2)-(4). 
Earthquake 
Amplitude 4 
Frequency 0,128 
extent 5000000 m2 
Speed 1000 m/s 
Duration 1000 ms 
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From its occurrence point to the network, hazard might encounter aggravation or mitigation factors. Attributes 
of these factors to be integrated in the model are presented in the following section. 
 Mitigation or aggravations factors 
In the case study, the barrier nearby node (7) is an aggravation factor (A). Parameters of this factor are given 
in Table ‎IV-2. This aggravation factor would increase the feared event amplitude of 2 points (+2) in a radius of 
10 meters. From its position only node (7) is in its area. 
 
 
 
 
Table ‎IV-2: Aggravation factor parameters 
From the initial state, a simulation is performed. The final state obtained is presented in next section. 
IV.1.2 SYSTEM FINAL STATE 
Final state is obtained after feared event occurrence. In the case study, when the feared event is initiated it 
will affect only node (7) in one second. Node (7) could resist the feared event amplitude. But because of the 
aggravation factor, the amplitude is rolled up to 6 to the feared event amplitude is added the aggravation 
factor amplitude (4+2). Node (7) will then break down after 1 second simulation. 
At time t=2s the edge (2)-(7) will be over its maximum capacity in flow and will break down. Extra flows   are 
redistributed on the edges (2)-(8) and (2)-(4). A new full blast obtained after 6s simulation is shown in 
Figure ‎IV-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
Amplitude 2 
extent 10 m 
Type Feared event amplitude 
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Figure ‎IV-2: Network after feared event occurence 
It can be observed that the network structure has changed as well as repartition, and stake consumption. 
Initially, the consumption of the stake S1 and S2 were 5 flows A and 1 flow B. After the feared event 
occurrence, this consumption is now: 
 For Stake S1: 3 flows A and 1 flow B; 
 For Stake S2: 7 flows A and 1 flow B. 
From the initial state and the final state, the vulnerability assessment is given in the next section. 
IV.1.3 RESULTS 
Table ‎IV-3 shows simulation results for the case study. These numbers are obtained from Figure ‎IV-1 (State 
E1) and Figure ‎IV-2 (State E2) on formula given in ‎II.1.8. 
Component 
E1 E2 
RbA RbB Rb t1 t2 Rs vul 
A B A B 
Nodes 1   1   1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Nodes 2   1   1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Nodes 3 5 1 5 1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Nodes 4 2 1 3 1 0,8 1 0,8 6 0 1 0,2 
Nodes 5 5 1 5 1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Nodes 6 2   2   1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Nodes 7         1 1 1 1 5 0,166 0,83 
Nodes 8 1 1 4 1 0,4 1 0,4 6 0 1 0,6 
Nodes 9 5 1 3 1 0,75 1 0,75 6 0 1 0,25 
Nodes 10     1   0 1 0 6 0 1 1 
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Edge (3)-(2)         1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (2)-(7) 2       0 1 0 2 4 0,33 1 
Edge (7)-(9) 1       0 1 0 1 5 0,16 1 
Edge (7)-(1) 1       0 1 0 1 5 0,16 1 
Edge (1)-(9) 4 3 3 3 0,85 1 0,86 6 0 1 0,14 
Edge (9)-(S1)         1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (2)-(8) 2   4   0,66 1 0,67 6 0 1 0,33 
Edge (8)-(S2)         1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (2)-(4)   1   1 1 1 1 6   1 0 
Edge (4)-(8)   1   1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (4)-(6)         1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (6)-(10)         1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (10)-(S2)         1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (5)-(6) 2   2   1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
Edge (5)-(1)   1   1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 
S1 5 1 3 1 0,75 1 0,75 6 0 1 0,25 
S2 5 1 7 1 0,83 1 0,83 6 0 1 0,17 
 
Table ‎IV-3: Results 
From the Table ‎IV-3 many observations could be made: 
 A robust and resilient component will be non-vulnerable. This is the case of many components: node 
(1), node (2), node (3); 
 If a component is non-robust or non-resilient then it is vulnerable: Nodes (4), (7), (8) and (9) for 
instance; 
 Stakes are supposed to resist to feared events, then their robustness might be different from 1 
because of the flow circulation. For stake S1, the consumption in flow A is dropped from 5 to 3. 
Consumption of stake 2 for the same flow has increased from 5 to 7. For both of them the difference 
between initial and final flow is 2. But the result shows that S1 is more vulnerable than S2. Indeed 
lack of flux induces more vulnerability than a flow surplus. That demonstrates that extra flow in a 
component is a vulnerability source. 
 Flows determine network dynamic. So flow dynamic robustness will have some sense. For this 
reason, they are supposed to be dynamically robust. 
 
 
 Cases Study 
143 
 
I.10: LOURDES CASE STUDY 
This chapter is an application of the model to a real case. The selected city is Lourdes, in the “Hautes-
Pyrénées” (France). Indeed, the Hautes-Pyrénées lies in the highest seismic area in the French metropolitan 
country. The Midi-Pyrénées region and more particularly the Pyrenees departments are concerned by a 
possible occurrence of an earthquake. An earthquake of magnitude 6, could generate significant damage. 
Such disaster is reasonably foreseeable in the department without being able to situate it in time and space. 
Because it is not possible to predict the location and date of earthquakes, the only answer seems to be the 
prevention in terms of making the considered system more tolerant to the occurrence of such an event. 
Earthquake plan priorities are people information, control of compliance with earthquake-resistant construction 
rules, training of health care structures and emergency plan preparation. It was launched at the national level 
and declined on the chain of the Pyrenees. The Hautes-Pyrénées were selected to be pilot of this 
implementation. Unfortunately the only prevention is not sufficient to eliminate the risk of large-scale disaster. 
Without wanting to compare with the tragic events in Haiti who are in a very different context from that 
considered in this thesis, a parallel can be made with the recent earthquake that occurred in Italy (6.3 on the 
Richter scale). The occurrence of such a catastrophe in the Pyrenean is not at all unthinkable. 
This section aims to estimate the vulnerability of Lourdes city situated in a high seismic area. Lourdes is a 
pilgrimage city since 1858 which may amplify the dramatic character of the consequences in case of the 
occurrence of a seism. As an illustration the city hosted during the 150th anniversary of the Virgin apparition 
nearby 70,000 pilgrims per day. Among the different topics of concern, the city wishes to analyse the 
vulnerability of the sewage network. 
IV.1.4 DATA COLLECTION 
Data structure collected in this case study is those presented in the previous chapter. It was realised with the 
help of the city of Lourdes and specialised databases. Data includes decision makers, the recorded feared 
event, mitigation and aggravation factors, infrastructure, flow, stake and the external environment. Part of 
these elements is presented in the followings sections. 
 Decision makers’ identification 
The section ‎III.1.1.4 underlined the importance of decision maker identification. In the case of the city of 
Lourdes, there are many entities involved in the decision making process. The aim here is not to list all 
individual and authorities that might influence decision in crisis situation. We only investigated the specific 
area of decision induced by infrastructure network failure in the context of natural disaster. In this case there 
are two decision makers: 
 The analyst: we played the role of the analyst. But very often, the city appeals external competence 
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such as specialized institution. For instance, the National Institute of industrial Environment and 
Risks realized the analysis after a flood in June 2013; 
 The Departmental Direction of Equipment: This direction is in charge of equipment administration in 
the department. It deals with the realisation of many studies related to risk and vulnerability analysis. 
Thanks to them we were provided with seismic maps of the city, and put in contact with the network 
managers; 
It can be said about these identified decision makers that they are mostly involved in the analytic part of the 
decision. Decision maker who really takes decision in crisis situation are sometimes not clearly identified. This 
leads us to the first problem of crisis management. 
Problem 1 :Who is able to take the right decision in a crisis situation? 
 The city of Lourdes: In this case study, the city of Lourdes is in charge of the application of every 
decision whether at regional or national levels. Some institutions such as the ministry of Ecology 
could be also involved in the crisis management. 
 The feared event 
Feared event determination is at the heart of vulnerability analysis. Most of them aim to determine effect of 
events on stakes. The case of Lourdes is quite similar to this situation. In fact the city is situated in a high 
seismic area. Figure ‎IV-3 shows a seismic zoning of the Lourdes regions. This zoning is determined by the 
French office on Geological and Mineral Research (BRGM). It is based among other on the geological 
structure. We can see that Lourdes is situated in the high seismic zone (4 on a scale of 5). This card has been 
validated by the French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development. (art. D. 563-8-1 of the environment 
code 01/05/2011). 
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Figure ‎IV-3: Midi-Pyrenées Seismic zoning 
The city has been in the seat of many seismic events these recent years. Flood and weak amplitude seism 
are the main events. Table ‎IV-4 shows some earthquakes that happened in Lourdes these past years. 
Date Hour Epicentre localisation 
Epicentre 
Intensity  
Intensity in 
Lourdes 
11/15/2007  13h47 min 35 sec BIGORRE (E. ARGELES-GAZOST) 5 4 
11/17/2006 18 h 19 min 50 sec BIGORRE (GAZOST) 6 6 
01/21/2003 18 h 1 min 1 sec  OSSAU (LOUVIE-JUZON) 5 3 
12/11/2002 20 h 9 min 53 sec OSSAU (ARUDY) 5 2 
09/05/2002 20 h 42 min 16 sec OSSAU (ARUDY) 5 3 
 
Table ‎IV-4: Earthquakes in Lourdes Region 
There are many approaches to determine feared events to be taken into account. But for this study, the city of 
Lourdes wishes to analyse the city vulnerability against earthquake. The choice is suggested. But in many 
cases, it is not. The analysis may find out the appropriate feared event. One will have to determine if feared 
events including or excluding the system internal failure. 
Problem 2: In the context of the analysis, what are the events to be included, how to identify them? 
For the city of Lourdes, we suggested an analysis for an earthquake of 8 on Richter scale. That corresponds 
to the maximum amplitude recorded since 1660. This earthquake occurred in Bigorre (Juncalas) the 
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03/24/1750 at 22h. The location and the propagation speed would be hazardous in the simulation. From its 
position on the Figure ‎IV-3 Lourdes is situated in a middle seismic area. For such area the period of an 
earthquake of 8 is between 75 to 250 years. We have chosen the minimal period of 75 years. The simulation 
will be performed for 100 years. We supposed that the worst case will correspond to a double occurrence of 
the earthquake. When it occurs it will affect components within a circular perimeter of 12 kilometres across, 
with a speed of 6 meters per second. 
 Mitigation and aggravation factors 
On the territory of the city, we did not identify any relevant factors. In fact, Lourdes is a small city of 36.4 
square kilometres. Because of this small size it does not host infrastructure that could be considered as 
aggravation facture. 
 Territory 
The only territory considered is the city of Lourdes itself. They are no interest to divide it. But in the context of 
interdependent network, we faced the following problem: 
Problem 3: What is the limit of the territory to be included in the analysis? 
 Infrastructure 
This analysis is about sewage network. The Autocad map of this network was provided by the city of Lourdes. 
The sewage network is represented in red; the green is the rain network. The network in magenta is a 
secondary network for both sewage and rain. 
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Figure ‎IV-4 : Lourdes networks 
The network in Figure ‎IV-4 consists in outlet pipes, pumping stations, water treatment plants, and manholes. 
Reliability of these components was not provided by the owner of the network. We supposed that the reliability 
of these components is 0.9 for the simulation time, their mean time to repair 24 hours and they could resist 
over 7 amplitude earthquake on Richter scale. These values are fictive. That leads to the following problem. 
Problem 4: What influence date relevancy could have on the result? 
 Flow 
Flow considered in this analysis is sewage. The circulation direction is imposed by the network structure. The 
unit is the cubic metre. The city consumed approximately 3 millions of cubic metre of water every year. The 
capacity of pumping stations, water treatment plants is 7, 000 cubic metre (700 cubic metre per hour). The 
speed is supposed to be 3 meter per second. 
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 Stake 
After some interviews with the authorities of Lourdes city, we decided to focus on the human stake. This 
decision was taken because pilgrims represent a wide population. The city is full of 16,000 people. But it hosts 
every year nearly 6 million of pilgrims or tourists for which approximately 60,000 are sick or invalids. This 
reason justified the choice of population as the main stake in our model. 
 External Environment 
We did not include the external environment. The environment consists among others of the effect of weather 
on the infrastructure and flow circulation. Its influence is not that considerable. Another reason was the time 
constraint. We did not have enough time for modelling this influence. This analysis leads to the following 
problem. 
Problem 5: From the vulnerability model to its implementation in a case study how to estimate the 
project duration? How many resources must be allocated? 
Results of the simulation are presented now. 
IV.1.5 RESULTS 
We have modelled part of the network in a software called VESTA. First, we imported a map edited by Google 
map and drawn the network on this image (Figure ‎IV-5). 
 
 
Figure ‎IV-5: Lourdes network modelling 
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After a simulation, the results are shown in the following table. 
Component S1 S2 t1 t2 Rb Rs v 
Nodes 1 700 700 98 2 1 0,98 0,02 
Nodes 2 700 500 70 30 0,83 0,7 0,42 
Nodes 3 300 400 100 0 0,85 1 0,14 
Nodes 4 300 300 45 55 1 0,45 0,55 
Nodes 5 300 300 99 1 1 0,99 0,01 
Nodes 6 500 600 100 0 0,90 1 0,09 
Nodes 7 700 700 68 32 1 0,68 0,32 
Nodes 8 200 300 23 77 0,80 0,23 0,82 
Nodes 9 100 0 56 44 0 0,56 1 
Nodes 10 100 0 94 6 0 0,94 1 
Nodes 11 200 100 71 29 0,66 0,71 0,53 
Nodes 12 100 100 98 2 1 0,98 0,02 
Nodes 13 200 200 81 19 1 0,81 0,19 
Nodes 14 400 500 97 3 0,88 0,97 0,14 
Nodes 15 500 500 45 55 1 0,45 0,55 
Nodes 16 600 600 78 22 1 0,78 0,22 
Nodes 17 700 600 22 78 0,92 0,22 0,8 
Nodes 18 200 100 59 41 0,66 0,59 0,61 
Nodes 19 200 300 89 11 0,8 0,89 0,29 
Nodes 20 100 100 44 56 1 0,44 0,56 
Nodes 21 100 200 94 6 0,66 0,94 0,37 
Nodes 22 50 100 27 73 0,66 0,27 0,82 
Nodes 23 50 0 78 22 0 0,78 1 
Nodes 24 100 0 89 11 0 0,89 1 
Nodes 25 200 200 32 68 1 0,32 0,68 
Edge(1)-(2) 700 600 55 45 0,92 0,55 0,49 
Edge(2)-(0) 700 500 70 30 0,83 0,7 0,42 
Edge(3)-(4) 300 400 30 70 0,85 0,3 0,74 
Edge(4)-(5) 300 300 90 10 1 0,9 0,1 
Edge(5)-(6) 300 300 97 3 1 0,97 0,03 
Edge(6)-(7) 500 600 92 8 0,90 0,92 0,16 
Edge(8)-(6) 200 300 84 16 0,8 0,84 0,33 
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Edge(9)-(10) 100 0 81 19 0 0,81 1 
Edge(10)-(11) 100 0 21 79 0 0,21 1 
Edge(11)-(7) 200 100 99 1 0,66 0,99 0,34 
Edge(12)-(11) 100 100 98 2 1 0,98 0,02 
Edge(13)-(14) 200 200 92 8 1 0,92 0,08 
Edge(14)-(15) 400 500 93 7 0,88 0,93 0,17 
Edge(15)-(16) 500 500 68 32 1 0,68 0,32 
Edge(16)-(17) 600 500 17 83 0,90 0,17 0,85 
Edge(18)-(15) 100 0 9 91 0 0,09 1 
Edge(18)-(16) 0 100 29 71 0 0,29 1 
Edge(19)-(14) 200 300 46 54 0,80 0,46 0,63 
Edge(25)-(13) 200 200 99 1 1 0,99 0,01 
Edge(21)-(25) 100 200 99 1 0,66 0,99 0,34 
Edge(24)-(25) 100 200 96 4 0,66 0,96 0,36 
Edge(23)-(20) 50 0 2 98 0 0,02 1 
Edge(22)-(20) 50 100 86 14 0,66 0,86 0,43 
Edge(20)-(17) 100 100 79 21 1 0,79 0,21 
Stake 2000 2200 100 0 0,95 1 0,05 
 
Figure ‎IV-6: Results of the Lourdes case study 
Results in this table confirmed those of the generated study. With the initial parameters, components 9, 10, 
23, 24, (9)-(10), (10)-(11), (18)-(15), (18)-(16), (23)-(20) are the most vulnerable. This is because at the end of 
the simulation any flow passes through these components. However, for (23)-(20) is fully vulnerable because 
of the fact that it has any flow at the beginning of the simulation. The less vulnerable components are 1, 5 and 
(25)-(13). This is because of the feared event occurrence point. In fact, these components are far away from 
the occurrence point. These results could be displayed in one of the forms presented in the ‎III.1.12. The 
following figure shows the vulnerability per component. 
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Figure ‎IV-7: Vulnerability of Lourdes network components 
These results despite their none-realism are quite satisfying. They could be more relevant with real data. 
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate the application of the models introduced in the previous chapters. 
First, we generated a case study taking into account all the parameters of the model. Second, we applied the 
model to a real case: the city of Lourdes. This second phase was the most difficult. Difficulties are related 
mainly to the data acquisition. In fact for the selected network, this latter is the property of “Veolia eau”. Veolia 
did not want to provide us with data about its network for public thesis. The alternative was to generate the 
missing ones. We then researched in public database on internet. The selected values are much closed to the 
reality. The main problem is the similarity of component parameters. We selected the same value for similar 
component. These values could be very different in reality. The implementation of the model in these case 
study revealed some problems summarized below: 
 Decision maker identification; 
 Feared event selection; 
 Territory limitation; 
 Data relevancy; 
 Environment effect assessment. 
These problems highlight the limits of our models. In spite of this, this chapter showed the importance of flows 
circulation and the interdependences of dynamic factors. 
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"In all things the end is the essential" Aristotle  
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General conclusion 
These days, natural disasters are becoming more and more frequent and devastating. A deficit of scientific 
work has been highlighted to manage a crisis situation linked to the occurrence of disasters disrupting 
infrastructure networks. For instance, following a serious earthquake, it has been estimated at approximately 
5 days the time limit for the emergency response to save human lives. The organization at this level is crucial. 
Every organization is strongly disturbed by network disruption that may be affected or rendered unusable after 
the feared event. In this exceptional situation, decisions must be taken quickly. The efficiency of these 
decisions depends on the models used. The objective of this thesis was to determine a vulnerability model 
allowing a crisis management in the context on infrastructure networks affected by natural disasters. The 
scientific problem dealt with: 
 The modeling of interdependent critical infrastructure; 
 The analysis of structural and functional vulnerability; 
 The correlation between the feared event intensity and damages to the stakes; 
 The establishment of a decision aiding methodology; 
 The prototyping of a Decision Support System. 
 Contribution 
The contribution in this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 Literature review on vulnerability and decision aiding; 
 Identification of component influencing the vulnerability analysis; 
 Definition and modelling of interdependences; 
 Vulnerability modelling; 
 Determination of crisis management components; 
 Elaboration of a decision aiding process; 
 Characterisation of Decision Support System for disaster management; 
 Building a prototype of a Decision Support System; 
 Identification of implementation problem from the model to a real case; 
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We began by a literature review according the two points of views pointed out in the introduction, that is: A 
vulnerability model especially designed for decision aiding in the situation of a crisis management. We 
analysed and differentiated the analysis of vulnerability and the analysis of risk. This literature review allowed 
us to identify the elements to be integrated in our future model. The objective was to answer the question: 
what are the interacting elements which could make a stake vulnerable or not vulnerable? Two kinds of 
components, one considered as static, the other as dynamic, aroused from the analysis: Dynamic factors are 
responsible of interdependences inside the global system. We then investigated the interdependence notion. 
We pointed out in particular a functional part representing the dependence relationship and a dysfunctional 
part standing for the influence connexion. The challenge was to integrate these concepts in the network 
modelling by using graph theory. The proposed modelling approach takes into account every possible 
configuration of the network. Then, we proposed a vulnerability assessment model. With this model, it is 
possible to determine the vulnerability of a component, or that of an entire network. This model confirms the 
point of view of many authors, which consider that vulnerability is composed of robustness and resilience. 
Vulnerability assessment is not and end in itself. It must lead to a decision. Consequently every component of 
a decision in a crisis context has been identified and described. The suggested process can be used in 
various identified crisis situation. This process includes the multicriteria aggregation method to be used. With 
the objective to provide the decider with a computer-aided tool, we characterized a Decision Support System 
and built a prototype. This prototype does not implement all the functionalities, but is under progress. The last 
contribution in this thesis was to point out all problems that occurred while implementing the model in a real 
case. With our contributions decision makers could find some answer element to the following questions: 
 What is to be feared?: event, scenario, system configuration; 
 What is vulnerable?: single component, network, stake, territory; 
 What can be done?: action on one or many element(s) of the global system; 
 How it could be done?: Decision process, aggregation approach; 
These results lead to some perspectives in the next section. 
 Perspectives 
Results pointed out in this thesis are quite satisfying. But they could be enhanced through some elements of 
perspective summarized in the following: 
 Using Multi Agent System for a wide simulation; 
 Deployment of the software on internet and mobile devices; 
 Using collaboration between Decision Makers; 
 Integration of direct impact of feared event on stakes; 
 Integration of the component failure mode after the occurrence of the feared event. 
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The use of Multi Agent System approach seems to be indicated to more than one title. In the context of this 
thesis, an agent could be seen as an autonomous computer module which is able to take decisions in an 
uncertain environment. From this point of view, different elements of the model could be considered as 
interacting agents. This will promote the emergence of new structure in the network. These structures are not 
directly accessible to human analysis. On another hand, the use of Multi Agent System offers the possibility of 
determining actions while Decision Makers are themselves affected by the feared event. This situation is 
unfortunately very common in natural disaster. Another point to mention is that the Multi-Agent approach is 
suitable for simulating Complex Systems and a vulnerability model could be seen as a Complex System. 
We have already highlighted the importance of the software distribution. By distribution, we mean 
geographical one. Software located at different places seems to be less vulnerable than when it is located in a 
single place. Moreover, its use and survivability will be greater when deployed on tablet and mobile devices. 
At this level, the software can be built in a collaborative way. For instance the users can determine the exact 
localisation of aggravation factor, the affected component etc. 
In this thesis we were interested only on indirect effect of feared events. Our model could be enhanced by 
taking into account the direct impact on stakes. In real situation direct impact are often those which are 
investigated. Moreover, component failure is not binary. Feared event effect is related to component failure 
mode. An affected component will resist or not according to its structure. We plan to incorporate in our model 
parameters such as testability, detectability, Integrated Logistics Support etc. 
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Conclusion générale 
De nos jours, les catastrophes naturelles sont de plus en plus nombreuses, fréquentes et dévastatrices. Le 
déficit du travail scientifique pour gérer une situation de crise liée à la l’occurrence de catastrophes perturbant 
les réseaux d'infrastructures a été mis en évidence. Il est prouvé que suite à un grand tremblement de terre, il 
y a environ 5 jours de délai pour l'intervention d'urgence afin de sauver des vies humaines. L'organisation à 
ce niveau est cruciale. Chaque institution peut être perturbée par une défaillance réseau due à la catastrophe. 
Dans cette situation exceptionnelle, les décisions doivent être prises rapidement. L'efficacité de ces décisions 
dépend des modèles utilisés pour déterminer les vulnérabilités. L'objectif de cette thèse était de déterminer un 
tel modèle de vulnérabilité afin de favoriser une gestion de crise dans un contexte de catastrophes naturelles 
affectant les réseaux d'infrastructures. Nous avons traité les problématiques scientifiques suivantes : 
 Modélisation des infrastructures critiques interdépendants ; 
 Modélisation des interdépendances ; 
 Analyse de la vulnérabilité structurelle et fonctionnelle ; 
 Corrélation entre un évènement redouté et les dommages-causés aux enjeux ; 
 Mise en place d'un processus de décision pour le management de la vulnérabilité ; 
 Prototypage d'un Système Interactif d’Aide à la Décision. 
 Contribution 
La contribution dans cette thèse peut être résumée comme suit : 
 État de l’art de la vulnérabilité et de l’aide à la décision ; 
 Identification des composants qui influencent l'analyse de la vulnérabilité ; 
 Définition et modélisation des interdépendances ; 
 Proposition d’un modèle de la vulnérabilité ; 
 Détermination des composantes de la gestion des crises ; 
 Élaboration d'un processus de décision facilitant la gestion de la crise ; 
 Caractérisation du Système Interactif d’Aide à la Décision ; 
 Construction d'un prototype du système d’aide à la décision ; 
 Identification des problèmes lors du passage du modèle au cas réel ; 
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Nous avons commencé par une revue de la littérature selon deux points de vue, comme indiqué dans 
l'introduction - à savoir : Modèle de vulnérabilité pour aider à la prise de décision suite à une crise de 
catastrophe. Nous avons analysé la vulnérabilité et l’avons différenciée du risque. Cet état de l’art a permis 
d'identifier les éléments à intégrer dans notre futur modèle. L'objectif était de répondre à la question : Quels 
sont les éléments qui interagissent et qui pourraient rendre un élément vulnérable ou non vulnérables ? Deux 
types de composantes ont émergés. La première statique, et la seconde dynamique. Les facteurs 
dynamiques sont responsables des interdépendances à l'intérieur du système global. Ensuite, nous avons 
investi la notion d'interdépendance. Nous avons identifié une partie fonctionnelle qui représente la relation de 
dépendance et une partie dysfonctionnelle se rapportant à l'influence. Le défi était d'intégrer ces notions dans 
la modélisation des réseaux à l'aide de la théorie des graphes. L'approche de modélisation que nous avons 
proposée prend en compte toutes les configurations possibles des réseaux d’infrastructure. Ensuite, nous 
avons proposé un modèle d'évaluation de la vulnérabilité. Avec ce modèle, il est possible de déterminer entre 
autres la vulnérabilité d'un composant ou celle du réseau entier. Il modèle confirme le point de vue de 
nombreux auteurs, à savoir que la vulnérabilité est composée de robustesse et de résilience. L’évaluation de 
la vulnérabilité n'étant pas une fin en soi, elle doit conduire à la décision. Par conséquent, chaque composant 
de la décision dans un contexte de crise a été identifié et décrit. Le processus proposé peut être utilisé dans 
divers situation de crise identifié. Il fait référence à la méthode multicritère d'agrégation la mieux adaptée. 
Dans le but de fournir aux décideurs un outil informatique, nous avons caractérisé les Systèmes Interactifs 
d’Aide à la Décision et construit un prototype. Ce prototype n'implémente pas toutes les fonctionnalités. Il est 
toujours en cours de développement à la rédaction de ce manuscrit. La dernière contribution dans cette thèse 
a été de signaler tous les problèmes qui se sont produites dans l’application du modèle au cas réel. Avec 
notre contribution les décideurs trouverons des éléments de réponse aux questions suivantes : 
 Qu’est ce qui est à craindre?: événement, scénario, configuration du système ; 
 Qu’est ce qui est vulnérable?: simple composant, réseau, enjeu, territoire ; 
 Que peut-on faire?: action sur un ou plusieurs élément (s) du système global ; 
 Comment on peut on le faire?: les processus de décision, l'approche d'agrégation ; 
Ces résultats conduisent à certaine perspectives dans la section suivante. 
 Perspectives 
Les résultats obtenus dans cette thèse sont tout à fait satisfaisants. Mais ils pourraient être améliorés par le 
biais de certains éléments de nos perspectives résumé dans ce qui suit : 
 Utilisation de système Multi Agent pour une simulation de grande échelle ; 
 Déploiement de l’outil sur l'internet et dans les appareils mobiles ; 
 Intégration de la collaboration entre les décideurs ; 
 159 
 
 Prise en compte de l'impact direct de l'événement redouté sur les enjeux ; 
 Intégration de la mode de défaillance du composant après l'occurrence de l'événement redouté. 
L'utilisation de l'approche Multi Agent semble indiquée à plus d’un titre. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, un 
agent pourrait être considéré comme un module informatique autonome et capable de prendre des décisions 
dans un environnement incertain. De ce point de vue, les éléments du modèle pourraient être considérés 
comme des agents interagissant. Cela favorisera l'émergence de nouvelles structures dans le réseau. Ces 
structures ne sont pas directement accessibles par analyse humaine. En outre, l'utilisation de système Multi 
Agent offre la possibilité de déterminer des actions alors que les décideurs sont eux-mêmes touchés par 
l'événement redouté. Cette situation est malheureusement très fréquente en cas de catastrophe naturelle. Un 
autre point à mentionner est que l'approche multi-agents est adaptée pour la simulation des systèmes 
complexes et un modèle de vulnérabilité peut être considéré comme un système complexe. 
Nous l'avons déjà souligné l'importance de la distribution de logiciels. Par distribution, nous entendons la 
répartition géographique. Un logiciel situé à différents endroits semble être moins vulnérable que lorsqu'il est 
situé dans un endroit unique. En outre, son utilisation et sa capacité de survie sera plus grande lorsqu'il est 
déployé sur tablette et appareils mobiles. À ce niveau, le logiciel peut être construit de manière collaborative. 
Par exemple, les utilisateurs peuvent déterminer la localisation exacte des facteurs d'aggravation, des 
composants affectés etc. 
Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes intéressés seulement à l'effet indirect des événements redoutés. Notre 
modèle pourrait être améliorée en prenant en compte l'impact direct sur les enjeux. Dans les situations 
réelles, ce sont les effets directs qui sont souvent investis. En outre, la défaillance d'un composant n'est pas 
binaire. L’effet de l’événement redouté est lié au mode de défaillance du composant. Un composant affecté 
résistera ou non en fonction de sa structure. 
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ANNEXES 
 
